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the Antwerp University Institution (Universitaire Instelling Antwerpen), 
who carefully and critically reread the manuscript, and to Hiss M.R. Verhegghe, 
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E.W. CHAPTER I 
THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATION: 
"CONTROL OF SECURITIES MARKETS" 
1. This report describes and analyses the different forms in which - and 
the instruments whereby - control of securities markets is exercised. 
2. Among the many meanings which can be attached to the term "control" we 
are thinking primarily of the methods and techniques which are employed 
to enforce compliance with a norm or standard, whatever its nature, to 
exercise supervision with regard to compliance and, finally, to impose 
sanctions in the event of infringement. No distinction is made in this 
connection with regard to the legal nature of the rule: both those imposed 
by the State and those formulated by professional bodies are included in 
the investigation. Nor is any distinction made according to the objective 
of the norm in question; this is usually many-sided, complex and lacking 
in transparency. Both norms for market organization and rules to protect 
investors, together with instruments of socio-economic policy, and even 
of monetary policy, are touched upon, although attention is directed 
primarily towards the two first-mentioned subjects, which directly affect 
securities business. 
3. Control can also mean the whole body of methods, instruments and techniques 
which are employed in order to intervene in a certain field, organize it 
according to one's views or dominate it. Rather than being taken to mean 
the checking of compliance with the norm, and associated sanctions, 
this connotation of the term "control" calls attention to the phase pre-
ceding the checking or testing, i.e. that of the preparation and enactment 
of these rules. From this point of view the various authorities involved, 
their powers and influence on the securities markets are studied 
in the light of statutory or corporative regulations, and 
in the context of the overall institutional framework. Where they can be scientifically determined, existing conditions which deviate 
from the legal regulations are recorded. It is clear that the facts 
often depart - and in a manner which cannot easily be determined -
from the law. 
Both forms of control can be subsumed under the wide and neutral term 
of "intervention", so that the study embraces both the basic organizational 
intervention by the legislator or public authorities, together with the 
additional enactment of corporative or professional norms, and the checking 
activity with a view to the prevention and suppression of abuses. 
4. The second guiding point of this report is to be found in the subject 
matter to which these interventions are directed, namely the securities 
markets themselves. Any precise definition of this term has been de-
liberately avoided. This makes it possible to embrace the rather divergent 
approaches in the various ;ountries with regard to the protection of in-
vestors, while it has also allowed phenomena occurring on the fringe of 
the security sector to be included in the investigation. 
5. The ultimate object of the intervention is indicated with the 
legally neutral term "security". The term is defined pragmatically in 
order not to impede an accurate understanding of the scope and purpose 
of the regulations. 
Depending on the purport of the regulations, a narrower and a wider 
concept of the term can be distinguished. In the narrower sense it is 
understood to mean: the bonds or loan instruments issued by the State, 
its subordinate authorities or territorial subdivisions; the bonds or 
loan instruments issued by private undertakings, usually operating in the 
form of joint-stock companies, together with shares or stockholdings in 
these companies; and also, usually, certificates representing investment 
funds. A striking point is that national regulations generally do not 
take into account the legal form of the security (whether a document 
of title or not), and that the distinction between securities governed 
by public or private law is not decisive for all matters. Securities in the narrower sense of the term are usually issued in large numbers of 
financially (if not also Legally) mutually interchangeable ("fungible") units: 
as they are thus suited to being dealt in on a stock exchange, they are some-
times also referred to as "marketable securities" or "stock exchange securities". 
In those countries where securities regulation is not only aimed at the 
organization of stock exchanges, and at the accompanying rules for companies 
with securities listed on an exchange, but also seeks to achieve wider pur-
poses of investor protection, the regulatory scope is widened by a technical 
extension of the term "security". The protection of the law is extended to 
cover also investment vehicles which in legal terms cannot, or can only with 
much difficulty of interpretation, be compared with the securities in the 
ordinary, narrower sense, but which, financially speaking, belong to the field 
of financial investments. This extension of the scope has existed for a long 
time in the United States and in Ontario; in the United Kingdom there is a 
comparable definition, and in Belgium these other investment vehicles were 
put on an equal footing with securities in 1969. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany legislation is now under discussion, and the recently published Dutch 
Investment Institution Bill (Ontwerp van Wet Beleggingsinstel lingen) might be 
applicable to some of these investment media (1). 
Only securities markets are studied rather than the whole of the securities 
sector. No attention is paid to the rules on documents of title or concerning 
involuntary loss of possession of bearer instruments, while the legal status 
of the rights, including the rules of company law which have a direct bearing 
on the field of publicly traded securities, is only mentioned incidentally. 
Attention is concentrated on the place where demand for and supply of 
securities meet: rules concerning the placing of securities in safe deposit or 
concerning transfer arrangements or clearing have only a complementary bearing 
on the conduct of the markets. Readers are referred to specialized studies for 
an examination of these fields, the importance of which can not be overestimated. 
(1) For the United States and Canada, see the term "Investment Contract" in s. 2 
(1) Securities Act 1933; cf. a similar provision in the Ontario Securities Act, 
s. (1) (58) of the draft of the Securities Act 1977 (Bill No. 20). 
For the United Kingdom s. 14 (3) Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958; 
for Belgium Arts. 1 and 2, law of 10 July 1969; for the Federal Republic of 
Germany see the Entwurf eines Gesetzes uber den Vertrieb von Anteilen an Vei— 
mogensanlagen, published 19 April 1977; and for the Netherlands see the Be-
palingen betreffende beleggingsinstellingen (Wet beleggingsinstellingen) 
(Provisions concerning investment institutions - Investment Institutions Law), 
Second Chamber 1977, No. 14664; the Japanese Securities Exchange Law 1948 does 
not contain any comparable provision. 8- Following the model of the classification adopted in the literature on 
financial legislation, the investigation in each country is divided according 
to whether the subject under discussion is the issue or primary market or the 
secondary market, i.e. the market for securities which have been already 
issued. This division is relevant, as most regulatory systems adopt 
a different approach to regulations in the primary market from that applied 
to the secondary market. Thus the American Securities Act of 1933 is 
directed to the issue market, while the secondary market, including the 
stock exchange system, is regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
A similar division of the subject-matter is also encountered in Belgium, 
France and Luxembourg, while in other countries stock exchange authorities 
make attempts to gain hold over issuing activity, which in most of these 
countries is practically left unregulated. 
Reservations can be made with regard to this division into two fields, as
 n
t 
can lead to a disregard of the many essential links existing between the 
two segments which really belong to the same market. Emphasis on investor 
protection and more active intervention on issue disclosure can be 
attributed to the presence of regulation on the primary market only in 
Belgium. 
9. This report is mainly descriptive. An effort was made to describe the 
different interventions with regard to the securities markets in as 
complete, accurate and neutral a manner as possible. To clarify certain 
aspects, elements which constitute the main features of a national regulatory 
system have been emphasized. The overall picture may however appear somewhat 
over-streamlined. This method, while respecting the individuality of each 
regulatory system, reveals relevant points of difference. The points of 
convergence deserve more attention: they can provide the starting-point 
for subsequent harmonization. 
This report does not contain qualitative judgments of each control system 
or of the methods of control employed. A qualitative evaluation, tempting 
though it may be, is difficult to formulate in practice, at least with 
any adequate degree of scientific accuracy. On the one hand, there is no relevant yardstick and, on the other hand, 
application of a possibly acceptable method of evaluation would depend on 
the full co-operation of all the parties concerned. Consequently this 
report merely mentions when a certain field is not subject to regulation 
or - as far as possible - when the regulation is in fact not applied. The 
quality of the control will therefore not be determined in a value judgment 
but will emerge from the description of the control itself. 
The material has been updated and processed up to the middle of 1977. 
There are plans for reform in several Member States: in the United Kingdom 
the Wilson Committee is working, in the Federal Republic of Germany work 
is still being done on the implementation of some recommendations of the 
Borsensachverstandigenkommission (committee of stock exchange experts), 
while a new Stock Exchange Law has been under study in the Netherlands for 
several years. More limited changes are being considered in France and 
Belgium. As the orientation and state of progress of these reform activities 
are not yet sufficiently well known, they could not be included in the 
analysis. It was, however, possible to report certain proposals published 
at the end of 1977 for the reform of the Italian stock exchange and security 
system. CHAPTER II 
SYNTHESIS OF THE COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 
SECTION I: THE PRIMARY SECURITIES MARKET 
10. The purpose of the examination of the regulations governing the primary 
securities market is to seek out all forms of intervention in this market, 
whether by government authorities or by corporative or self-regulating 
bodies. An initial survey shows that one can divide these interventions 
into, on the one hand, interventions which can be said to be of a socio-
economic nature and permit the pursuit of more or less temporary aims of 
economic and financial policy and, on the other hand, interventions of a 
more structural nature which determine what is to be regarded, onthe primary 
market, as desirable, permitted or forbidden. 
A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTERVENTIONS 
11. In practically all countries one finds legislation or regulations which 
subject dealings on the primary security market to some form of approval 
or authorization. This is usually crisis legislation dating from one of 
the two World Wars or from the depression of 1929. The government authorities, 
as a rule the minister or his representative,have a very large degree of 
discretion as to whether or not to permit the transaction, so that the 
legislation can be used for a variety of purposes. One can distinguish four 
forms of intervention. 
12. Several Member States have rules whereby capital flows can be influenced 
by the government. Not so much the issuing of securities as the raising of 
capital, in whatever form, constitutes the subject of these regulations. 
All transactions, irrespective of the currency, the amount, or the identity 
or nationality of the parties, can be covered by them. The executive power 
has to authorize or approve the transaction, otherwise the transgressor is 




w exceptions, most capital transactions have been freed from 
this authorization requirement. This has been done by generally applicable 
implementation orders, which can however be changed at once and the 
restrictions immediately reinstated. Both French and British law have 
11 retained the rule whereby all raising of capital, including that effected 
by the public or private issue of securities, is subject to approval by 
the competent minister. These laws form part of the reconstruction measures 
introduced after the Second World War. Nowadays they are practically without 
any real effect, apart from a few cases specified in administrative 
provisions. The purpose of the system is similar in Italy, where the 
establishment of companies and the making of capital increases or issuing 
of bonds by companies are subject to approval by the competent minister, 
actually the central bank. This rule still has considerable effect at 
present, at least for transactions above five hundred million lire. 
13. Other Member States operate with an authorization system confined to the 
public issue of foreign securities. This system can be put to use for 
various purposes, including the aforementioned channelling of capital flows 
into productive domestic investment. In Belgium we find a provision, dating 
back to the First World War, prohibiting the public issue of foreign 
securities, unless permission is granted by the Minister of Finance: per-
mission can be - and is - refused for a very wide variety of reasons 
(including those of isolating the national capital market and of protecting 
investors). 
14. A more up-to-date approach to the same question is to be found in the 
foreign exchange regulations of several Member States. The aforementioned 
legislation regarding authorization for foreign securities, which was 
introduced in France and Belgium during the First World War, has remained 
in existence as an independent provision only in Belgium. In France this 
instrument was transferred to the foreign exchange regulations when the 
Foreign Exchange Law was revised in 1966. No comparable rules, applicable 
to the issue of securities, are to be found either in Italy or in the 
United Kingdom: the general foreign exchange regulations in these countries 
lead to a limitation - complete for Italy and considerable for the United 
12 Kingdom - of the purchase of new or already issued foreign securities by 
residents and of any other securities transaction. The Federal Republic 
of Germany and the Netherlands pursue for the moment an open policy 
with regard to foreign securities issues. But here, too, foreign exchange 
regulations empower the national authorities to intervene at once and 
provide them with the necessary instruments. 
15. A fourth, widespread form of intervention aims at avoiding a situation where-
by new securities issues disturbe the domestic capital market equilibrium. 
These measures do not consist of approvals, but rather of waiting lists, 
issue calendars, reductions of quantity, or of extensions of the issue period. 
Some Member States make use of this instrument in a wider perspective: the 
equilibrium of the capital market can be upset not only by purely quantitative 
overloading but also by the terms offered. Some Member States therefore 
exclude "securities of a type that may disturb the equilibrium" (e.g. Belgium) 
or make recommendations concerning interest rates, issue premiums, life of 
the securities and redemption terms (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg). 
This intervention often appears to be based on informal consultation between 
the authorities (central bank) and the banks which are going to place the 
issue (Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, France, but also the 
United Kingdom). In Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg there is a formal legal 
basis: in Italy this form of supervision of issues is implicitly incorporated 
in the aforementioned power of authorization of the Banca d'ltalia, while in 
Belgium and Luxembourg an express provision vests the Banking Commission or 
"Commissariat au Controle des Banques" with powers for this purpose. 
16. To sum up, the interventions of a socio-economic nature are associated 
mainly with the directing of capital flows, including the sealing-off of 
the national markets for the purpose of meeting domestic capital require-
ments. Both the foreign exchange regulations and other instruments are 
employed. The abolition of these usually very effective barriers to inter-
state capital movements forms the subject of draft measures and studies 
13 at the EEC and other Levels. These, however, cannot be implemented 
in the present financial and monetary situation (1). The solution to 
these problems is a question of political will and expediency. Harmonization 
of securities regulation would make only a minimal contribution to it. 
B. INTERVENTIONS OF A STRUCTURAL NATURE 
17. 1. Purpose or purport of the interventions 
In most Member States interest attaches more to the normative interventions 
of a structural nature or tendency than to the application of the afore-
mentioned instruments of economic and financial policy. The general term 
"structural measures" is used to classify all interventions which exert a 
lasting influence on the primary security market and are usually designed 
to regulate the issuing operation within very narrow channels.These measures 
consist both of measures under public law and, in an ancillary fashion, of 
self-regulatory or corporative measures. 
18. The difference between structural rules and instruments which are employed 
mainly for purposes of economic and financial policy is not always clear. 
While the main purpose is perhaps the most relevant criterion for 
differentiation, one finds that the reasons are often interwoven and that 
rules which were originally regarded as temporary have developed into 
instruments of permanent general policy. Thus the public issue of foreign 
securities was subject to ministerial authorization in France and Belgium 
during the First World War. After the War the measure was continued in 
both countries and is now applied in order to preserve the national capital 
market for domestic issues and, in some cases, in order to protect investors, 
or even as an instrument of foreign policy. The authorization requirement 
has in fact grown into a prohibition . The primary securities markets in 
these countries are structurally characterized by the almost complete 
absence of new foreign securities issues. 
(1) See the first directive, dated 11 May 1960, and the second directive, 
dated 18 December 1962, concerning the implementation of Art. 67 of the 
Treaty; a third directive has been published in draft form but has not 
yet been approved by the Council of Ministers: see also Art. 120 et seq 
of the Treaty of Accession and Annex I. VII, 3 et seq. 
14 19. While a L L rules which have the aim or effect of organizing or influencing 
the primary market can be grouped together as structural measures, it is 
generally found that most rules have a number of purposes and, conversely, 
that most purposes are interconnected and are promoted by rules of different 
kinds. 
If one tried to find the lowest common denominator for all these rules, 
this could probably be formulated as the general objective of the 
development or promotion of the new issue market, through the imposition 
of adequate norms for honest, reliable, trust-worthy conduct, not only with 
a view to avoiding any injury to, but also to protecting and to fostering 
public confidence, which is the basis of this form of company financing. 
Under this general heading, one can classify as significant partial 
objectives: the protection of investors, the adequate organization and 
functioning of this part of the financial system, but also: the defence of 
the monopolistic privilege of the financial community, and even: a super-
visory insight into the more sensitive aspects of corporate life. This 
complex of objectives is pursued by means of a rather motley array of 
instruments. Investor protection - an objective favourably accepted in 
political terms - is pursued through company law rules, rules for securities 
transactions, especially the rules that forbid certain transactions or 
confine them to the recognized securities business. In some Member States 
the issue of securities itself, sometimes even its legal form, is regulated, 
and disclosure is developed to become the main form of investor protection. 
The same instruments are also often designed to achieve other aims, in-
cluding the successful realization of the public issue itself: disclosure 
is designed to generate investor confidence in the securities offered; 
they should not be upset by unusual issue or loan conditions, especially 
when this would result in disturbing the market; participation by 
recognized, established intermediaries promotes confidence and increases 
the attractiveness of the securities offered. 
2. Examination of the main forms of intervention 
20. It can be deduced from the comparative survey that structural measures 
which are directed towards the primary securities market can be subdivided 
into measures which relate to issuers and measures which are concerned 
with the issuing operation itself. 
15 a) Measures directed towards issuers 
21. A direct influence is exercised over the issuer of securities by 
company Law and by the systems of prudential supervision which have 
been developed in all countries with regard to financial institutions. 
1. In connection with the structure of the issuer 
22. The rules of company law which directly affect issuers as organizations 
have been considered only in principle in this report. But this inter-
vention cannot be left unmentioned. It represents the earlier approach 
in the struggle against abuses in the primary securities market. Thus, 
in the last century, premium hunting by stags was combated by rules 
of company law, such as the requirement that shares be fully subscribed 
or that an adequate minimum amount be paid up, these then being pre-
requisites for the validity of the formation of new companies. For 
similar reasons, the promotors of a company are, according to British 
company law, required to ensure that the initial capital will be sufficient 
for the conduct of the undertaking. These rules of company law apply 
to any formation of a company, or to any issuing of securities, whether 
the issue be public or private. This approach can only be recalled here 
as a form of investor protection. Good results could perhaps be 
achieved nowadays, too, with this approach. 
2. Supervision of financial institutions 
23. Also immediately directed towards the undertaking, with repercussions 
on the primary securities market, are the regulations concerning 
establishment, management and associated prudential control to which 
institutions in the financial sector in all Member States have to submit 
themselves (primarily banks and savings banks but also pension funds, 
investment funds, insurance companies, etc). The financial soundness 
of these major issuers is an essential consideration in investment 
decisions. In this type of supervision, the issue of securities 
itself is not as a rule regulated, but is considered as a taking up 
of funds on a continuous basis by these intermediaries. Therefore, this 
form of control can only be touched upon here. 
16 b) Measures directed towards the issuing operation or the securities 
24. The interventions which regulate the issuing operation itself are more 
numerous and more stringent. The following approaches can be distinguished: 
indication and limitation of the legal or physical persons allowed to 
issue securities; limitation of the intermediaries employed in the 
issuing process; sometimes even: regulation of the actual operation; 
further: limitations with regard to the security: permitted or pro-
hibited securities, and, finally, measures to protect the public. 
1. Issuers allowed to make public issues of securities 
25. The question of who can or may issue securities has traditionally been 
dealt with by company law. In addition to bodies incorporated under 
public law, companies were the legal bodies which put securities on 
the market. In practically all legislations one finds a type of company 
which has been made particularly suitable for financing through public 
securities issues, while other types of company are sometimes expressly 
excluded from making public issues. Thus under British and Dutch law 
there is a type of company (public company, open vennootschap) regarded 
as suitable for the public issuing of shares, while under French, 
Belgian, Luxembourg and Italian law the societe anonyme type of company 
is designated as suitable for this purpose, while the related type of 
the private limited liability company is prohibited from issuing either 
shares or bonds (France, Belgium, for instance). 
As financial techniques have developed it has become apparent that this 
approach is inadequate. Securities representing other securities, or 
representing a partial entitlement to a common deposit, are publicly 
issued without a company being involved in the operation. Of more 
recent date is the offering of participations in other types of company, 
including common-law companies, partnerships, limited partnerships, or 
even undertakings without any definite company structure but entailing 
only a form of co-operation.or pooling of assets. To some extent the 
forms have been developed to evade the protective rules, including the 
disclosure and company law rules. In other cases the document of title 
embodies a right of claim. Legislation has not yet caught up with these 
17 developments whereas in most countries of the European Economic 
Community an extensive set of control measures has been enacted with 
regard to investment funds, the other, somewhat strange and 
occasionally exotic investment formulas are regulated in only a few of 
them. Common action by the Community on this plane might raise serious 
objections, particularly due to the institutional aspects of regulatory 
intervention. 
2. Intermediaries involved in placing securities 
26. The issuer can place its securities itself: it can rely for this purpose 
on its own publicity, or appeal directly to its customers, or its members, 
or the public, etc. Recent experience has shown that this approach is 
rarely successful, and that recourse usually has to be had to banks and 
other financial institutions for the placing of the issue. 
In all the countries of the Community the issuer itself may place its 
securities, or resort for this purpose to its directors or other 
representatives. This also applies in the United Kingdom: the sole 
requirement is that in this case a prospectus, in accordance with company 
law, should be provided. In Belgium the public issue by the issuer 
itself is exempt from the generally required compulsory intervention of 
brokers or banks. This exemption also applies to the resale, by 
the underwriter, within six months of issue. The most efficient selling 
technique, namely that involving house-to-house canvassing (demarchage), 
is forbidden or subject to very strict limitations in several countries (1). 
This same limitation is in some cases extended to canvassing by banks or 
by brokers. Administrative practice in countries with official supei— 
vision of issues encourages the use of a bank as intermediary, but with-
out making this a requirement for admission to the market. 
3. Methods of placing 
27. Interventions with regard to the issuing operation can be subdivided 
according to whether one is considering the methods of placing (under-
writing syndicate) or the rights conferred by the securities. 
(1) In Belgium (Royal Decree No. 71 of 30 November 1939) and in the Federal 
Republic of Germany (§ 56, Gewerbeordnung 1900) there is a direct pro-
hibition of canvassing. Indirectly, canvassing is not allowed in Luxembourg 
(Arts 1 and 2, law of 5 March 1970, and law on establishment of businesses 
by foreigners, etc) and in the United Kingdom (under the Prevention of 
Fraud Act). A system of administrative approval exists in France (law of 
3 January 1972). There are no prohibiting laws in force in the other Member 
States. 
18 28. The methods of placing are determined by the banks involved in the 
issuing. There is rarely any external intervention. The London Stock 
Exchange requires that underwriting shall be subject to its approval, 
this mainly to combat premium-hunters, or stags. The Belgian Banking 
Commission has reported a few cases where, on account of its general duty 
to protect investors, it has demanded a reduction of underwriting commissions. 
4. Rights attaching to the securities 
29. Very often one finds interventions with regard to the rights attaching to 
the securities. As far as shares are concerned, the rights are in principle 
determined by company law and by the articles of association. Additional 
requirements are frequently imposed by the control bodies, e.g. to safe-
guard free negotiability of the securities, or to protect the preemptive 
rights of existing shareholders. The regulations of the London and 
Amsterdam Stock Exchanges provide that companies applying for quotation 
have to put their articles of association in conformity with the guide-
lines, or the model clauses of the exchange: interesting clauses relate 
to, e.g. the dismissal of directors without notice, or to the 
approval by the exchange of any subsequent change, or amendment to the 
articles of association. Similar actions are taken by the French or 
Belgian control bodies, but their action is not systematic, nor is it 
based on any explicit legal ground. 
As to bond issues, apart from having to comply with company law, if and 
where applicable, additional requirements are found in the rules of the 
London and Amsterdam Exchanges. Special rules have been enacted by the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange as to trust certificates, or to certificates of 
investment funds,which are admitted to the exchange. These rules which 
come on top of the common law rules, which are generallyconsidered in-
adequate, are of course only imposed on securities admitted to exchange 
trading. In fact, issuers contemplating quotation conform not 
on admission, but on issue itself. Several countries try to influence 
the financial terms of the securities offered, especially of bonds 
(interest rate, redemption): whether within the larger framework of the 
authorization policy (Federal Republic of Germany) or in order to safeguard 
the equilibrium of capital markets (Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy, 
United Kinqdom) issuers are urged to consult the authorities with regard 
to interest rates and terms of issue (issue premium, redemption conditions), 
although the authorities are not entitled to impose conditions. 
19 5. Securities not admitted or advised against 
30. With regard to the proposed securities - the actual investment - several 
forms of intervention can be conceived:certain securities or investments 
may be prohibited; for others, a qualitative criterion may be introduced; 
if not, the parties themselves must decide, and the intervention will 
aim at the provision of ample objective information. 
31. One rarely encounters provisions absolutely prohibiting certain 
securities or investments. In France, company law forbids the issuing, 
publicly or otherwise, of profit shares (actions de jouissance), and 
the issuing of lottery loans is subject to legal approval (1). In the 
United Kingdom it is forbidden to invite joint investment in commodities, 
merchandise or other assets by means of generally distributed circulars, 
although joint participation in these investments would be lawful when 
not offered to the public at large. 
32. Qualitative assessment is usually considered to be a form of investor 
protection which does not lend itself to practical application and 
which, in addition, entails unforeseeable risks and responsibilities 
for the control body making the assessment. In fact, however, one does 
encounter a few forms of a limited quality control: there is no 
quality-grading of the investment, but the removal from the market of 
clearly dangerous or exceedingly risky investments. A rudimentary form of 
qualitative assessment is to be found in Section 795 of the German Civil 
Code (BGB): when granting permission for the issue of bonds, the 
authority assesses whether the issuer will normally be able to repay the 
principal and pay the interest on the loan. In France, Belgium and 
Luxembourg an informal procedure would be followed: these issuers are 
urged to refrain from issuing the securities to the public. If they 
refuse to comply with this urgent recommendation, the control authority 
could only require them to disclose the appropriate facts in the issue 
prospectus. In none of the above-mentioned three Member States has use 
been made of this last resort - which shows the effectiveness of this 
moral suasion technique. In the United States, on the other hand, the 
control authority has repeatedly had to apply the disclosure doctrine 
to the bitter end, and has had to require that the issue prospectus shall 
include notices which should cause any cautious investor to shudder. 
(1) See also Art. 100 of the Belgian Company Law, which subjects the 
issuing of securities redeemable by the drawing of lots to stringent 
conditions regarding interest rate and maturity. 
20 Lastly, one can perceive a form of qualitative assessment in the action 
of the banks participating in issue syndicates, which will not allow 
their reputation to be associated with dubious investments. It is very 
difficult to measure the extent of this assessment. 
6. The doctrine of information or disclosure 
33. Nearly all Member States require the issuer to publish certain data 
concerning itself, its activities and assets and concerning the rights 
attaching to the securities. This information obligation is designed to 
protect investors: if the investors must themselves assess the quality 
of the investment, then the issuer must provide them with adequate material 
for this purpose, presenting a coherent, complete and reliable picture of 
the proposed investment. The information doctrine is the alternative 
approach to the question of qualitative assessment. Usually, protection 
of the investor is the only official reason. In fact, issuer-oriented 
information has several purposes: it is also a promotion instrument for 
the wide distribution of the company's securities; it may be considered 
as a reporting technique vis-a-vis the public, with occasional internal 
effects on its policy; or it is used as an instrument for governance of 
company behaviour. In view of the extent and scope of this subject, it is 
analysed in the next section. 
C. INCREASED DISCLOSURE ON PUBLIC ISSUE OF SECURITIES 
34. The principal form of regulation regarding the primary securities market 
consists of the additional disclosure imposed upon either the issuer, 
or the offeror of the securities. This type of disclosure is sometimes 
extended on a continuous basis and covers the entire existence of the 
issuer. Disclosure on issue of securities becomes related to this larger 
disclosure body and is hence deemphasized. In most countries, the public 
issue of securities remains the ideal occasion for imposing this 
additional disclosure as a condition for access to the market. 
1. The major types of regulation 
35. Three approaches regarding disclosure on the issue of securities can be 
distinguished. A first type, considered rather obsolete, requires the 
publication of certain items permanently laid down by law. No preventive 
21 supervision is organised as to whether the information disclosed is 
accurate, complete and not misleading. Remedial control, by way of penal 
or civil sanctions, exists but it is very seldom used in practice. A second 
type of regulation is based upon the same approach but here the extent of 
information to be disclosed is considerably increased, and certain parts 
of it have to be certified by an expert. In a third regulatory pattern, 
a general obligation to disclose is imposed, the context of which is 
defined by an administrative agency that also supervises the adequacy of 
the information published. 
Examples of the first approach are found in France, Belgium and Luxembourg 
where the law requires, prior to the public offer of the securities, the 
publication in an official journal, or filing with the court's registrar, 
of a statutory notification ("notice legale") the content of which has 
been strictly and invariably defined by law. 
The approach of British and Irish company law can be classified as belonging 
to the second type. The Companies Act prospectus must be drawn up in 
accordance with an extensive list of data and items which are specified in 
the Act itself and from which no variations can be made. No external super-
vision is however provided for. Certain parts of the prospectus have, 
however, to be certified by an accountant. In both countries this disclosure 
technique is only used upon the issue of shares in companies; it is some-
times referred to as an obsolete disclosure system. 
36. The third and by far most important type of regulation requires extensive 
disclosure on the public issue, or distribution of securities. The content 
of the information to be published is not very precisely defined and is 
supplemented by administrative action, which also supervises the compliance 
with the disclosure rules and the accuracy of the disclosed information. 
This approach can be further divided into two variants. 
The historically oldest and most widespread approach presents the 
disclosure duty as a condition for the admission of securities to the 
Stock Exchange. No supervision is exercised over the public issue of the 
securities itself. But on admission, the exchange authorities enforce 
their disclosure requirements. The disclosure is used here less as an 
22 instrument of investor protection than as a filter and promotion 
technique that benefits the issuer itself and stock exchange trading 
in general. This approach prevails in the Northern Member States, i.e. 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and, with some 
minor variations, in the United Kingdom and Ireland. A similar approach 
is also adopted in Switzerland. In the other Member States, disclosure 
is obligatory on either the public issue of securities, and/or on the 
admission of securities to stock exchange quotation; compliance is 
enforced by public bodies (Belgium, France, Luxembourg). The difference 
between the two approaches is in part bridged by the action of stock 
exchange authorities who submit admission of securities to the exchange 
to the compliance with their disclosure rules before the public issue 
itself is made. Hence both approaches coincide, although not entirely: 
the content of the information to be published is fixed by private bodies, 
which also supervise compliance with their requirements. Moreover, 
securities for which no application for admission to a stock exchange will 
be introduced are not submitted to any substantial form of disclosure, 
nor is any control on their issue exercised. 
37. The position in the Eurobond market very closely resembles the last 
mentioned approach as far as disclosure is concerned. The issue could 
be made without a prospectus being issued, although this is not 
customary. Issuers operating on this market are very much concerned 
about their regulation and about the success of the issue. Therefore they 
voluntarily publish an issue prospectus in compliance with "internationally 
accepted standards". Application is usually made for admission of the 
securities to a stock exchange: London, Luxembourg or Frankfurt are the 
main centres. The stock exchange authorities and for Luxembourg the public 
control body impose - although sometimes with a certain flexibility -
the same rules as they impose on local issuers. They impose adjustments or 
additions to the international prospectus but these are most of the time 
rather slight. Here again, issuers are urged to make the information 
available at or before the issue of the securities. Ultimately there 
remains little difference from a pattern that would require disclosure upon 
the issue itself. 
23 38. Italy present a special pattern: according to recent regulation, which 
has however not yet been implemented, it would become compulsory to 
disclose extensive information, but this only upon admission of the 
securities to a stock exchange. Unlike the pattern prevailing in other 
countries, the information required will have to enumerated in an 
executive order of the public control body that will also supervise 
compliance with these rules. It is reported that the Italian authorities 
are considering extending the powers of this control body to the dis-
closure to be made upon the issue of the securities. 
With this reservation one can speak of a Southern regulatory approach 
characterized by a general disclosure duty imposed , enforced and 
controlled by a public body, and applied on the issue of the securities 
or on their admission to a stock exchange. It is also between the control 
authorities of these countries that cooperation has become established 
regarding control on the issue of securities that take place in these 
Member States (France, Luxembourg, Belgium). Only the regulatory approach 
in these is further dealt with here. The Northern approach (Netherlands, 
Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom) is discussed later, in connection with 
the study of the secondary market. 
21 2. Supervision of disclosure on issue 
39. Supervision on the information to be disclosed on issue of securities 
to the public has been organized in Belgium, Luxembourg and France. 
Outside the Community similar controls are to be found in the United 
States, and also, on the United States model, primarily in Canada and 
Japan. Marked similarities can be noted in all these cases. 
40. Everywhere where there is disclosure control on issue of securities, it 
has been imposed by statute. Although public issues of securities are 
usually carried out by or with the assistance of banks or other financial 
intermediaries, the latter have never been able to formulate and to enforce 
self-disciplinary rules comparable to the corporative prescriptions of 
stock exchanges, imposing disclosure on admission of securities. In all 
these countries the body entrusted with this disclosure control is a 
government agency, created by law and composed of persons appointed by 
the government. This organizational pattern is also found in countries 
which have established a specialized control body for investment funds (1). 
41. There seem to be two variants in the powers the law has conferred on the 
control agencies. In Belgium, and outside the Community, in the United 
States, Canada and Japan, the field of action of the control agency is 
very broadly defined and encompasses, apart from the public issue of the 
traditional shares and bonds, other investment vehicles as well, the rules 
being applicable both to the initial issue and to any subsequent public 
offer. Investor protection is the usual explanation for this extensive 
grant of power. The field of action is much more limited in France and 
Luxembourg: only shares and bonds are concerned, and in France shares 
issued for a consideration other than cash are, in principal, excluded. 
Also the way of defining "securities" or "the public character" of the 
issue, and lastly the exclusion of the secondary distribution in France, 
indicate that these statutes rest on another regulatory philosophy. 
(1) Including the Bundesaufsichtsamt fur das Kreditwesen in the Federal 
Republic of Germany; cf. the proposed "Foundation" ("Stichting") in the 
Ontwerp van Nederlandse Wet Beleggingsinstellingen (Netherlands Investment 
Institutions Bi ID . 
25 42. Another difference is of historical origin but has far-reaching conse-
quences: only in Belgium and Luxembourg is the action of the control body 
confined to primary market information. According to the applicable statutes, 
disclosure is obligatory upon admission of securities to the Stock Exchange, 
but as admission usually intervenes shortly after public issue, most 
issuers fall within the exemption for previously publicly issued securities. 
In other countries, the powers of the control body extend to the secondary 
market, essentially to the information which has to be regularLy published 
by issuers of securities that are listed on a stock exchange. Differences 
can be illustrated by comparing the action of the French control authority 
with that of its Belgian and Luxembourg counterparts. 
43. The French control authority possesses extensive powers of control in both 
the primary and the secondary markets. This very quickly gave rise to an 
integrated information policy as a result of which the issue information 
lost in importance in comparison to permanent or continuous information more 
directly oriented to the secondary market. The public issuing of securities, 
especially by a company with securities traded on the stock exchange, is a 
rather occasional event. This shift in policy can be measured by different 
signs: the issue information is de-emphasized, and becomes part of an inte-
grated, overall information policy; hence exemptions from the prospectus 
requirement itself are frequently granted and a flexible attitude is adopted 
as to the content of the prospectus for issuers adhering to the integrated 
policy. On the other hand, attention is drawn to permanent information, 
and especially to the so-called occasional information, i.e. relating to 
facts or events that have a direct bearing upon stock exchange price 
formation. In comparison to the regulatory pattern in the two other states, 
where information is published only on public issue or admission to a stock 
exchange, one could say that this integrated information policy has less 
directly relevant influence upon the legal position of the market partici-
pants, and therefore is less directed towards the protection of investors. 
This interpretation of the French regulatory system seems the more acceptable 
when one bears in mind that this legislation has been enacted for providing 
an instrument of promotion of company financing, essentially by the larger, 
stock exchange admitted companies. This legislation is furthermore an element 
of the overall effort, undertaken by the French Government, for facilitating 
the financing of public or private undertakings. Motives of investor pro-
26 protection are put forward, but both with regard to the field of 
application and in respect of information policy the main emphasis does 
not lie on the protection of investors. 
44. Belgian securities regulation presents different characteristics. Histori-
cally and socially the Belgian control authority is primarily a body for 
control and inspection of banks and other deposit taking institutions. It 
is rather an historical coincidence that the same body was made responsible 
for the supervision of the public issue of securities. Its field of action 
has been extended several times by law at the request of the control 
authority: every time, this action was explicitly based on reasons of in-
vestor protection. In order to close loopholes in the original statute, 
the coverage was broadened, whether in terms of "transactions" submitted to 
control, or in terms of securities. The action was made more strict, more 
comprehensive and more efficient; but no change was made to the instruments 
with which the control body could intervene. The Belgian control authority 
can intervene only on issue: the issue prospectus is the central instrument 
for action and is required with undiminished insistence upon each issue of 
securities, whether the securities are issued by the initial issuer itself 
or not, or whether the issuer has already previously made public issues 
and its securities are dealt in on the stock exchange; or whether the 
securities are created within the framework of a contribution in kind or of 
a merger. With regard to circulation of information the Belgian control 
authority, unlike that of France or Luxembourg, has never permitted the use 
of abbreviated prospectuses. In comparison to the very important permanent 
or occasional information - virtually absent in Belgium - the prospectus 
obligation is overemphasized. The policy of the Belgian control body thus 
seems to be directed more strongly towards investor protection. 
45. The Luxembourg legislation greatly resembles the original Belgian law, as 
formulated before the above-mentioned extensions. In Luxembourg, too, the 
control body has no authority in connection with permanent or secondary 
market information. Considerations of investor protection have undoubtedly 
exercised considerable influence, e.g. in the enactment of legislation on 
investment funds. In view of the small amount of domestic issuing activity, 
control is designed to meet the wishes of the Luxembourg authorities 
to preserve and enhance the position of Luxembourg as an international 
financial centre. That is why control is usually enforced from as early 
as the time of issue, despite the fact that the technical point 
of application is admission of the securities to stock exchange quotation, 
27 while a flexible procedure is established for issues made by issuers of 
known standing (shorter duration of the procedure, standard 
prospectus forms, more flexible information obligations for issuers making 
successive - and also continuous - issues). 
46. These differences in overall concept nevertheless cannot conceal the 
great resemblances which characterize information control in these 
three Member States. For the rest, this control does not differ 
essentially from the supervision exercised by the stock exchange 
authorities in the other Member States over the information to be 
published on admission of securities. 
The procedure for supervision follows a comparable pattern in the 
three Member States under review here. The supervision is based on 
criticism and comparison of the draft of the issue prospectus with the 
data which the issuer has published in other connections. The contents 
of the prospectus are made clear in France and Luxembourg by means of 
a standard outline. The control authority reserves the right to call 
for additional information, but does not very often make use of it. 
In Belgium no set outline is followed customarily. The draft prospectus 
is drawn up by the financial department of the banks and supplemented 
by information drawn from the answers to a questionnaire, which is usually 
largely tailored to the case in question. In each of the three Member 
States it is customary, although not legally prescribed, that the issue 
dossier should be submitted by a local bank. This intervention, as well 
as the accountants' statements, increase the credibility of the data 
submitted by the issuer. The control is exercised in dialogue with 
the bank: contacts with the issuer's directors are made if it has not been 
possible to reach a satisfactory arrangement with the bank. In Luxembourg, 
in view of the very nature of the issue activity, more importance attaches 
to the intervention of a Local bank. The existence of previous contacts 
between the issuer and the control agency the latter's familiarity with 
the sector to which the issuer belongs, the penetrating nature of additional 
questions and of possible discussions with directors of the company can 
result in qualitative differences regarding the required disclosure. 
28 The investigation powers as to the content of the information of both 
the public and the stock exchange authorities are usually very limited, 
if not non-existent. Only in France do we find a wide general power of 
investigation, which, however, is rarely made use of in connection 
with this form of disclosure. No physical on-the-spot checks are made 
in any of the three Member States. 
The control process culminates in a formal decision by the control 
authority with regard to the issue prospectus. The legal nature of 
this decision differs somewhat in the various countries. A similar 
feature is the requirement that the issue information shall be made avail-
able in the form of a brochure, and not by means of an announcement in 
the press (-as required or customary in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the United Kingdom and Denmark). The prospectus must be used as an 
advertising document in canvassing for subscriptions: consequently Legal 
importance is attached to the information contained in it. The control 
authorities, especially in France, have directed attention to the actual 
use of the prospectus in the canvassing of subscriptions. 
47. Compliance with this legislation is greatly dependent, in each of the 
three Member States, on the willingness of issuers to notify the control 
authority of their plans in advance. Non-notification is severely dealt 
with everywhere. The Belgian and French control authorities have in-
vestigatory powers of their own (1). For further investigation and pro-
secution the control authority has to rely on the co-operation of the 
public prosecutor, which has not always contributed to the effectiveness 
of the enforcement. In France there have been no criminal prosecutions 
nor civil law suits for violation of this statute. In Belgium, and to 
a smaller extent in Luxembourg, several cases have occurred recently; 
as a rule the public prosecution has mainly been based on'charges of fraud, 
embezzlement or breach of trust. Violation of the regulations on issue 
of securities are treated as a technical, hence minor offence. Investors 
whose interests have suffered appear in some cases to have found no redress 
(1) Art. 72, law of 30 June 1975; Art. 5, Order N° 67-833 of 28 September 
1967. 
29 under prevailing civil law. In none of these Member States is the control 
body entitled to appear before the court and present its views. 
The control authorities have more extensive means of action against 
recalcitrant issuers: in Belgium and Luxembourg they can suspend the 
operation and in France they probably could forbid it outright by 
refusing their approval. There is also in all cases a publicity sanction. 
Applications of these measures are extremely rare: issuers prefer to 
abstain from the operation. No cases are known where a prospectus approved 
by the control authority has been the subject of a civil law suit on 
the grounds that it contained incomplete or misleading information. It 
appears not to be possible to inflict criminal sanctions for this behaviour, 
except on general criminal law charges as e.g. forgery. In none of these 
countries there is a general duty for issuers to disclose, in a complete, 
fair and not misleading manner, all facts that are material to a fully 
informed investment decision. Belgian and French control authorities 
have endeavoured to remedy this situation by requiring the directors of 
the issuer to subscribe a statement according to which they guarantee that 
the information in the prospectus, for which they declare themselves res-
ponsible, is true to the best of their belief and that no material 
fact has been omitted. 
30 SECTION II: THE SECONDARY SECURITIES MARKET 
48. In the financial Literature the term secondary securities market is used 
to signify all transactions in securities which take place after their 
issue, or after the initial distribution. Both the stock exchange market 
and the markets outside the stock exchange, or parallel markets, are 
considered to belong to the secondary securities trade. The line of 
demarcation from the primary market is unclear in a few respects but 
these cause little inconvenience for our present purposes. Reference 
is sometimes also made to a "third market", mainly in the United States 
where this term is used to denote transactions in large blocks of 
securities. Owing to their disturbing effect on price formation they 
cannot as a rule be dealt in via the stock exchange but change hands 
direct between buyers and sellers, frequently institutional investors. 
49. The comparative law study shows that in each of the Member States of 
the European Economic Community the secondary securities market can 
be subdivided into two parts. In each Member State there is in operation 
a stock exchange market, or official market, on which only admitted 
persons can deal in admitted securities, which gives rise to an official 
price or quotation which is widely published as the day's price. Stock 
exchange markets usually have a very elaborate structure: they are 
based on a clearly delineated organization which can itself issue and 
enforce rules. In several cases continuous supervision is exercised with 
regard to compliance with these rules and with regard to the proper 
operation of the market. Next to it, there are in all Member States one 
or several unofficial, parallel, "off-the-floor", "over-the counter" 
markets, where mostly unlisted securities are dealt in. Under one of these 
headings one can classify all transactions in securities which have not 
been executed on the stock exchange, and including e.g. trading by 
broker-dealers from their own portfolio, or by offsetting orders from 
different clients, or execution with third parties. Considerable differences 
appear in the organizational pattern governing these markets, ranging from 
practically absolute absence of rules, to a pattern, which is based on 
extensive regulation, enforced by a market governing board and distinguish-
able from the official market only in minor aspects. Generally speaking, 
the organizational pattern in these markets is less stringent than on 
the main, official market: no admission procedures for securities, nor 
31 formal price fixing (but there are bid and ask quotes, or target 
prices). Admission of persons is usually confined to security dealers 
who also operate on the official market. The Eurobond trade is here 
also classified as an unofficial securities market. 
PART I: THE STOCK EXCHANGE MARKETS 
50. All Member States of the European Economic Community have one or more 
stock exchange markets. These can as a rule be recognised not only by 
their name but also by the direct or indirect statutory recognition which 
they enjoy as official markets, or as markets between authorized 
securities dealers. 
Several Member States have more than one stock exchange, but as a rule 
one of them plays a leading role (1). The plurality of markets has 
certain structural consequences which, however, are of little importance 
for this study. The national stock exchange systems are therefore 
regarded as units with a uniform structure. The Netherlands, Denmark 
and Luxembourg each have a single national stock exchange. 
Irrespective of their legal status, all stock exchanges in the Community 
have a well-established structure. A uniform basic pattern points to 
the economic function of the stock exchange organization. It is a meeting 
place for demand and supply in circumstances which, since they approxi-
mate as closely as possible to perfect competition, lead to a price 
which can be accepted as the value of the commodity dealt in. For this, 
equality of the market participants is necessary: they appear in their 
own name and are all subject to the same financial and other requirements. 
The transactions are standardized: the securities are financially, if 
not legally, fungible, the terms of trading and execution are uniform, 
while tardy or non-performance may lead to immediate compulsory execution 
and settlement by the exchange authorities, or even by the other broker. 
From these elements in the market, as streamlined and made transparent, 
a price is formed which reflects the value of the security so accurately 
that it is referred to by the authorities as "official", or sometimes 
(1) E.g. Brussels (Belgium), Milan (Italy), Paris (France)/London (United 
Kingdom and Ireland; only in the Federal Republic of Germany do we find 
two important stock exchanges: Frankfurt and Dusseldorf. 
32 even as "authentic", this means that everyone can be sure that, at this 
price, and in the given circumstances, he has paid or received the best 
price and therefore the fair value. Underlying, as a fundamental element, 
the stock exchange organization, and to which recent reforms refer express-
ly, the basis function of stock exchange organization appears to be the 
stimulation of public confidence in the official securities market, by 
affording the most refined technique of price-formation. This implies the 
creation of - sometimes artificial - perfect competition, and refuses free 
rein to any excessively strong, so-called market disturbing forces. 
1. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE MARKETS 
1. Interventions analysed according to their subject 
51. Five decision levels can be distinguished: the authorization in principle 
to organize a stock exchange, the provision of the basic structure, the 
issuing of the supplementary stock exchange regulations, the general 
management of the stock exchange and, lastly, its day-to-day management. 
Parallel with the line of decision, a control line can be perceived. 
- The decision levels 
At the base we find the fundamental power to organize or to allow the 
organization of a stock exchange market. In most Member States this matter 
is of theoretical importance: the establishment of option exchanges, as 
recently in Amsterdam, could bring about a change in this. 
The decision to establish a stock exchange appears in most Member States 
to be the subject of a political intervention. The decision has a funda-
mental effect on the organization of securities business. In smaller 
countries the law itself organizes the stock exchange (Denmark, Belgium, 
Luxembourg), while in the other countries it makes the authorization or 
approval of the political authority obligatory (Belgium, France, Italy, 
Ireland, Germany and the Netherlands). In several countries the creation 
of stock exchanges was due to government initiative (Denmark, France). In 
the United Kingdom the stock exchange is merely "recognized" by the govern-
ment, this being primarily the condition for the granting of certain privi-
leges (e.g. equivalence of stock exchange and issue prospectuses, no 
registration requirement for members-securities brokers). The establish-
ment of a new stock exchange between recognized security dealers would 
not be subject to any permission. 
The decision to organize a stock exchange market implies a fundamental 
choice with regard to the securities business in general and particularly 
with regard to the place of the stock exchange market in relation to 
33 the other, unofficial markets. The precise terms of this choice are 
not very clear. We can perhaps record as a few guiding ideas that in 
most statutory systems privileges are granted to the stock exchange market, 
as a result of which this market is regarded as being more attractive 
than others, and especially is thouqht to ensure a fairer price. These 
privileges differ from country to country. Thus,statutory rules making 
it obligatory for transactions in quoted securities to be carried out on 
the stock exchange are rare (France, indirectly the Netherlands), their 
absence being as a rule made up for by corporative (United Kingdom) or 
contract law rules (Germany). Unofficial markets are most of the time 
not forbidden, not even for quoted securities, but organization of or 
participation in these markets is greatly hampered (no publication of 
prices, no participation by recognized brokers). The privileges whereby 
the stock exchange market is made attractive are mainly of an economic 
nature: it is the market where the principals expect and obtain the best 
execution of their orders. One also finds that the statutory organization 
is primarily designed to protect the status of brokers (e.g. protection 0f 
the title,and sometimes of the function),although stock exchange intermedi-
aries have succeeded in only three out of the nine Member States (the Nether-
lands, France and Germany) in obtaining a legal monopoly for all securities 
dealings. In some countries the publication of security quotatiors is 
reserved to the stock exchange authority or its authorized agents (France, 
Italy, Luxembourg), while in other countries (the Netherlands, but also 
the United Kingdom) the corporative rules lead to the same result. 
52. The power to formulate the basic structure of the stock exchange system 
can be subdivided into four sections: the establishment of the governing 
bodies (public authority and stock exchange bodies) and the assignment 
of their powers; the issuing of rules concerning the granting of permission 
to persons to deal on the stock exchange; the issuing of rules regarding 
admission of securities to official quotation on the stock exchange; and, 
lastly, designation of transactions allowed to take place on the stock 
exchange, and rules concerning execution of and settlement for orders. 
These four sectors are to be found in all national systems. There are 
considerable differences, not so much in this organizational pattern, but 
in the legal nature of the rule by which it is established. In most Member 
States these are rules enacted by the government. In the United Kingdom, 
and in practice also in the Netherlands, these rules are private, or 
corporative. 
34 The power to establish the basic structure of the stock exchange system 
does not in most Member States carry with it the power to issue the 
complementary stock exchange regulations. In order to enable the system 
to be adapted to local requirements, but also mainly in order to make it 
possible for securities dealers to have a say and to participate themselves 
in the management of the exchange, this power is delegated to subsidiary 
bodies. Here the interaction between government and corporative inter-
ventions becomes more intimate. 
53. The application of this set of regulations can be divided into two 
decision levels, general and the day-by-day management. Application of 
the generally-valid rules to persons individually, or with regard to com-
panies or issuers applying for admission of their securities to quotation 
on the stock exchange is entrusted to, and the associated sanctions are 
imposed by, bodies which must either be regarded as being government 
authorities or are corporative, being composed of local securities dealers. 
The regulations generally leave room for a certain exercise of discretion 
by these bodies. The extent to which use is made of this discretion, and 
especially the objectives of such use, cannot be determined, owing mainly 
to lack of information. Unlike the public bodies, the corporative bodies 
are not subject to any public reportinq with regard to the policy pursued 
by them. Information is available only on the action of the French and, 
partly, the Belgian, public bodies. 
The day-by-day stock exchange management requires active presence during 
actual trading, mainly with a view to fair price formation. This task 
entails the application and enforcement by the corporative authorities, 
of the aforementioned general and complementary regulations. These duties 
also cover the publication of prices and assistance in the compulsory 
performance of inexecuted transactions. 
- Control 
54. Affixed to this governance structure one can distinguish a set of rules 
relating to the control of governance and which belong to the aforementioned 
basic legislation. One form of control is the supervision, exercised by the 
State or its subdivision, on the enactment of the aforementioned comple-
mentary regulations and this in accordance with the general rules on 
administrative supervision. Normally this approach is not fallowed for the 
general or daily stock exchange management. Thereto, an official supervisor 
35 (or stock exchange commissioner) is appointed, controlling the activities 
of the corporative bodies, and sometimes of the members of the coi— 
poration, while simultaneously more and more special techniques for super-
vision are being developed (investigation of and reporting by brokers, 
supervision on internal control and auditors of brokers, "stockwatch 
programs" whereby erratic price trends can be traced and transmitted 
for further analysis). At the same time, stock exchange managing bodies 
also keep check on the implementation of their own rules. This in fact 
prevents that a clear control line can be perceived. Rarely used, but 
to be mentioned in order to be complete, is judicial supervision 
exercised by imposing criminal or civil sanctions. 
2. Interventions analysed according to the body empowered 
55. The stock exchange structure is the result of two forces. On the cor-
parative side, one finds the people and interests involved in the 
securities trade; these people are as a rule organized as a corporation, 
a united body of persons. Simultaneously, action is taken by the public 
authorities, who as guardians of the public interest make available 
the necessary basic framework, or as controllers, supervise compliance 
with laws and regulations; more recently, public authorities in some 
countries have been active in restoring and stimulating the role of 
the exchanges in financial mechanisms. Although both ingredients are to be 
found in each Member State, there is considerable difference as to their 
relative proportions, not only from State to State, but also from one 
field of regulation to another. 
Which interventions are to be regarded as action by the public authorities 
or which are corporative in nature is not always clear. In view of the 
diversity of national systems, the following approach can be adopted 
for the purposes of this comparative law study. 
2.1 The difference between public and corporative interventions 
56. The terms "public" and "corporative intervention" are used here more in a 
sociological than legal sense. The intention is not only to look into 
the legal status of the measures in question but also to investigate how 
for each sector of intervention, power and influence are flowing whether 
from public or from corporative sources: the intervention will be deemed 
36 to be corporate if its content is determined by members of the cor-
poration. Rather than the usually employed term "self-regulation", we 
here use the expression "corporative regulation". This term emphasises 
the specific nature of the Legal source, namely the association or group 
of security dealers connected with a certain stock exchange, who are 
associated with each other in a corporation in nearly all countries (1). 
57. Another reason why the term "self-regulation" is not used is because it 
can lead to confusion with self-discipline, which can be regarded as a 
specific form of complying with rules or norms. Here no rules are 
formulated within a group, non enforced by it on the members. The rules 
observed are rules of conduct advocated by certain members of a profession, 
usually organized in an association, as the rules by which they will 
abide. On violation the sanctions are economic: non-abiding members will 
be avoided in further commercial contracts, or as a contracting party, 
but will not be expulsed from the association, nor be submitted to any 
other punishment. Self-discipline characterises the rules of conduct 
to which the London issuing houses conform: although members 
of the Issuing Houses Association, the rules of the association do not 
empower its board of directors to impose sanctions on members violating 
the rules of conduct. Furthermore, the rules are established by mutual 
agreement and consultation of the members, whether this is done formally 
or not, and deal with proper conduct on issue of securities. Self-
disciplinary rules may also be found in the covenant subscribed by the 
German credit institutions, and according to which they will insert 
within general standard conditions for banking transactions a clause 
whereby execution of securities orders will as a matter of principle 
be realised on the stock exchange, unless the client directs otherwise; 
they further agreed not to avail themselves of the last exception, 
allowing them to execute "off the floor". 
(1) In Luxembourg the corporation takes the form of a limited liability 
company (societe anonyme) with a few additional brokers; in the Federal 
Republic of Germany the position may differ from stock exchange to stock 
exchange, but the credit institutions admitted to the stock exchange are 
not grouped in a separate corporation although they elect the majority of 
the members of the stock exchange management. The position is different 
again for the official brokers (Kursmakler). 
37 2.2. Applications of this distinction 
58. The two fields where the changing relationship between government and 
corporative action can be determined with sufficient accuracy are on 
the one hand the bodies which are concerned with stock exchange manage-
ment and supervision and on the other hand the stock exchange regulations, 
including both general implementing measures adopted in execution of the 
stock exchange law and the rules issued by the corporate and specialised 
public bodies. 
1. The managing and supervisory bodies 
59. What are the criteria to be used to classify agencies, involved in 
management or control of stock exchange markets, as a public or as a 
corporative body? A formal legal criterion whereby the legal status 
as an administrative authority is considered decisive, throws little 
light on the reality of policy and decision-making. At all times 
corporative interests have been able to induce the State to give their 
organizational structure a legal character and to help them in the 
enforcement of the rules, even those of a corporative nature. These 
bodies continue to represent mainly the corporative interest, while 
the State confines its supervision to checking that the law has been 
complied with. A more useful criterion for the present purposes is to 
take account of the composition of the body. The term corporative 
body is used here to indicate a body in which the majority of the 
members belong to the corporation, even if, according to rules of 
administrative law or precedent, they are considered to be an 
administrative authority and hence submitted to the rules of decision-
making, due process and recourse, characteristic for administrative systems. 
A similar criterion can be applied to government agencies: their members 
are as a rule appointed by a decision of the government, and are selected 
for their personal expertise from circles with different interests and 
38 activities, and at Least not only from among stock exchange members. 
This poolinq together of different views is regarded as a guarantee of 
correct definition of the public interest that these agencies must 
pursue. They all enjoy a special legal status which guarantees them fai— 
reaching independence vis-a-vis the central and political authorities. 
These authorities, although they do not exercise any general supervision, 
have kept some limited power to influence the agencies' conduct. Measures 
of administrative supervision exist and are limited most of the time 
to the proper exercise of their delegated regulatory powers. Rights of 
higher control are as a rule confined to the choice of the members upon 
their appointment, and even sometimes to the curtailment of the inde-
pendence of the management with regard to personnel matters or financial 
resources. This independence has in some Member States been extended even 
to the last-mentioned matters (Belgium, Luxembourg). 
A brief review of the bodies which are involved in the management and 
supervision of stock exchange markets can make this method of classi-
fication more concrete. No mention is made of the supervising minister, 
nor of other authorities which are themselves the executive government 
power. This division would look as follows: 
- In Belgium the Banking Commission and the Quotation Committee are to be 
classified as public bodies, and the Stock Exchange Commission as a 
corporative body: the members of the two first-mentioned bodies are 
appointed by Royal decree, while the members of the Stock Exchange 
Commission are elected by the brokers. Only members of the corporation 
sit on the Stock Exchange Commission, while persons from various 
circles can be included in the other two bodies. In prevailing case 
law, all three of these are considered to be administrative authorities. 
- In France a similar distinction could be drawn: in the "Commission des 
operations de bourse" people from different circles (industrialists, 
magistrates, bankers) are appointed by government decree: the "Chambre 
Syndicate de la Compagnie des Agents de Chang^' consists solely of 
39 elected brokers, members of the corporation. There is some doubt 
as to whether in French administrative Law the "Chambre Syndicate" 
is to be regarded as an administrative authority. 
In Italy the present situation is more intricate: the "Commissione 
nazionale per le societa e la borsa" is, in accordance with the above-
mentioned criteria, a government body; so is the "Deputazione di Borsa", 
responsible for policy within the exchange, since the members are 
appointed by an official decree; the corporative bodies are the 
"Comitato direttivo degli Agenti di Cambio", and the board of the 
corporation of brokers, both of which bodies are composed solely of 
elected brokers. The special supervisory instrument consisting of the 
right of the Minister of Finance to dismiss all the members of the 
Last-mentioned bodies does not detract from this classification. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany both of the "Borsenvorstand" and 
the "Zulassungsstelle" are corporative bodies, as the members are elected 
either by and from among the firms permitted to deal on the stock 
exchange (for the Borsenvorstand) or half from among these firms and 
half from among representatives of the issuing corporations (Zulassungs-
stelle). Both bodies enjoy a wide degree of autonomy and the supervision 
is limited to checking that rules have been complied with. The "Kurs-
maklerkammer" (Chamber of Official Brokers), too, is a corporative body: 
although the members are ministerial officials, as are the French or 
Italian brokers, they form a corporation which they manage themselves, 
without being subject to any supervision other than that with regard 
to the legality of their actions. The additional bodies such as the 
disciplinary or arbitration committees are also corporative in nature 
and in composition. 
In Denmark management of the stock exchange is entrusted to a board 
composed of persons appointed by ministerial decree, who represent all 
the interest groups directly concerned with the stock exchange market; 
40 the members who are securities brokers are only entitled to propose 
for nomination three out of the twelve members. 
- In Luxembourg the "Commissaire au Controle des Banques" is a public 
official, while the stock exchange and its bodies are governed by 
private law, encharged by the State with the organisation of a public 
service (concession-holdinq). 
- In the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland, all the bodies are 
corporative. 
2. The stock exchange regulations 
60. In nearly all Member States we find,in addition to regulations issued 
solely by the State executive power, rules or regulations to which the 
corporative authorities have made an essential contribution, and above all 
of which they have determined the content. Nevertheless, these rules 
sometimes appear in the form of decrees issued by the State executive 
authority. These many and varied measures of administrative supervision 
cannot conceal the reality: if the State intervenes, as the supervisory 
authority, only to declare that the action of another authority is executable, 
or to approve or ratify it, then this act remains that of the subordinate 
body, whether it be a public or a corporative one. The testing by the 
State remains confined to the legality of the provision, without any right 
of initiative or substitution. Sometimes it is accepted that the public 
interest can have a direct bearing on this control process. In at least 
one Member State (Italy) the supervising minister plays only a passive 
role declaring the measure merely executable. 
61. Owing to this distinction, the stock exchange regulations in the Member 
States can be classified as follows: 
- In Belgium the stock exchange rules are presented by the Stock Exchange 
Commission and approved by the King: only the corporative body, and 
not the state executive power, can exert influence on their content, 
so that the stock exchange rules can be regarded as corporative 
regulations. The regulations governing the "Quotation Committee" can be 
analysed otherwise: despite the fact that this Committee's opinion is 
sought by the executive, the final enactment decision remains with 
41 the King; these regulations are therefore considered to belong to 
the sphere public regulations. 
Under Luxembourg law the Stock Exchange Act is implemented by a 
Grand-Ducal Decree (Grand-Ducal Decree of 22 March 1928), whereby the 
concession-holding limited liability company "Bourse de Luxembourg" 
is authorized to issue rules for the internal conduct of the exchange, 
subject to the approval of the Minister of Finance. The regulations 
therefore represent a corporative act. 
Under Netherlands law the stock exchange regulations (Beursvoorschriften 
1919) represent an implementing decree of the Stock Exchange Act 
(Beurswet) itself. All other regulations are issued by the "Vereniging 
voor de effektenhandel" and are not subject to any administrative super-
visory measures. 
In France the stock exchange system is governed mainly by government 
decrees (decrets). On the basis of these the "Règlement général de la 
Compagnie des Agents de Change" is approved by the corporation itself, 
adopting the resolution at its general meeting. The regulations are, 
on the recommendation of the COB "homologized" by the minister. The 
rules relating to the internal order of the Compagnie are also adopted 
by this body itself and in this case approved by the COB. Both sets of 
regulations meet the criteria for corporative regulations. 
The decisions of general scope which the COB can take with regard to 
the operation of the stock exchanges are public-authority actions 
of the COB: the opinion of the "Chambre Syndicale" of the Compagnie 
must be sought, but is not binding, and the decision is submitted 
for approval to the supervising minister. 
42 - In Italy all regulatory provisions belong to the sphere of public law, 
irrespective of whether they are issued by the supervising minister 
or by the political authority (Council of Ministers, President of 
the Republic) or by CONSOB. Even the local stock exchange regulations 
are henceforth to be drawn up by CONSOB. The opinion of the corporative 
local stock exchange bodies must be sought, but is not binding in that, 
if CONSOB wishes to depart from their opinion, this is possible 
provided that reasons are given for the departure. 
- The German stock exchange legislation contains a rather complicated 
regulatory system of which only the main lines are mentioned here. 
The stock exchange regulations are issued by the stock exchange manage-
ment, with the approval of the supervisory authority. Executive 
measures, such as the conditions governing transactions in securities 
(usage) are laid down by the management of the exchange, no supervision 
being applicable here. Due to the official character of the activities 
of the official broker ("Kursmakler"), the rules governing his 
activities are essentially of a public nature. The same prevails as to 
the Decree relating to the admission of securities to stock exchange 
negotiations. (Zulassungsbekanntmachung) . 
- In Denmark most stock exchange regulations are issued by the supervising 
minister. 
- In the United Kingdom and Ireland, only corporative stock exchange 
regulations apply. 
2.3. Comparison of public and corporative interventions' 
2.3.1. Predominantly corporative interventions 
62. While the stock exchange systems of each Member State contain elements 
of both forms of intervention, the relationship between these varies 
greatly. In three Member States one can scarcely speak of public 
intervention at all: these are, in order of decreasing public intei— 
vention, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The State has, 
admittedly, reserved certain sovereign rights (opening or closing 
of stock exchanges, recognition of the corporation, etc.), but these 
instruments are rather unsuitable for the pursuit of any policy regarding 
security business. 
43 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 





































Vereniging V/D E. 
Stock Exchange 



















Order of brokers 
Conseil d'Administ. 
Vereniging V/D F. 











+ Commision de la 
3ourae 







Comm. Contr. Bq. 











































closing + Suspension 
Consob 









other forms of 
general supervision 




All Corp. Bodies 
Conseil ■•-Commiss. B 
legality 
Conaob 






(1) 2 sets of rules ; regulation of Quotations Committee adopted on the tatter's recommendation by Royal Decree. 
(2) Supplementary regulations are iasued by the corporative bodiea or the Government (eg Maklerordnung). 
(3) Without prejudice to the recognition, by law, of authorized security dealers (Prevention of Fraud Act). 
45 The highest degree of this self-management is to be found in the 
United Kingdom. Despite the fact that - and perhaps because - this 
is the most important stock exchange in the Community, the government 
is only involved in stock exchange matters as far as the recognition 
of an exchange is concerned, which ensues from the reporting obliaations 
to which security dealers are subject. The internal life of the stock 
exchange is governed entirely by the private rules of the corporation. 
This is also the case in Ireland, although an old Irish law (of 1799) 
subjects certain fundamental matters to the approval of the Minister of 
Finance (establishment or closing of stock exchanges, granting of a 
broker's licence for government bonds). In the Netherlands, statute 
imposes more government intervention, but no use of it has been made 
since a very long time. In practice the corporation governs the entire 
securities business. 
2.3.2. Mixed types of intervention 
63. The following analysis applies only to the other countries of the 
Community. These systems are based on both governmental and corporative 
action, in prooortions that differ from country to country. 
Although recent changes in the law in Denmark and in Italy have somewhat 
modified the entire system, one can describe the overall system as one in 
which the corporative influences and organizations play the leading 
role, while government intervention is more ancillary. 
1. With regard to the legal and regulatory organization 
64. A first form of intervention consists in all these countries of the 
power to provide the stock exchange system with a legal basis and 
organization. Each of these Member States has an extensive stock exchange 
legislation - which, for instance, is not the case in the United Kingdom, 
Ireland or the Netherlands, where the stock exchange law is only of 
theoretical importance. This basic legislation serves the purpose of 
organizing the stock exchange system , establishing the structures and 
designating their management. As an extension we find the requirement, 
appearing everywhere, of government permission for the establishment 
of stock exchanges. Linked are varying degrees of privileges for 
security dealers: e.g. monopoly of using the stock exchanges facilities, 
price publication, etc. or even monopoly of securities business in general. 
46 65. This basic organization is strongly inspired in all Member States by 
principles of self-management. A special but important expression 
of this principle consists in the delegation to the corporative bodies 
of rule making power - in the form of generally applicable "rules" or 
"regulations" - of which it is sometimes accepted that they apply, as 
by-laws of a corporation; not only to members, but to all third parties 
as well. The delegation is limited in scope and only be made use of 
in clearly specified fields. Not in a single one of the national systems 
does this delegation include the right to issue rules relating to the 
personal status of members, brokers or dealers in securities, save for 
a limited exception in France or in Germany (1). All matters relating 
to their perspnal status are dealt with directly in secondary governmental 
regulation. Conversely, the rules concerning the actual stock exchange 
transactions are frequently included within the rule making power: the 
basic legislation prefers to leave this matter to the professionals. 
With regard to the admission of securities to a stock exchange quotation 
and relations with issuers, some striking features will be pointed out 
later. 
66. If the public authorities authorize the corporative stock exchange 
to issue regulations, they reserve the right to exercise some right of 
higher supervision. This right can assume varying forms: in Belgium the 
stock exchange regulations are proposed, and thus determined as to their 
content, by the corporative stock exchange Commission, but are promulgated 
by Royal Decree. Similar rules apply with regard to the "reglement general" 
of the French stock exchanges: here the supervising minister is authorized 
to ratify, or withhold ratification of, the rules of the stock exchange, 
acting on the expert advice of the "Commission des operations de bourse". 
(1) For France mention should be made of the obligations contained in the 
"Reglement d'ordre interieur", cf. also Art. 21bis, Decret of 7 October 1890 
regarding book-keeping and reporting by brokers, and for Germany, the 
authority - within strictly demarcated maximum limits - to establish the 
conditions for the admission of brokers: Section 7, Borsengesetz.. 
47 With regard to the content of the rules, however, exclusive power lies 
with the "Compagnie des Agents de change", deliberating in a general 
meeting of its members, the stockbrokers. Similar rules are to be 
found in Luxembourg and Germany. In Italy the reform of the stock 
exchange system (1975) put an end to the regulatory powers of the local 
stock exchanges. Henceforth all power emanates from the State regulatory 
agency, the CONSOB. In all Member States the testing by the supervisory 
authority includes checking that the law has been complied with; whether, 
in this connection, the public interest, or the interest of the State are 
also taken into account is not always very clear. It is implicitly 
accepted in Belgium. In Luxembourg there is an express legal provision to 
this effect in the stock exchange decree, German law recognizes only testing 
as to legality. Rule making by corporative bodies is always subject to 
specific administrative supervision: no cases are known where this super-
vision is absent. 
2. With regard to the management of the stock exchanges 
67. The management of the stock exchanges is carried on within this general 
statutory and regulatory framework. The daily management is directly 
concerned with day-to-day operation of the exchanges and with trading 
procedures. In nearly all Member States (with the exception of Denmark) 
daily management is exercised by a corporative body, whether or not with 
outside supervision. The general management was previously also carried 
out by corporative bodies in all Member States. This form of organization 
is now only to be found in Germany and, to a smaller extent, in Luxembourg, 
where the public control commission performs important control functions, 
but only in connexion with the information to be disclosed on admission 
of securities. In the other countries there are one or more active public 
agencies: their function often includes the exercise of supervision over 
the corporative bodies and - in at least two of the Member States - direct 
involvement in the general management of the stock exchange. In these 
cases there are also appropriate powers of control. It would therefore 
seem justifiable to speak of a double organization line: corporative 
self-management is directed, bound by, stimulated by administrative action 
of governmental agencies. Numerous gradations are to be found in the way 
government agencies act with respect to stock exchange functioning and 
corporative self-management. 
48 The field of action of corporative self-management can be defined as 
comprising all matters for which the public agencies have not reserved 
for themselves the right of general or day-to-day management. The two 
fields are connected and wi 11 therefore have to be dealt with together 
a) Admission of securities to stock exchange quotation 
68. Admission of securities to stock exchange quotation appears to have 
attracted a qreat deal of attention from the public authorities in 
several countries. Associated with this subject is the whole matter 
of the relationship between the stock exchange world and the business 
world. This aspect of the stock exchange structure can be placed in a 
dual perspective. On the one hand, the public agencies play a dominant 
role in the primary securities markets, in order to achieve there, by 
imposing essentially disclosure, orderly conduct of business, which 
must contribute to the climate of confidence which must prevail in 
connection with the raising of capital. On the other hand, one sees a 
tendency towards greater objectivity of the decision to admit securities 
to exchange markets. So, e.g. have many stock exchange systems established 
more or less independent committees, or bodies, which will have to decide 
on applications for admission, and on the related disclosure, in an 
independent, objective way. These bodies or committees are not always 
public bodies. Thus the admission office for the German stock exchanges 
can scarcely be classified as a public body as to its composition, and 
yet is entrusted with this task of objective assessment of admission 
applications. Even in the London Stock Exchange there is an independent 
"Quotations Committee". In the Netherlands according to the law, the 
Minister of Finance admits securities to exchange trading; in practice 
he always follows the advice of the corporative stock exchange management. 
A striking point is that in all these countries an attempt is made to 
remove the relationship between the exchange market and the business world 
from the corporative sphere of influence. 
69. Belgium, France and Italy have set up separate public bodies and have 
given them power to admit or remove securities from exchange dealings. 
In Belgium this power is shared: compulsory disclosure is controlled by 
the Banking Commission, while the admission is granted by the Quotation 
Committee. In France and Italy both these matters come under the authority 
49 of the central public body. This allocation of power can constitute 
the starting point for the development of a general public policy 
wtih regard to the larger companies whose securities are admitted to 
quotation on a stock exchange. 
b) The personal status of stock exchange securities dealers 
70. The personal status of securities dealers on stock exchanges is in most 
cases of a mixed origin. In France, Italy and Denmark, and in the 
Federal Republic of Germany with regsrd to official brokers, appointment 
and dismissal are by ministerial decree. All other matters are referred 
to the corporative bodies. They keep watch over compliance with deontological 
and financial obligations and can impose sanctions. In Belgium and 
Luxembourg the organization is purely corporative; a comparable situation 
is that of credit institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany. But 
in each of these countries, all matters relating to the persoral status 
of stock exchange traders have been systematically kept out of the 
influence of one cf the aforementioned government agencies.(1). In Italy 
it has even been expressly provided that if the government agency finds 
irregularities in a broker's behaviour, or violations of his statutory 
duties, it shall pass the case and its findings to the minister or the 
corporative disciplinary board, entitled to impose sanctions, without 
being itself entitled to take action. 
c) Stock exchange transactions 
71. In the field of stock exchange transactions, corporative organization 
and supervision are coupled with government supervision. The managing 
bodies of the stock exchanges are, except in Denmark, corporative bodies. 
They appoint one or more of their members to be present during the stock 
exchange session itself, their task relating both to the organization 
and the supervision of transactions. The public authority confines 
(1) There are a few exceptions to this division of powers in France; 
they can only be explained historically. itself in this field to supervision, including supervision through the 
stock exchange commissioner mentioned below. In some countries, primarily 
France, this supervision is extended to the market behaviour not only 
of the brokers but also, and mainly, of their principals (insider trading, 
market manipulation). The last-mentioned matter lies outside the cor-
porative field, so that legislation is considered to be necessary. 
Policing in stock exchange matters and the material running of the 
stock exchange are as a rule corporative business. 
72. 3. With regard to rules of control and supervision 
The vesting of substantial autonomous powers in subordinate managing 
bodies is as a rule coupled with certain rights of control with regard 
to these bodies. The system of administrative supervision which 
applies with regard to the public agencies is very different from that 
applying to the corporative bodies. 
In Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy the right of the government 
to appoint the members of the publi c agencies is regarded as an important 
form of higher supervision. It is not clear whether it also contains the 
right of dismissal. As a measure of general supervision the government 
appoints a commissioner with a wide power of control on the activities of 
some of these independent agencies. This is the form of supervision 
exercised on the French COB and on the Belgian Quotation Committee. 
A somewhat different pattern prevails in Denmark, where, a public official 
on the one hand has general control powers on stock exchange functioning 
while he also supervises stock exchange securities dealers, although 
here with limited powers. 
51 In several countries the powers of this government commissioner are 
Limited: if he has objections to raise, he can only submit the decision 
to the same body (France) or to another, similarly corporative body 
(Belgium, Luxembourg). Sometimes he can resort direct to the supervising 
minister: the testing will as a rule (for instance in the Federal Republic 
of Germany) be confined to checking the legality of the matter. 
In some countries the independent power of decision of the subordinate 
agencies is extended still further: in Belgium (Banking Commission) and 
in Italy (CONSOB) there is no government commissioner supervising the 
public control agency. The Luxembourg pattern is a special one: the 
"Commissaire au Controle des banques" performs the function personally 
as a civil servant; it is accepted that he is not subject to the 
hierarchical authority of the appointing minister. 
73. The supervision on the corporative bodies is carried out in all the 
Member States referred to here, with the exception of France, by the 
appointment of an official referred to as the government, state or stock 
exchange commissioner. This official has the task of exercising supervision 
over all actions of the stock exchange managing bodies: as a rule, he can 
only oppose actions or decisions, that would violate the law, although in 
Belgium and in Luxembourg it is accepted that his opposition can also be 
based on grounds of general interest. These officals
1 own means of action 
are as a rule rather limited: in Belgium and Luxembourg the official can 
only submit the decision to another, also corporative body, while in 
Italy and Germany he can refer the matter to the public authorities for 
appropriate action. In Denmark he makes the decision himself. It is 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of this supervisory instrument. 
52 In view of their Limited means of action, it would seem that the afore-
mentioned form of government supervision by appointment of a permanent 
commissioner can be compared to, but not be placed on the same footing 
as, instruments of general administrative supervision, existing in the 
related field of administrative law. 
In Italy, lastly, there is a drastic instrument of supervision, which 
is difficult to use: the entire dismissal of all members of the stock 
exchange organ (1) with the possible appointment of a trustee. 
74. In Member States where government agencies are involved in stock exchange 
matters, a general right of judicial appeal lies before the general 
administrative courts (e.g. the Council of State). The independence of 
these bodies explains the absence of any hierarchical recourse, for 
instance to the Minister of Finance. In Belgium, however, a special 
appeal procedure against the decisions of the Quotation Committee brings 
the matter first before a specific Appeals Board, whose decisions can then 
in turn be tested as to their legality by the Council of State. In Denmark, 
the decisions of the Stock Exchange Committee can be reviewed on appeal 
by the Minister of Trade. 
Appeal against the decisions of the corporative bodies is in some 
Member States governed by administrative law. This is the cjse with 
the decisions of the German stock exchange bodies, and witli those of 
the Belgian Stock Exchange Commission. In France and in Italy the 
question is disputed, but is as a rule answered in the negative. In 
Luxembourg, too, these decisions are subject to appeal according to the 
general rules of common law. 
(1) This applies both to the "Deputazione di Borsa" and to the "Comitato 
direttivo". The brokers' Disciplinary Board is also subject to it. 
53 2. THE PERSONS INVOLVED IN STOCK EXCHANGE DEALINGS 
75. The flexibility of stock exchange dealings and the safety of executing 
the transactions, require that not just anyone shall be allowed to deal 
on the stock exchange, as was in fact the case in the old days 
on some of the European exchanges. In all the countries of the Community, 
only admitted persons or enterprises can take part in dealings on the 
stock exchange. 
1. BROKERS' AND MIXED STOCK EXCHANGES 
76. A distinction is made between brokers' stock exchanges and mixed stock 
exchanges. The former do not allow banks, but only stockbroking firms, 
to deal on the stock exchange, even if these firms receive the great 
majority of stock exchange orders from the banks. This type of organization 
is the most frequently met in the European Community. A subsidiary, 
mainly legal, distinction differentiates the French and Italian stock 
exchanges, since there the brokers enjoy the status of "ministerial 
officers", and are, among other things, appointed, or subjected to 
disciplinary sanctions, by ministerial decree. The British, Belgian, 
Irish and Danish stock exchanges also admit only stockbroking firms, 
although in the case of the Danish stock exchange this is done by 
ministerial decision. 
In mixed stock exchanges banks as well as stockbroking firms execute 
orders on the floor of the exchange. This pattern is met in Germany, 
the Netherlands and in Luxembourg, where securities business is largely 
in the hands of the banks. The brokers play an active role on the floor 
of the exchange itself,whether acting as agents for their clients, or for 
bringing orders together coming from banks, or by acting as dealers for 
their own account. 
Admission is as a rule confined to a certain stock exchange. Further 
admissions can be obtained within the same country, but require a new 
decision. Relaxations, including relaxations with regard to requirements con-
cerning experience and knowledge, or to financial status, are 
granted. Participation of foreign firms in stock exchange trading occurs 
more in the countries with mixed stock exchanges, where both foreign banks 
and local offices of foreign broking firms are involved in the trading, 
54 either directly or through the acquisition of shares in an already 
admitted bank or broking house. In the countries with brokers' 
exchanges only nationals are allowed to deal: in France, Belgium and 
Italy there is a nationality requirement and in Denmark a residence 
condition, while the nationality requirement in the United Kingdom was 
lifted a few years ago. 
2. GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR ADMISSION 
77. The admission conditions are defined in the stock exchange rules. The 
admission decision is in most countries of a discretionary nature: even 
if the candidate satisfies the objectively specified conditions, he has 
no right to be admitted to the stock exchange market. Refusal, the 
motives for which have not to be disclosed, can be based on either personal 
or general qrounds, including the interest of the market, the excessive 
number of participants, etc. The arrangement is different in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, where since the law of 1975 a candidate can claim 
a right to admission if he fulfils the conditions, and in Italy, where 
nomination for a vacant place is made by ministerial decision, which 
must obligatorily designate the first candidate after a competitive 
examination. In all countries, apart from the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Luxembourg, the number of persons admitted is declining. 
The admission conditions relate to the trustworthiness of the members 
of the stock exchange, their experience in this line of business, the 
extent of their offices and their financial position. As an extension 
of'the last-mentioned aspect, requirements regarding book-keeping or 
rules with regard to internal control are usually imposed. In countries 
with mixed stock exchanges, no specific requirement is established 
concerning the financial position of the banks, reference being made 
instead of the banking control legislation. Losing the banking authorization 
or ceasing to be a banks entails loss of stock exchange membership. 
D.l The requirements as to trustworthiness and experience are made necessary by 
reason of the usual procedures for carrying out stock exchange transactions 
which are almost solely on verbal agreements: not only must candidates 
be familiar with local practices and stock exchange terminology but, and 
above all, they must stand by their given word. Representatives of banks 
are, for understandable reasons, also subject to this requirement. 
Judgment as to the fulfilment of these requirements is usually left to 
the admitting authority: the latter takes as its basic the statements of 
referees or sponsors or other information. 
78. In countries where the exercise of the profession of stockbroker requires 
the permission of an administrative authority (i.e. France, Italy, Den-
mark and, for official brokers -Kursmak ler - also the Federal Republic 
of Germany), the qranting of this permission is made dependent on the 
necessities of the market, including the need for new appointments, or their 
being economically justified. This is explicitly stated in Denmark, is in-
cluded in the ministerial decision establishing the roll of brokers in France and 
Italy, and is inherent in the nature of the activity of official brokers 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. In other countries establishment is 
free, a fact which has sometimes been detrimental to the viability of 
the profession and the possibility of regulative action by the stock 
exchange authorities. 
79. Connected with this is the establishment of a maximum age Limit. 
Rejuvenation of the profession, even from an institutional point of view, 
is impeded in some countries by the absence of an age limit, while its 
introduction in other countries is still too recent to have yet become 
fully effective. No age limit is laid-down in Belgium, Denmark, the 
United Kingdom and Luxembourg: Italy, France, the Netherlands and -
for the official broker - the Federal Republic of Germany have in fact 
introduced a limit. 
3. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF FIRMS 
80. One rarely encounters rules concerning the organization of the firms,, 
their personnel, the minimum infrastructure, additional packages of 
services offered, etc. In the Netherlands the admission board has to be 
56 convinced that the candidate disposes of an "adequate" spread as to 
clients and as to securities dealt in for account of clients, these 
being rules which also contribute to the independence of the firm, 
particularly in relation to certain issuers or to institutional investors. 
In the United Kingdom a new candidate for membership must have the support 
of an existing firm. In several countries, participation in the common 
mechanisms of clearing, transfer or custody of securities, even if not 
expressly made obligatory (as in the Federal Republic of Germany), is 
enforced in practice. Common computer facilities are offered in some 
countries (e.g. France) but are not always accepted by the firms. 
The appointment of floor delegates, entitled to deal in the name of a 
member firm, whether as assistant to, or as substitute for a member, is 
subject in some countries to a maximum limit, this being partly in order 
to avoid having an excessive number of persons present on the floor 
(e.g. in Italy). 
81. In some regulatory systems one finds rules regarding the legal status in 
which the securities firms have to carried on. Whether brokers must or 
can carry on their business as sole trader, or grouped together in partner-
ships, possibly in limited liability companies, is still answered in 
widely varying ways. During the past few years a trend has developed 
whereby less hostility is shown towards the formation of associations, 
including limited liability companies, while even a prohibition of the 
sole trader has been introduced in one Member State (United Kingdom). 
There are many reasons for this development: the prohibition of association 
led to a multiplicity of individually weak market participants, and to 
undercapitalization in proportion to present-day dealer and securities 
advisory functions. In competition with the banks, independent securities 
dealers who are too weak are usually reduced to the ancillary role of market 
executants. 
In Italy brokers act as independent professionals: their status of ministerial 
officers is considered to be an obstacle to any form of association among 
them. In Belgium and Denmark there are both sole dealers and partnerships: 
57 here the broker must remain jointly and severally liable so that all 
firms have to be carried on either as sole proprietorships, or as 
unlimited partnerships; in Belgium the limited partnership can also 
be used. 
In all other countries there is freedom as regards the legal form, 
except that in the United Kingdom and Ireland, in principle, no individual 
security dealers are now being admitted, but only members of a firm 
(i.e. the "four eyes" principle)/ while in Luxembourg practice - although 
not in law - only limited-liability companies are admitted to trading 
on the stock exchange. In Germany and the Netherlands individual brokers, 
or brokers grouped together in partnerships, participate in stock 
dealings. In both countries the limited-liability company form is per-
missible; it is not for the time being used by the free brokers in Germany. 
In countries with mixed stock exchanges, banks and credit institutions 
are in addition - and in fact mainly - subject to the banking control 
regulations. 
A. FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF SECURITIES DEALERS 
82. The financial obligations imposed on persons or enterprises - other than 
banks - allowed to operate on the stock exchange assume four 
forms : the lodging of a deposit, or the provision of 
a security or guarantee by a local bank; an obligation with regard to 
their own capital resources; observance of certain liquidity ratios; 
and additional insurance for certain risks. France has a guarantee system 
of its own, based on the solidarity of all offices. 
83. The guarantee technique is undoubtedly the oldest and is employed in 
France (FF 2500), Belgium (Bfrs 150 000) and Denmark (DKr 100 000) . 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the guarantee has been updated. In 
accordance with the local stock exchange regulations, the guarantee can 
be set at DM 50 000 or DM 200 000, depending on whether the member is 
acting solely as broker or also for his own account. In most of these 
cases the guarantee can be provided by way of a bank guarantee commitment. 
1 
This guarantee is limited to commitments towards other members of the 
stock exchange. 
58 The guarantee does not only have to be in force at the time of admission 
but also has to remain effective throughout the whole period of membei— 
ship. Further control measures, for instance with regard to the adequacy 
of the guarantee, are not found. 
In France and Italy the corporation has established an internal guarantee 
fund to serve as security for the commitments of the members of the coi— 
poration. It is financed by contributions from the members, and is 
resorted to when a member finds himself in financial difficulties. In 
Belgium the law has formulated a similar arrangement, but this has not 
yet come into effect. 
84. The imposition of minimum capital requirements constitutes a more modern 
approach: here candidates for stock exchange membership are required to 
make a minimum investment in their business; sometimes these funds have 
to be employed in the way specified by the exchange. Thus, Luxembourg 
brokers are required to have a capital of Lfrs 10 million; supervision 
is exercised through the balance sheet. In the Netherlands an initial 
check must show that there is a capital of at least Fl 50 000, increased 
to Fl 100 000 for partnerships and corporate bodies. A continuous check 
is kept on observance of this requirement. In Denmark a capital of 
DKr 250 000 must be shown, although a guarantee declaration for the same 
amount can be accepted as satisfactory. Supervision exists. The same 
applies on the German stock exchanges: the capital resources are here 
put by the stock exchange rules at twice the guarantee obligation (i.e. 
DM 100 000 or DM 400 000 respectively for the pure broker and for the 
broker acting on his own account), with the requirement that these funds 
be invested only in liquid assets. The British stock exchange regulations 
only contain an investment requirement for the directors of firms, 
organized as limited liability companies; other firms are primarily 
subject to the minimum liquidity margin requirement. No capital requirements 
have been imposed in France, Italy and Belgium. 
85. A further approach is based on the observance of a compulsory liquidity 
ratio, coupled with supervision by the corporative control bodies. In 
France, the corporation imposes a liqudity ratio of 100X, on the basis 
59 of which aL L funds of third parties must be covered by easily 
realisable assets. The British approach is different: a comparison 
of certain assets and liabilities must show a minimum net balance, 
which is set at fc10 000 per member of the firm (max. t200 000). This 
coefficient takes the middle road between solvency and liquidity 
requirements. In the Netherlands a similar result is sought by requiring 
the deposit of all moneys and securities with a third party, a recognised 
credit institution, thus reducing the corresponding risk for the firm; 
compliance with this requirement is still optional. 
86. In some countries it is customary to cover certain risks inherent in the 
securities business - such as those in respect of loss, theft, forgery 
of securities or currency - by insurance. No obligation to do this was 
found. Only the British regulations provide for a reduction in the 
liquidity requirement for the risks covered by this insurance. A particular 
system applies in Denmark. 
87. Special mention should be made of the French approach, which consists of 
regarding all firms of brokers, together with the corporation's own 
resources, as jointly and deverally liable for the professional liabilities 
of each one of them. The considerable risks which the members run as a 
result of this system are governed by an extensive control system, 
managed by the corporation. 
88. Participation by banking institutions in securities business rarely leads 
to additional financial or other obligations: in countries with mixed 
stock exchanges the stock exchange regulations refer to the capital 
or other financial requirements resulting from the banking Legislation. 
In Belgium mention should be made of the obligation to constitute a 
security of Bfrs 300 000 by the pledging of securities, this obligation 
applying to all banks which wish to accept security orders. In the 
United Kingdom the banks will be authorized, usually as "exempted dealers", 
to deal in securities: this does not give rise to any financial obligations. 
In Luxembourg, bank managers permitted to deal on the stock exchange are 
required to lodge a guarantee of Lfrs 250 000. 
60 5. CONTROL ON SECURITIES DEALERS 
89. The extent of the control over the offices and activities of dealers 
usually depends on the extent of their financial obligations. Two 
stages can be distinguished: if the stock exchange regulations contain 
no financial obligations, or only static ones, then the control is as a 
rule confined to a right of control whereby an administrative or cor-
porative body is empowered to keep check on compliance with legal, 
regulatory or ethical rules, a right which includes the power to question 
the dealer, inspect his books and examine his stock exchange records. 
This control is intermittent and not obligatory. It is carried out 
mainly in cases of complaints or after default. The right of control of 
this type is to be found in all Member States. The authorized control 
body is the corporative authority in countries tending more towards 
self-regulation (Netherlands, United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Belgium) or 
a public agency which may be empowered to investigate together with a 
corporative body (Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, France). In Denmark 
action is taken only by the public inspector. 
90. Permanent supervision, as a second type of control, is found in all 
Member States, except in Belgium and in Italy. It is usually exercised 
by the corporative bodies. Luxembourg presents an intermediate case: 
Luxembourg brokers, who are not registered banks, are subject to exchange 
supervision, which is however limited to the maintenance of their stated 
capital. 
This form of permanent control is as a rule organized round three more 
or less extensively developed methods. Firstly the firms are required to 
draw up their annual accounts in a uniform manner; sometimes this gives 
rise to the imposition of additional book-keeping rules. Annual accounts, 
or in some countries also monthly or half-yearly accounts (United Kingdom), 
must be filed with the supervisory authority. 
91. Measures of internal control are made obligatory or recommended in several 
countries. 
In some countries, exchange rules require the appointment of an accountant 
as the firm's auditor, irrespective of the firm's form of legal 
organization (United Kingdom, Denmark; recommendation in the Netherlands). 
In other countries, especially in France, measures of internal management 
and control are imposed, and supervision is exercised over their imple-
mentation. 
61 92. External control is superimposed on this in most Member States. This 
includes auditing of the accounts and/or supervision of the develop-
ment of the firm by an accountant appointed by the corporation or by the 
corporation's own accountancy services. This organizational pattern is 
to be found in the Netherlands and France; in the United Kingdom the 
corporation's administrative services act in conjunction with an 
independent firm of accountants. For understandable reasons of secrecy, 
the corporative control authorities are organized as independently as 
possible of the corporation's management and report to them only when 
measures have to be taken. In Denmark the control is exercised by the 
public inspector's own services. In these countries, external control 
is as a routine matter mainly based on the reports or accounts which 
the firms have to submit to the corporative control office annually, 
and sometimes also half-yearly or monthly (in the United Kingdom). The 
control in France is coupled with an at least annual inspection, which 
also includes a physical check on the security portfolio and gold holdings. 
In the other countries the reports, especially the annual accounts, serve 
as an instrument for monitoring the state of individual firms, without 
an investigation being undertaken as a matter of routine. 
6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS 
93. Supervision of fulfilment of these obligations and imposition of 
sanctions is found to be of a corporative disciplinary nature in all 
countries. The sanction consists of - apart from reprimand, reproach 
or censure - primarily suspension or striking-off. In most countries 
(including the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), striking-off puts 
an end to the right to deal in securities, except in the form of an 
advisory activity. In France, Italy and Denmark the appointing minister 
is empowered to impose these more severe sanctions. In practice the 
corporation plays a supplementary part in these countries, too. 
Other sanctions or means of coercion are rarely encountered. In France 
it is possible, in addition to disciplinary penalties, to require 
62 payment of a fine of a penal or compensatory nature. In Germany mention 
should be made of the broker operating for his own account, who, if he no 
longer meets the reinforced capital requirement applicable to this 
activity is thenceforth allowed to act only as a broker, i.e. only on 
behalf of others. Trusteeship of firms which have run into difficulties 
is not organized, but does in fact appear to be resorted to. 
In countries with mixed stock exchanges the banks which are allowed 
to trade on the stock exchange are in principle subject to the disci-
plinary supervision of the stock exchange authority, and could possibly 
be struck off. If, on the other hand, the banks are not authorized to 
trade on the stock exchange, they do not appear to be subject to any 
special supervision with regard to their securities business. 
One seldom hears any mention of the number of cases when sanctions have 
been imposed. It would appear that there are not very many. 
7. THE ANCILLARY PROFESSIONS 
94. In most countries security orders are collected or prepared by persons 
who do not enjoy the status of recognized securities dealers. They are 
referred to as "remisiers" or "courtiers" (half-commission men or 
intermediate brokers) when, as commission agents or brokers, they transmit 
orders for stock exchange transactions to exchange brokers. All sorts 
of portfolio managers and investment consultants frequently exert a 
decisive influence on stock exchange orders. In the countries where their 
activity is not forbidden they are usually outside the scope of any 
legal or regulatory provisions. In the past abuses have developed from 
the activities of these ancillary participants in securities business. 
The present approach as regards regulations differs fairly considerably. 
In France the passing-on of stock exchange orders, as well as portfolio 
management, is subject to some measures of investor protection. In the 
United Kingdom, some investment consultants and intermediate brokers 
could come within the scope of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act: 
they then have to apply for registration in one of the lists of 
authorized security dealers. There are many exceptions to this rule. 
63 It was recently proposed that suitable rules be drawn up for investment 
1 
consultants . In Belgium and the Netherlands only securities brokerage 
is reserved to the recognized securities business: investment advisory 
services or portfolio management are offered absolutely freely, in-
2 
spite of an ambiguous Belgian legal provision . In Luxembourg the question 
is solved by the application of the Order controlling the opening of 
new businesses, while in Germany problems have arisen both with portfolio 
managers or consultants and with sellers of securities from their own 
portfolios. In Italy there is complete freedom. 
1 
See § 6, Amendments to the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958, 
a consultative document, July 1977, HMSO, Cmnd 6893. 
2 
Art. 2, Royal Decree of 12 November 1969. 
64 3. INTERVENTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE SECURITIES 
95. Under this heading are grouped the rules which, on the one hand, 
govern the admission of securities to stock exchange quotation and, on 
the other hand, indicate the obligations resting on issuers whose 
securities, mostly shares, are accepted for stock exchange trading. 
The field of investigation is confined to securities, issued by private 
bodies: in all countries , except the United Kingdom, securities issued 
by the State, and as a rule also securities guaranteed by the central 
government, are admitted ipso jure to stock exchange trading without 
specific conditions having to be fulfilled or any decision being required 
for this purpose. Nor are they bound by permanent stock exchange 
regulations. Other securities, on the other hand, are admitted only if an 
appropriate application is submitted to the competent authority in 
accordance with the general terms of admission. 
1. THE BODIES ENTRUSTED WITH THESE INTERVENTIONS 
96. An important policy measure with regard to the securities and stock 
exchange system consists of the conferring of management or regulatory 
powers on a certain body or agency. In the present fie Id, the bodies 
Listed below intervene: 
- Belgium: Noteringscomite - Comite de la Cote - (quotation committee) 
- Denmark: stock exchange management 
- Federal Republic of Germany: Zulassungsstel le (Admission Office) 
- France: Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB) 
- Ireland: see United Kingdom 
- Italy: Commissione nazionale per le societa e la borsa (CONSOB) 
- Luxembourg: stock exchange management, by delegation: the stock exchange 
commission. 
- Netherlands: stock exchange management, through its "bureau" 
- United Kingdom: stock exchange management (the Council of the Stock 
Exchange), through its Quotations Committee. 
65 97. The power of decidinq which securities may or may not, or must or must 
not, be admitted to stock exchange trading, was formerly usually 
exercised by the corporative body. The principle of the self-management 
of stock exchanges meant that other interests, including primarily that 
of the issuers concerned, or the general interest, were not taken into 
account in decision-making. This arrangement still applies undiminished 
in the United Kingdom, and in practice also in the Netherlands and, less 
clearly, in Luxembourg. One sees that in these countries too, however, 
an effort is made to ensure that admission decisions are based on a 
neutral and objective analysis of the securities. In practice this trend 
means that wide decision and investigation powers are entrusted to a body, 
independent from the corporation's management, such as: an internal 
admission committee, or even the exchange's own administrative staff. In 
the United Kingdom, admission decisions are taken by the Quotations 
Committee, while in Luxembourg, securities are admitted by the Commission 
of the Stock Exchange, a deputy body for the management. In the Netherlands, 
the Bureau of the Vereniging, i.e. the permanent administrative staff of 
the Association, exercise large powers of decision with regard to 
applications for admission. Structurally in all these cases only coi— 
porative interests are involved, but in practice an effort is made to 
separate this subject-matter from general stock exchange management. 
Another step in the development is to be found in Belgium and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The decision is dissociated from the corporative 
interests, and the issuers (as for the German Admission Offices) or 
other interests (as is permitted by Belgian legislation) can also make 
their voice heard together with that of the representatives of the 
corporation. 
A third form of this trend of making the admission decision more objective 
consists in taking away this matter from corporative interests and en-
trusting it to a public agency: in France the COB, in Italy CONSOB, in 
Denmark the managing committee of the stock exchange, here analysed as a 
government body. The admission decision no longer meets the often 
quite legitimate desires of the securities dealers nor the more company-
oriented interests of the issuers, but becomes a definite instrument of 
government policy whereby an issuer and its securities change status and 
develop into mainstays of market confidence. In Denmark the law expressly 
states that admission is granted if the managing committee is of the opinion 
that this is in the general interest. The French COB has also exercised 
its powers in this spirit, and has made explicit statements to this effect. 
66 The Italian CONSOB is entitled to use its powers in the same way. 
A striking feature is the emphasis laid in these countries on the -in 
practice unusable - instrument of compulsory quotation, euphemistically 
referred to as "the officially sponsored quotation", which is unknown 
to the British and Netherlands authorities: how should a private 
association be able to change the status of the company in such a radical 
1. 
way ? 
98. These structural differences in the stock exchange organization do not 
prevent their governing bodies from being able to pursue similar 
objectives. Indications of this are found both in the general admission 
conditions and in the practice rules.which have resulted from their 
implementation. In all countries one finds that the admission decision 
is taken in the light of two questions. Firstly: are there sufficient 
securities to maintain the depth of the market, and thus to promote 
proper price formation? Secondly: will proper operation of the market 
not be disturbed by abnormal events, conditions or decisions departing 
from usual company practice? While the first question relates more to 
technical market conditions, the second has to do with the structure and 
behaviour of the issuer itself. Under this last mentioned heading one 
can group interventions relating to information and disclosure (continuous 
information - special events disclosure), the imposition of a certain, 
more refined good faith in company life (protection of minority share-
holders; preemptive rights; control on articles of association and on all 
amendments thereto, etc.), and more recently, the adoption of codes of 
conduct, especially in the fields of mergers and take-overs. From these 
sometimes scattered interventions is gradually emerging a new type of 
company, i.e. the open company with shares quoted on the stock exchange, 
the official market. As in several Member States, the same rules apply to 
these companies as to the closed, or private companies, or as to the 
non-quoted companies, it seems more precise to speak of the "stock exchange 
status" governing these open companies. It should be borne in mind that 
these companies, and their directors, are bound to a higher, reinforced 
and more refined duty of good faith and have to be concerned, not only 
about events directly relating to the company, but also about its reper-
cussion on the market and, in general, about trade in the company's shares. 
In consequence, companies are considered to be bound, not o. ly as far as 
their own shares are concerned, but also inth regard to the market in general, 
1 
Compulsory quotation could be used for just this reason in Luxembourg 
before the entry into force of the prospectus obligation in 1965: it 
had no consequences for the issuer. 
67 to refrain from any market disturbing or disturbing conduct, but to 
the contrary,to endeavour to stimulate general market confidence. 
What this stock exchange status, and the corresponding rules implywill 
1 
be discussed later . The stock exchange authorities administer this body 
of rules: in this respect no distinction has to be made between systems 
strongly inspired by principles of public law (mainly France and Italy) 
and Member States where private organizations dominate the stock exchange. 
The last-mentioned systems (Netherlands, United Kingdom), too, conscious 
of the general importance of confidence in the stock exchange market, 
have developed, and vigorously imposed, forms which are just as far-
reaching if not more radical than those which have been developed in the 
afore-mentioned systems with a primarily public-law structure. In the 
countries which occupy an intermediate position (Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Germany, Denmark) this aspect of stock exchange policy receives less 
emphasis, or only a very subsidiary degree of attention. 
2. THE INTERVENTIONS 
99. The interventions with regard to the securities admitted to stock exchange 
quotation can usefully be subdivided according to whether they take 
place at the time of the admission or are imposed as a permanent system 
on companies which have securities on the stock exchange. The first-
mentioned interventions are to be found in all Member States: they form 
the subject of the admission decision itself, which means that supervision 
of their observance is established, and that sanctioning will usually 
consist of a refusal of the admission. 
2.1 Admission to stock exchange quotation 
2.1.1. Conditions of admission 
100. In each of the Member States we find generally formulated admission 
conditions. The degree of flexibility in their application differs 
considerably. In the German view the conditions must be precisely 
formulated and admission, once the conditions have been complied with, 
is an enforceable right. In the British approach, strict general conditions 
i 
See Section 105. 
68 are imposed: in the absence of relaxations in their application, the 
requirements recently had to be reduced in order to avoid impeding too 
greatly the accession of new companies. In Belgium, Luxembourg and to 
a certain extent also Denmark the pre-fixed admission conditions are 
kept to a minimum and are supplemented by the discretionary appreciation 
of the admission bureau. The same wide freedom of discretion is to be 
found in France, and in Italy, where CONSOB has not yet issued any rules 
in this field. In France, the COB has additionally issued a few 
directives on the subject, but it would appear that the COB has retained 
it wide discretion in their application, and would not be prevented from 
departing from the rules it set itself. Only in a few countries are the 
admission requirements expressly based on considerations of protection of 
the market and of its regular functioning. As far as bonds are concerned -
including Euro-bonds - admission to stock exchange trading does not always 
seem to be a guarantee that stock exchange markets and prices will be 
representative. 
Admission requirements can be divided into three categories. The aim of 
the first is to ensure orderly dealings. For this purpose, supervision 
is exercised over the form and presentation of the securities as docu-
ments of title, the validity of the issue of the securities is checked 
(primariry in France, because of the severe sanctions imposed), trading 
in the securities on the stock exchange before the end of the issue period 
is forbidden, and trading in shares which are not fully paid-up, or are 
subject to transfer restrictions, is limited. A second se. of rules is 
aimed at admitting only those securities in which the depth of the market 
can be safeguarded. The third condition relates to disclosure of information. 
101. In nearly all the Member States (Italy is the exception) a company 
wishing the exchange trading privilege must provide and disclose 
extensive, checked documentation concerning itself, its management, its 
69 activities, accounts, etc. In several countries this disclosure duty 
would overlap with the one on issue of the securities, so that only 
the chronologically earliest form is made compulsory (France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg); In other countries this is the only type of financial 
disclosure: in practice however, it is already imposed on the issue 
of the securities itself (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Denmark)* or 
exchange authorities strongly recommend the release of this information 
previously to the issue (Federal Republic of Germany). The information 
to be published on admission to stock exchange quotation performs a 
wider function than the issue disclosure, which is mainly designed to 
protect the contracting parties. Here it provides the stock exchange 
authority with an instrument for examining the issuer as a whole, 
this examination being based, at least in France, on a special audit which 
is described as much more penetrating as the one required on issuance 
of the securities. In Belgium and Luxembourg, where the issue disclosure 
is separated from the stock exchange disclosure, the stock exchange 
authorities make little use of this instrument, even for their own 
analysis, and rely on the data presented in the issue prospectus. The 
admission decision always entails a qualitative assessment of the suita-
bility of the securities for stock exchange trading; in some countries 
this assessment can be more correctly described as a negative test than 
1 
as a quality Label . Unlike the issue prospectus, which in most countries 
is distributed in the form of a brochure and is supplied to subscribers 
or buyers (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, but also the Netherlands), the 
stock exchange prospectus is published in Germany and the United Kingdom 
in one or more newspapers, and sent to the known shareholders, if any. 
This difference in the method of publicity is symptomatic of the purpose 
for which this disclosure was made compulsory. In a nutshell, one could 
say that investor protection inspires more the former type of disclosure, 
where exchange admission disclosure is more oriented towards stating 
the suitability of the securities for exchange trading. 
1 
See, inter alia. Section 32 above. 
70 2.1.2. The admission procedure 
102. The admission procedure is initiated, in practically all Member States, 
by a locally recognized security dealer. In the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands this must be a member of the association. Even after the 
securities have been admitted, he will act as a permanent contact 
between the stock exchange authorities and the issuer. The usefulness 
of this institution has often been emphasized, as an efficient method of 
keeping watch on the obligations of companies towards the market. In 
Germany and Luxembourg the application must be presented by banks 
authorized to deal on the stock exchange. They serve as the contact for 
the processing of the application, but do not appear to act as a permanent 
link. The investigation procedure is very similar to that followed in 
other countries on the issue of securities. The procedure is carried out 
mainly in writing, supplemented by talks with the afore-mentioned financial 
intermediary, and sometimes with the management of the company itself. 
In France a special audit of the accounts is required, supplemented by 
direct contacts between the control authority and the issuer or its 
advisers. 
103. Only in the Federal Republic of Germany can an application for admission 
which fulfils the legal conditions not be refused . In the event of 
refusal, reasons must be given. In the other countries the decision is 
discretionary and a refusal - at least according to present rules - does 
not need to be justified by explicit reasons. Everywhere, it is true, 
a right of appeal against a refusal decision is organized. This appeal 
is governed by general administrative law in France and Italy (Appeal to 
the Council of State), while in Belgium an administrative board belonging 
to the stock exchange structure is entitled to review the decision in 
all its aspects. 
As the admission conditions have not yet been laid down by the control 
authority in Italy, any comparison here would be premature. 
71 No formal right of appeal (other than in respect of negligence) exists 
in the United Kingdom and in the Netherlands against decisions of refusal 
by the stock exchange authorities. Decisions to refuse an application are 
extremely rare: the issuers are as a rule persuaded to abstain from pur-
suing their application. Case law in connection with refusals of admission 
is almost non-existant. 
2.1.3. Suspension or striking-off 
104. Together with the power of admission we can also discuss the power of 
suspension or striking-off. The authority which grants the admission 
is as a rule also empowered to supervise compliance with the permanent 
requirements for maintenance of the quotation privilege. It can suspend 
a security or strike it off from the exchange list (delisting). In 
Germany, however, it is not the admission office (Zulassungsstelle) but 
the managing board of the exchange (Borsenvorstand) that is entitled to 
delist a security. In France only the Chambre Syndicate, as the managing 
body of the stock exchange, can suspend trading; striking-off or transfer 
to another stock exchange is decided upon by the COB. 
The power of suspension is usually conferred in very wide terms, such 
as, for instance, the taking of measures necessary in order to protect 
the public (Germany) or found necessary to safeguard the general interest 
(Belgium). The right of suspension is often used as a preparatory measure 
for delisting, or in order to avoid excessively unbalanced price formation, 
for instance if the issuer or his sector of business is affected by extra-
ordinary events. Temporary suspension of quotation, or of publication of 
quotations, can also be used as a sanction in conjunction with public 
censure. 
The striking-off of a security is not only the result of natural 
circumstances which put an end to the life of the security (merger, 
redemption of bonds, etc.). Delisting is used in France as an instrument 
for revising and improving the stock exchange list: the threat of delisting, 
72 together with persuasion and inducement often appeared to be sufficient 
to convince the issuer properly to fulfil the obligations resulting from 
the stock exchange rules. The usefulness of delisting as a sanction is 
limited, as as it affects the market more than the issuer. There are 
few applications in countries other than France. 
2.2. Obligations imposed on companies whose securities are admitted to 
stock exchange quotation 
2.2.1. Development towards "stock exchange status" 
105. It is found that, according to the laws, regulations or customs of each 
of the Member States, admission to stock exchange quotation of company 
securities is an important turning point in the life of the issuing 
company. In some countries (i.a. Belgium, and partly in France) recourse 
to the savings of the public at large is also regarded as such a turning 
point, but most frequently it is admission to stock exchange quotation 
that is the key event (France, Italy; naturally also in the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany). By 
obtaining this admission the issuer undertakes to comply with the 
whole body of rules and obligations grouped together for our present 
purpose under the collective name of "stock exchange status". Prior 
to its admission to stock exchange trading the issuer could as a rule 
lead a closed existence, with limited public accountability, this being 
usually clearly confined to a group of more or less known shareholders. 
After admission of its securities to stock exchange quotation, on the 
other hand, the issuer must conduct its business publicly and is bound 
to comply with extensive disclosure requirements. The purpose of this 
compulsory disclosure is to prevent alienation from its shareholder 
public. It also expresses the greater corporate responsibility of these 
as a rule larger undertakings, not only in relation to the financial 
markets but often also in relation to the community as a whole. 
73 In addition to disclosure, there appears to have developed a tendency 
these last years to impose upon the issuers rules of behaviour for their 
corporate conduct: there are codes of conduct, especially in the 
take-over field, the guidelines against abuse of inside information, or 
the European Code of Conduct, as the overall European standard. Although 
also serving as the point of reference for determining the field of 
application of these provisions, the extension of the negotiability of these 
securities points towards the underlying motives for this set of rules. 
As a consequence of their stock exchange quotation these securities become 
available for public confidence, the element supporting the whole securities 
business. The proper operation of this system is incompatible with forms 
of behaviour which, initially touching upon one security only, but later 
with repercussions throughout the entire securities business, would be 
liable to impair this confidence. This is why we can group under the over-
all heading of the "stock exchange status" of a company and its securities, 
a complex of standards or of actually accepted lines of conduct designed to 
establish, to promote and to maintain this confidence. 
2.2.2. Elements of the "stock exchange status" 
106. The rules which are thus laid down can be grouped in three categories. 
The purpose of the lowest is to ensure compliance with the legal claims 
of the security-holders: organization of a financial service in the 
town where the stock exchange is situated, compulsory replacement of 
damaged securities, indication of a person responsible for registration of 
transfers, etc. These minimum obligations are to be found in all Member 
States. They do not call for any further comment, except that their 
enforcement sometimes creates problems. 
107. The second level, which also historically developed after the first, 
comprises a set of information, reporting and disclosure rules which either 
are imposed only on companies admitted to exchange trading of their 
securities, or apply to them with more strictness and detail. The annual 
information, with the associated obligatory audit by an announcement, is 
1 
a requirement which applies in nearly all Member States . Several Member 
States (France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) also require the release 
1 
Only in Luxembourg does this audit not have to be carried out by professional 
accountants. 
74 of half-yearly or quarterly information, although this disclosure is 
1 
not subject to the auditing requirement . It is clear that these 
information and disclosure rules perform varying functions, one of which 
is their role in the internal life of the company (voting procedure, 
rendering of accounts to shareholders). As far as stock exchange matters 
are concerned, their function is essentially to contribute to the trans-
parency of the markets. 
108. Several countries have refined these information obligations and have 
supplemented them by other requirements directly oriented to the correct 
functioning of the exchange system. The term "occasional information" is 
used to denote disclosures to be made about recurrent or special price-
influencing events within the company, and which would not otherwise be 
reflected in the above-mentioned continuous information. The imposition of 
the Last-mentioned duty to disclose assumes that the management of these 
companies have a responsibility towards the exchange market in this 
respect. Recommendations to abide by this "duty" to publish occasional 
information have been based by the exchange authorities on the need to 
promote public confidence in the proper functioning of the exchange as 
a securities market and to prevent prices from fluctuating erratically 
in view of the true state of the affairs of the company owing 
to incomplete information. Confidence in the exchange markets is 
strengthened in several countries by the imposition of rules which may or 
may not be legally enforceable concerning the behaviour of directors of 
companies, of controlling shareholders and of third parties. In the 
United States there are several rules imposing legal sanctions against 
manipulation of the market: "rule 10b-5" has become notorious in this 
connection, while some recent anti-bribery measures can also be attri-
buted to the desire to maintain confidence in the company's, directors. 
In the countries of the EEC developments in this field are still in a 
state of flux, and the approach is less legalized. Thus one Member State 
has introduced legislation concerning abuse of inside information (France), 
and plans are being studied in several other countries (viz. Belgium, 
1 
For a summary, see Section 110 below. 
75 United Kingdom), while the same problems are being approached in some 
countries by means of a code of behaviour (United Kingdom, Germany, 
Netherlands), which does not prevent the simultaneous development 
of formal legislation (United Kingdom). There is a similar trend with 
regard to take-over bids, which had originally aroused great indignation, 
being regarded as raids on another company. Until now, solutions 
in this field are not of a legally formalized nature, the process of 
crystallisation of the rules concering behaviour which was previously 
often regarded as improper still being in full evolution. Hence the appearance 
of all kinds of codes of conduct; such as the City Code on Take-overs and 
Mergers, the Netherlands mergers code and the informal guidelines of the 
Belgian Banking Commission. The French approach is more legally formalized, 
but, side by side with the regulations, considerable scope for discretion 
is left to the control bodies. In Italy too, generally framed powers 
have been entrusted to CONSOB; no cases of implementation are yet known. 
Similar in type are the German "Handler- und Beraterregeln" whereby the 
credit institutions and their staff impose rules of conduct on 
themselves for the difficult conflict of interests which results from 
their simultaneous activity as consultants and stock exchange brokers, 
on the one hand, and security speculators for their own account, on the 
other. Although this conflict of interest, albeit in different terms, 
also occurs in the other Member States, suitable regulations regarding 
it have rarely been formulated. Some legal rules (for instance the 
prohibition of own-account trading which is imposed on Italian brokers) 
indicate that the problem has long been recognized. 
Less formalized, but representative of the stock market oriented duties 
of directors of companies, are the recommendation of the French control 
authority concerning the study of the shareholding public, the 
organization of a more active dialogue with the shareholders, including 
a dialogue outside the formal framework of the annual general meeting, 
and in general the encouragement of all initiatives which help to promote 
76 the interest of the public and its confidence in the company. 
2.2.3. Comparative summary of Legislation 
109. There are still considerable differences among the Member States regarding 
the content of the rules belonging to this "stock exchange status" and 
regarding associated forms of control. Several Member States have intro-
duced or recommended extended information obligations. Some of these 
obligations form the subject of proposals for directives of the European 
. 1 
Community . 
More restraint is shown in imposing supplementary codes of behaviour on 
companies and their managements. At Community level a recommendation of 
the European Commission was recently published, while rules are being 
2 
prepared or planned in specialized fields . 
a. Extended disclosure 
110. In each Member State companies whose securities are dealt in on an exchange, 
are bound to publish annual accounts, usually after having submitted 
these to an external audit. Half-yearly disclosure rules are imposed as 
a statutory requirement in France and in Italy; they form part of the 
agreement which companies seeking quotation have to subscribe in the 
United Kingdom and in the Netherlands, while a widely followed recommendation 
in the Federal Republic of Germany and a recent recommendation in Belgium 
also deal with the same subject. Neither Luxembourg nor Denmark have a similar 
obligation. The proposed admission directive, submitted by the European 
- Proposal for a directive and Council recommendation concerning the 
prospectus to be published when securities are admitted to official 
stock exchange quotation; ("Prospectus directive") OJ C 131 of 
13 December 1972. 
- Proposal for a directive coordinating the conditions for the admission 
of securities to official stock exchange quotation ("Admission directive") 
OJ C 56 of 10 March 1976. 
Recommendation of the Commission dated 25 July 1977, OJ L 212 of 20 August 
1977; for a first comment see C. Lempereur, Le Code de conduite europeen 
concernant les transactions relatives aux valeurs mobilieres, R.D.I.D.C., 
1978; by the same author: Des regies europeennes de bonne conduite sur les 
transactions en valeurs mobilieres, to be published in "Banque". 
77 Commission to the Council on 12 January 1976, mentions among the obligations 
of companies whose securities are officially quoted "4, Continuing in-
formation - the company must periodically, and half-yearly at least, make 
available to the public sufficient information to enable the public to 
evaluate the financial position of the company and the general progress of 
its business, ...." . A similar rule of conduct was incorporated in the 
Recommendation for a European Code of Conduct of 25 July 1977 . 
Only rarely does one come across the obligation to publish certain key 
data (above all: sales) on a quarterly basis. Only in France is this made 
obligatory as a statutory provision. In the other countries there can 
be said to be an actual practice, without any obligation. The recommendation 
of the European Commission for a code of conduct does not contain any 
explicit reference to the publication of quarterly data . 
Supervision of strict and timely compliance with these pre-established 
disclosure requirements is exercised systematically in France by the COB, 
while one can assume that the Italian CONSOB holds a similar right of 
control. In both countries the control agency is entitled to check whether 
the information disclosed is true, complete and not misleading through 
the use of its special inspection powers, expressly laid down in the 
statute itself. Enforcement and sanctioning would in both countries be 
preceded by conciliatory consultation and might result in penal sanctions: 
applications are known in France. Civil remedies, the existence of which 
can be accepted in this connection, have not been called upon. 
1 
See Annex III point 4 of the proposed Admission directive. 
Supplementary principle N° 12, Recommended Code of Conduct. 
But according to supplementary principle N° 12 the half-yearly information 
requirement is a minimum. 
78 In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands the stock exchange authority 
keeps a check on compliance with the disclosure rules voluntarily 
subscribed by the issuers. The action of the stock exchange authorities 
with respect to investigation or sanctioning is more limited in these 
countries as these bodies do not dispose of the instruments that belong 
to public agencies: suspension or delisting, possibly with publication 
of the reasons^ are sanctions which are resorted to only after all 
possibilities of consultation, mainly via the exchange member who 
maintains .contact with the issuer, have been exhausted. 
111. The financial community shows an active interest for occasional in-
formation relating to price-sensitive special events. In the United 
Kingdom and in the Netherlands, disclosure, although varying in content 
and scope, is imposed in the listing agreement; in Denmark, disclosure 
is made compulsory by statute but is limited to dividend announcements or 
to other decisions of major importance. In France the control agency has 
published fairly detailed guidelines concerning occasional information, 
but there appears to be no legally enforceable disclosure requirement. 
In Belgium there is a vague general recommendation. Neither Luxembourg nor 
the German or Italian stock exchanges provide any guidelines on the 
subject. Both the above-mentioned proposed Admission directive and the 
Recommendation concerning a European Code of Conduct which the Commission of 
the European Community submitted to the Member States contain general 
1 
provisions on this subject . 
b. Rules of Behaviour 
112. In several Member States it appears that companies with securities on the 
stock exchange, their directors and even their staff members are obliged 
to comply with additional rules of behaviour,especial ly with regard to 
their attitude to and behaviour on the exchange market. Some of these 
rules cover a wider range of people. This is the case with the general 
prohibition against any price manipulation through fraudulent or dishonest 
means, rule which is criminally sanctioned in most countries. 
'Annex III point 5 "Additional information" of the proposed Admission directive. 
See supplementary principles 12 and 13 of the European Code of Conduct. 
79 The same can be said about the prohibition of insider trading. For a 
further analysis of these topics, the reader is referred to the comparative 
1 
Law analysis of stock exchange transactions . 
113. In several countries rules governing "take-over bids" have come into 
being in order to police these sometimes wild and always market-
disturbing actions along acceptable lines. As a rule, these regulations 
are mainly directed towards companies. They deal with the procedures to 
be followed, and with information to be disclosed. In some countries, 
much emphasis is laid on exact and honest price setting, or whether all 
market participants, both those canvassed and the others, will be placed 
on an equal footing. There is a widespread tendency for keeping these 
rules extremely flexible. They are not laid down in advance: some major 
principles are announced which will subsequently be elaborated from case 
to case by the bodies entrusted with special jurisdictional powers. 
A striking point in these rules is the absence of any assessment of the 
take-over as a change in the industrial or commercial structure. 
114. In Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the respective 
control authorities endeavour to avoid a situation whereby certain decisions 
of the company upset the equality of all holders of securities of the same 
class. In these countries, and although by different means, preemptive 
rights on issue of new shares have to be respected. A parallel 
can be drawn with regard to the sale of controlling shares, although here 
the differences are considerably greater. This concern of the control 
authorities for equality can also be observed with regard to other, more 
nationally conditioned matters (for instance, in Belgium, the rules concerning 
1 
See Sections 123 et seq. below. 
80 the unification of shares, or concerning valuation in the case of mergers). 
In France the COB has, on a couple of occasions, indicated, as the basis 
for its action, the broad duty of fairness to which company directors 
are held in connection with their attitude towards the 
market in the company's securities. This standard of conduct has been used 
as a guideline for defining directors' duties to inform the market 
about special, price-sensitive events (occasional information). 
In France too, one should mention the various initiatives taken by companies 
under the influence of the control agency, and aimed at strengthening 
or reviving internal company life, essentially the links between the 
company and its shareholders. Although the COB uses its information and 
disclosure policy as its primary tool for achieving this objective, it 
has on several occasions strongly recommended the adoption of other measures, 
such as: measures in order to make shareholders' meetings more lively and 
more interesting; spreading of the period in which major companies hold 
their annual general meeting; tracing shareholders, etc. 
115. At Community level the efforts being made in this connection in some Member 
States are encouraged and recommended as a general line of behaviour for 
the whole Community. In the Recommendation concerning a European Code 
of Conduct relating to transactions in transferable securities we find, 
among the general principles, the general duty of fairness resting on 
1 
the directors of companies , and also, in the special principles, the 
prohibition against price manipulation by fraudulent means and the 
obligation regarding equal treatment both as regards the information 
published by the company and as regards the treatment of its shareholde 
Special mention should be made of the obligation to treat shareholders 
1 
General principle N° 4 
Supplementary principle N° 7 
Supplementary principle N° 15 
4 
Supplementary principle N° 16 
81 1 
fairly with regard to the transfer of controlling shares . 
c. Forms of regulation and supervision 
116. According to the regulatory technique that has been used, the rules of 
information and of conduct can be classified in several categories. In 
a given legal order, rules of different categories always coexist. 
Several rules are of statutory origin. Others are imposed by the stock 
exchange authorities, by way of an agreement which the issuers must 
enter into when applying for admission to the stock exchange. More diffi-
cult to define are the rules, very frequent in this field, which the 
issuers impose upon themselves, either spontaneously or under the pressure 
of recommendations from professional organizations or from the public 
authorities. 
This multiplicity of rules reflects a process of increasing awareness 
which is still in full swing. Both issuers and authorities feel that the 
credibility of private business is bound up to a considerable extent with 
compliance with requirements regarding information and disclosure bona 
fide management and proper conduct. 
The Western European approach contrasts sharply with the North American 
way of dealing with the same matters by express legislation, implementing 
regulation and administrative action. The rules are strictly enforced by 
official action. The censure of the investing public is particularly active, 
and very frequently takes the form of legal proceedings. 
117. The enactment of rules by law or statute is found in practically all 
Member States in the field of annual accounts and reports, with their 
associated auditing. In countries with a legalistic tendency half-yearly 
information (France, Denmark) or even quarterly reporting (France) is 
governed by law. The implementation of the last mentioned provisions 
appears to have caused, at least in France, considerable difficulties, not 
only with regard to public circulation of the information, but also to 
the precise content of these required disclosures. Furthermore, this body 
of law is part of the company law and is not included in the stock exchange 
1 
Supplementary principles N°s 17 and 18. 
82 system, and this detracts from its flexibility and force. 
118. The stock exchange system of nearly all Member States makes use of the 
conventional techniaue: here the issuer must agree to respect certain 
rules, as a condition for admission to the exchange. In several countries 
this technique is used only in order to incorporate obligations already 
appearing in laws or regulations (e.g. Luxembourg, Belgium, France). Only 
an extensive investigation of local administrative law can clarify whether 
it would be possible to extend this technique to further obligations not 
included in the law. 
The stock exchanges organized on the basis of private law (primarily: the 
Netherlands and United Kingdom) have to rely entirely on this conventional 
approach, in which they have gathered a great amount of experience. For 
the less controversial fields, issuers have also agreed to co-operate. 
In these countries, therefore, a stock exchange code of practice or body 
of rules has grown up which in many respects is more far-reaching than any-
thing that could have been achieved by legislation. By using this con-
ventional technique stock exchange authorities have not only been able 
to impose disclosures (e.g. half-yearly and on special events) but also 
certain rules concerning the issuer's legal organization, or the framing 
of the issue operation itself. So in London, amendments to the articles 
of association of the company, and the (many) circulars to shareholders 
have to be submitted in advance to the approval of the exchange authority. 
There also happens to be a comparable provision in Italian law: only the 
company's most important decisions (annual reports, amendments to the 
Articles of Association, mergers, bond issues) have to be notified to 
the control authority in advance. The authority does not have the right 
to approve or reject the decision: it can only call for additional 
information. 
83 The stock exchange, as a contracting party, exercises supervision over 
the observance of these conventional rules. Its possibilities of imposing 
sanctions are confined to stock exchange business: suspension of quotation, 
suspension of trading, removal of the security from stock exchange trading. 
1 
In addition use can be made - with caution - of public censure, or 
securities subsequently issued can be refused. These sanctions are rarely 
resorted to: the stock exchange authorities prefer to employ the sanctions 
as a way of exerting pressure within the framework of their suasion and 
recommendation approach. 
119. A comparable conventional basis can be indicated for the many codes of 
behaviour which in the last few years, both in financial and other fields, 
have come into being in several countries and also internationally. 
Financial codes of conduct are subscribed to not only by the securities 
business, or by the issuers, but also by all undertakings or institutions 
which have an interest in the efficient, orderly and undisturbed operation 
of the stock exchange markets . The rules contained in these codes are 
usually - still - not amenable to legal or conventional juridical formulation: 
either there is still too much controversy about them in the business 
community concerned or the principles of the rules are accepted but their 
applications and contours are still too unclear. Consequently they are 
formulated in general and very vague terms and supplemented by more 
detailed "rules of practice", precedents, etc. In the take-over codes 
much emphasis is laid on procedure. The imposition of sanctions is entrusted 
to a professional body appointed for this purpose. The authority and 
powers of this body are difficult to compare: thus the authority of the 
1 It is accepted that the statutes on libel and slander would limit the 
freedom of action of the stock exchange authorities. This point has not 
been investigated in countries with public control bodies. 
Thus the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers is subscribed to and 
sanctioned by practically the whole London financial community; the same 
applies to the German recommendations on insider trading, and partly 
to the Netherlands merger code, in view of the composition of the 
Socio-Economic Council (Sociaal-Economische Raad). 
84 German "PriJfungskommission" with regard to insider trading is confined 
to the mere factual establishment of an infringement. The British Take-
over Panel, on the other hand, systematically tracks down violations 
of the Take-over Code, actively participates in the investigation and 
processing of the cases and can itself even impose limited sanctions -
in fact primarily public censure . Further sanctioning is entrusted to 
the professional organizations or companies which have subscribed to the 
1 
principles of the code and related jurisdiction of the Panel . 
120. In countries where public agencies are more intensively involved in 
policing the securities business, less recourse is had to codes of conduct, 
but the same or similar subjects are dealt with in the recommendations of 
these agencies. Good examples of this alternative approach are found in 
Belgium (policing of take-over bids by means of recommendations and 
directives of the Banking Commission, condemnation of insider trading) 
and also in Luxembourg (recommendations, and subsequently legislation, 
concerning investments funds), in France (policy concerning the annual 
report - "plaquette" - or with regard to occasional information, etc.) and 
in the Federal Republic of Germany (recommendation for half-yearly 
disclosures, issued by the industrial and trade associations) .Although 
stock exchange authorities also make use of the recommendation as 
policing-technique, it would seem that the public agencies involved in 
this field more systematically and more intensively prefer this instrument 
for implementing their policy. 
A factor which has been little investigated and is difficult to pin down 
is the self-discipline of issuers, who, without any obligation but possibly 
under external pressure from, for instance, the stock exchange or public 
bodies, have developed a certain standard of behaviour for themselves and 
1  According to recent reports, there are now plans in London too for 
imposing rules in connection with insider trading by having them 
accepted by the employees of the companies involved; this approach has 
been followed in Germany. 
85 consistently and deliberately comply with it. Examples can undoubtedly 
be found in all sectors: we may mention here the spontaneous publication 
of consolidated financial statements, the release of interim or occasional 
information which in many countries is not obligatory, and even the 
the introduction of rules internally in a company regarding trading in the 
company's own shares by its employees. 
121. The sanctioning of last-mentioned voluntarily observed rules is generally 
limited. 
1 
In France - but presumably not in Italy - the public agency can 
investigate whether the voluntarily published information is accurate and 
true. If this is found not to be the case, then the same sanctions can 
apply as for false or misleading compulsory disclosures. But the public 
agency is not entitled to enforce the duty to disclose itself. It can only 
proceed by recommendation or persuasion. No distinction must be made 
between information published spontaneously and information published 
in compliance with a recommendation. The government body's recommendations 
do not carry any legal sanctions. It can only show its authority, its 
disapproval, and sometimes publish the name of defaulting issuers. 
Sanctions at common, civil or criminal law, although probably applicable, 
are very uncommon. 
If rules of behaviour are imposed by professional associations, their 
violation could be sanctioned according to the rules of the association. 
No applications are known. 
Cf. Art. 3(c), end, Law N° 216 of 7 June 1974. 
86 4. THE TRANSACTIONS CARRIED OUT ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
I. SECURITY TRADING ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
122. The oldest form of intervention, widespread in all Member States, has as 
its object the organization of trading in securities on the floor of the 
stock exchange itself. Considerations of "transparency", safety and 
flexibility require that trading on the exchange takes place in accordance 
with the most uniform possible conditions, so that the price reflects 
as perfectly as possible the state of the market, or of supply and demand 
on the stock exchange. The legal conditions regarding the execution of orders 
on the stock exchange, the rules of execution, price formation, the changing 
of prices and permitted price fluctuations, as well as subsequent settle-
ment procedures of executed orders, form the very core of stock exchange 
regulation. Careful supervision of compliance with these rules by the stock 
exchange authority constitutes the necessary complement in each Member State. 
123. The power to issue rules governing the trade on the floor of the exchange 
belongs, nearly in all Member States, to the professional or corporative 
interests. In several Member States, however,statutes have been enacted 
dealing with certain specific transactions: so, forward transactions have 
been declared legal in France and in Belgium, if certain conditions for 
their execution have been met, essentially as to the necessity to constitute 
a cover. Composition, percentages or interest rates of this cover are fixed 
by administrative order, which can be considered to be an instrument of 
financial policy. The core of the intervention lies as a rule not with the 
legislator but with the stock exchange management, which lays down the 
conditions for stock exchange trading in a sovereign manner (United King-
dom, Netherlands, Denmark), or can exercise this power subject to admini-
strative supervision (Belgium, France, Luxembourg). The German arrangement 
is more complex: most of these rules are issued by the stock exchange 
management in its basic ordinance, which is subject to the approval by the 
political authority of the Federal State ("Land"). This ordinance authorizes 
the exchange management to enact incidental rules or "customs" ("usancen") 
relating to stock exchange transactions. Additionally the Federal Minister 
can prescribe uniform rules regarding the method of quotation. The Italian 
legislation, on the other hand, contains a much stronger element of State 
involvement in this field: both the recording of the legal conditions 
governing transactions and the fixing of quotation rules lie within the 
87 authority of CONSOB and must be rendered executable by ministerial decree. 
124. In all Member States much importance is attached to strict compliance with 
the above-mentioned rules and supervision of such compliance has been 
established. As a rule this supervision is corporative in nature. It forms 
part of the general function of the stock exchange management entrusted to 
the corporative bodies. This is not only the case in the Netherlands or in 
the United Kingdom but also in Member States with active state intervention 
in stock exchange matters, such as France and Italy and also in Belgium 
and Luxembourg. The supervision is exercised by a member of the stock 
exchange management board, who has to be present on the floor when prices 
are fixed, or sometimes contributes to it himself; disputes among brokers 
are settled by him on the spot. As a representative of the stock exchange, 
he is answerable to the management. Unsettled disputes between market 
participants can be referred by him to the management of the exchange, or, 
more commonly, to a specialized section of it. The German stock exchange 
system clearly displays considerable differences here, as price deter-
mination is entrusted to a ministerial officer (the "KursmakLer"), who does 
not belong to the group of securities dealers. Supervision is exercised 
by a separate corporation of which these ministerial officers form part. 
These differences are more legal than material in nature, so that with regard 
to supervision over price determination, a far-reaching convergence in the 
national approaches, in favour of corporative control , can be found. 
125. In some Member States this permanent supervision by a representative of the 
stock exchange management is supplemented by additional powers of control 
on the part of the State or the management. In the case of the German stock 
exchanges the government commissioners have the right to be present at 
the establishment of the price, as this is done by the official broker, 
and thereto he can control compliance with the applicable law or regulations, 
and compel the official brokers to produce their order books and other 
records. Similar rules are in force in Luxembourg and in Italy. Additional 
supervision is sometimes organized by the stock exchange management: this 
is the case in Belgium, where a Quotations Committee, composed of members 
of the Stock Exchange Commission, has the task, among other things, of 
monitoring compliance with the rules concerning price determination. The management of the German stock exchanges is, by virtue of the decree on 
the official brokers, entitled to exercise powers of supervision, together 
with the government commissioner, the Official Brokers' Chamber and the 
Land authorities. In the Netherlands the stock exchange authority delegates 
matters concerning quotations to the Quotations Committee and contraventions 
with regard to quotations to the Quotations Disciplinary Committee. No 
similar forms of supervision are to be found in the United Kingdom, this 
being due largely to the method of price formation in use there. 
II. REGULATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE ORDERS 
126. In several Member States we find, in addition to the rules concerning the 
execution of the orders on the floor of the exchange itself, a more or less 
extensive set of rules relating to the giving of orders for securities. 
We can group here on the one hand the rules which make it obligatory to 
execute security orders on the stock exchange and on the other hand the 
rules whereby certain security orders are forbidden both to insiders and 
to consultants with conflicting interests. By affecting the structure of 
the trade in securities,these rules have a direct influence on stock 
exchange trading, on the depth of the market and on the transparency of 
stock exchange business. 
1. Delimitation of the stock exchange market 
127. The attitude of the Member States with regard to the obligatory inclusion 
of all transactions in quoted securities in the official or published price 
formation differs fairly considerably. The importance of this objective 
cannot be investigated here: it can be assumed that the stock exchange 
price is only representative of the value of a security if it reflects 
not only supply and demand as they exist at a given moment but also the 
totality of dealings in this security. Settlement outside the exchange, 
whether or not through offsetting of orders, or on the exchange but 
without the transaction being included in the price determination, are not 
compatible with this objective. 
128. Italy, Denmark and Luxembourg do not have any obligation requiring security 
orders to be brought to the exchange floor for execution. The banks 
89 frequently appear as the counterparty for their customers, or endeavour 
to carry out orders which they have not been able to offset internally 
with other banks, but without the intervention of the stock exchange. 
The stock exchange market collects smaller orders, or functions as a 
residual market for orders that have not been executed otherwise. 
129. In Germany a similar situation existed prior to 1968. Since then the 
banks have undertaken to bring the regular securities business to the 
exchanges. This undertaking can be qualified as a form of self-discipline, 
whereby the banks accepted to modify their general contract forms for 
bank transactions. It is assumed that most orders reach the stock exchange: 
but this does not yet mean that they are included in the official price 
determination. On the stock exchange there is a choice between direct 
execution between banks, with or without the intervention of an unofficial 
broker, and execution with the co-operation of the official brokers. Only 
the transactions which take place with the intervention of an official 
broker are taken into account in the official price determination. No 
statistical data are available concerning the different forms of execution. 
130. In Belgium and France, security dealers have a monopoly. This legal monopoly 
has been very stringently and closely formulated in France: all security 
transactions must be carried out through an exchange broker. Execution on 
the stock exchange is the rule for quoted securities. True, quoted 
securities can also be directly transferred outside the stock exchange, 
but for this it is necessary to have the permission of the corporative 
1 
authority , which as a rule is only granted for large blocks, or for 
transactions on special conditions. All other transactions go to the stock 
exchange and are included in its official price determination. Apart from 
transactions under special circumstances, such as transfers of blocks, 
there are only limited exceptions to the last-mentioned rule:for offsetting 
on the stock exchange ("application") or for security brokers or banks to 
1 
In France; there is no similar rule in force in Belgium: the intervention 
of an exchange broker or bank and compliance with the formalities laid down 
by law are sufficient. 
90 act as counterparty ("contrepartie"), in which cases special rules linking 
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these transactions to the official price have to be followed . 
The Belgian monopoly with regard to trading in securities is much less 
stringent. In principle all security transactions are subject to the 
intervention of an exchange broker or banker, but there is no obligation, 
even for quoted securities, for the transaction to be brought into the 
stock exchange. Reference to the latest quoted price is obligatory, however. 
Although all stock exchange orders have to be brought into the stock exchange 
and offsetting outside the stock exchange is forbidden, security trans-
actions can also be carried out directly with a counterparty, e.g. with a 
bank acting as principal. For the time being, this way of executing orders 
applies only to bonds, as Belgian banks - generally speaking - are not 
allowed to hold shares in other companies. On the stock exchange itself 
all transactions are in principle included in the price formation, but 
execution before or after the "call" at a different price is possible. 
131. The Netherlands and United Kingdom stock exchanges are entirely governed 
by private law: they cannot require individuals to bring security orders 
to its floor. In the Netherlands the trade is predominantly channelled into 
the stock exchange market as a result of two rules. Firstly, legislation 
has made the mediation of a member of the stock exchange generally 
obligatory for all security transactions. Secondly, the stock exchange 
regulations require members to carry out all transactions on the exchange, 
apart from a few important exceptions. In the United Kingdom this legal 
support is lacking: only the rules of the corporation, and the attraction 
exerted by an efficient stock market, explain why the great majority of 
transactions in quoted securities are carried out on the stock exchange. 
132. The tendency to concentrate security dealings on the stock exchange manifests 
itself most markedly in countries with a more developed stock exchange 
system: as the relative importance of the securities business increases, 
1 
Reglement general de la Compagnie des Agents de Change, Arts 107 et seq., 
162 et seq. 
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encourage, possibly by means of coercion,concentration on the stock exchange. 
The legal nature of these rules, and especially the distinction between 
legal or corporative rules, appears to be of little interest here. In 
several countries the controversy about this subject is still very active: 
not until 1968 did the German banks agree to carry out the majority of the 
transactions on the stock exchange, while in the United Kingdom there 
is growing discussion about the place of parallel markets, which are even 
being mentioned as an alternative organization model for the London stock 
exchange market. In the Netherlands it is proposed, by means of an amend-
ment to the regulations governing security dealings, to subject the 
execution of transactions outside the stock exchange to stricter and 
individually supervised rules. In Belgium, lastly, there is some uneasiness 
about the increasing undermining of stock exchange business by the banks. 
2. Behaviour of the principals 
133. A subsequent step in the organization of the stock exchange markets does 
not affect the actual conduct of stock exchange dealings but is directed 
towards the principals. These must not behave in a manner which can be 
liable to undermine confidence in the market. 
134. The first interventions in this field date from the previous century, when 
massive speculation, mainly in food, regularly caused prices to rocket. 
This was combated not by any curtailment of the freedom of dealing on the 
market but merely by prohibiting the use of fraudulent means. The spreading 
of misleading information for price manipulation was sometimes punished 
separately. This general interdiction, usually incorporated in the penal 
code, was also declared to be applicable to the securities markets, but 
applications in this field have remained very limited. 
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the end of the 1960s when take-over bids for shares started to be made, 
as a method of acquiring companies. The resultant conflicts led to a 
fundamental disruption of stock exchange life and of confidence in the 
stock exchange. The competent authorities took the quickest possible action 
to ensure that these transactions would take place, whether on the stock 
exchange or not, in such circumstances as to safeguard transparency of 
the market through full disclosure, while the promotors of the bid had to 
treat all shareholders equally. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
these matters were settled by self-regulation; a statutory approach was 
chosen in France, Belgium and Italy. In the Netherlands, and to a limited 
extent in France and Belgium, the approach is not only a matter of stock 
exchange technique: the interests of the undertakings affected by the merger 
or take-over bid are, above all in the Netherlands, assessed from a wide 
socio-economic point of view. 
136. The attitude of the Member States concerning the abuse of inside in-
formation differs fairly widely. In the United Kingdom the question is 
dealt with in the regulations governing take-over bid: the basis lies 
in the support given by the professional groups of the City, administered 
by a self-regulating body, without any express powers of investigation or 
sanction. These professional groups have stated that they are willing 
to participate in detecting violations of the rules, and to curb contra-
ventions as a matter of internal discipline, possibly by suspension 
or expulsion of the offending member. There is said to be a wide consensus 
about giving at least some legal backing to this prohibition. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany we find in the Recommendations on Insider 
Trading ("Insider-Empfehlungen") - and also in the Rules for Dealers and 
Consultants ("Handler- und Beraterregeln") - an equally self-regulating 
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organizations in the financial sector but also by those associations 
grouping the major German industrial or commercial enterprises. Here 
again the code of behaviour is applied by a voluntary committee: if a 
violation has been established, the offending party is referred, for 
further action, to the professional association, or to his employer. 
Very serious violations can lead to public censure. Few applications of 
these rules are known up to the present. 
France has enacted legislation on insider trading which is administratively 
applied by the COB. Cases of application are rather rare here, too, 
although some court judgments have attracted considerable public attention. 
Lastly, mention should be made of the recommendations of the Banking 
Commission in Belgium, which in some cases has censured insider trading 
without being legally empowered to impose sanctions. Legislation is said 
to be in course of preparation in Belgium and, according to some reports, 
also in Italy. 
137. Special mention should also be made of the "Handler- und Beraterregeln" 
whereby German banks undertake not to place their own interests above 
those of their customers for whom they are acting on the stock exchange, 
or whom they are assisting as advisers. Application of these rules runs 
parallel with that of the "Insider-Empfehlungen"; no cases of application 
are known up to the present. Although the approach reflected in these 
rules can be said to be typically German, it should be noted that the 
conflict of interests in which investment consultants are placed when 
they also operate for their own account occurs in all countries and is 
governed only by common law. In Italy brokers are under the obligation 
to abstain from any security transactions for their own account, but this 
94 does not apply to the banks or other intermediaries. Unlike the 
negative approach represented by the German attitude, mention should 
be made of the American rule, known as the "suitability rule", whereby 
the security dealer may only recommend securities which are suitable 
for the client and whose suitability he has investigated. Acting with 
conflicting interests is strongly condemned, and repressed. 
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All security transactions which are not carried out on the stock exchange 
can be classified under the overall heading of "parallel" or "unofficial 
markets". This expression covers a great variety of submarkets, methods 
of trading,etc. 
I. STRUCTURED MARKETS 
A first category of "parallel securities markets" is still closely akin 
to the stock exchange market itself. These are the markets where more or 
Less regular dealings take place mainly in securities not yet admitted to 
stock exchange quotation. The major points of difference from the official 
market therefore lie in the admission conditions for the securities and in 
the techniques of price formation, which is often based on a much smaller 
volume than on the exchange market itself. For the sake of clarity these 
markets are summarized below: 
- In Belgium: the daily or twice-weekly auctions in unquoted securities 
held by the stock exchange authority. 
- In the Federal Republic of Germany: the "geregelter Freiverkehr" (regulated 
free market) brought into existence by the local security firms, run 
as a private organization by a "Freiverkehrsausschuss" (free market 
committee). 
- In France: the "marche hors cote" (off-the-list-market) organized by 
the Chambre Syndicale and reflected in a "releve quotidien de valeurs 
non admises a la cote" (daily list of securities not admitted to a 
quotation). 
- In Italy: the "mercato ristretto" (restricted market) established by the 
law of 23 February 1977 with its own managing body ("comitato del mercato 
ristretto"). 
- In Luxembourg and the Netherlands, auctions can be organized by the stock 
exchange management. This practice has largely fallen into disuse. 
The organizational pattern of these markets is based directly on that of the 
main exchange market. The intermediaries operating are the same as in the 
exchange market. In Belgium, France and Italy these are the same brokers, 
while in the Federal Republic of Germany the official brokers and unofficial 
brokers are particularly active here as intermediaries between the banks 
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and France, be dealt in on this market without following any admission 
procedure, nor has any decision to be taken. Neither is any disclosure 
organized, although stock exchange authorities in practice recommend some 
form of disclosure. In France, foreign securities may only be dealt in 
on this market if the Minister of Finance has at some time given his 
permission. This does not apply to Belgium, where in practice few foreign 
securities are traded outside the stock exchange. 
In the other two Member States an admission procedure has to be followed: 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, this procedure is much simpler than 
for admission to the exchange itself (less stringent requirements, no 
prospectus requirement). In Italy the "mercato ristretto" does not 
appear to have got off the ground yet because the admission requirements 
are for the moment at least as stringent as for the stock exchange market 
itself. A check on fulfilment of these requirements is kept in the Federal 
Republic of Germany by the "Freiverkehrsausschuss", and in Italy by CONSOB. 
The procedures for security trading are closely modelled on those of the 
official market: in France and Italy the rules are identical, while in 
Belgium securities are sold by the "call" procedure; in Germany market-
makers operate within bid and ask prices. In each of these countries prices 
(in Germany in the form of buying and selling rates) are published, often 
in an annex to the official price list. Actually this section of the market 
appears in many respects to enjoy the same legal protection as the stock 
exchange market itself: e.g. rules as to compulsory execution against a 
defaulting party, use of confirmation slips and their value as 
instruments of evidence, etc. 
The function of this market is usually described as being a preparation for 
admission to official trading. But several other functions can be dis-
tinguished, including the organization of a market without the co-operation 
or against the will of the issuer,or for securities not suitable for mass 
trading (for instance, medium-term notes in Belgium, lottery bonds), 
compulsory sales for the settlement of inheritances, or of trustee property 
of guardians, etc. 
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In most Member States there are other more or Less structured markets, 
the significance and extent of which appear difficult to assess. 
1. The secondary Eurobond trade 
139. The secondary trade in Eurobonds is the natural consequence of the issuing 
activity in these securities. Initially established mainly to stabilize 
prices in the post-issue period, this market appears in recent years to 
have developed and grown considerably. Little precise data is available 
concerning the secondary Eurobond market: this is the result both of its 
recent blossoming and of the international and exclusively interbank nature 
of the market. As this trade does not belong exclusively to any of the 
national security-dealing systems, some information about it is given below. 
The trade relates to Eurobonds. Without attempting to define the term 
Eurobonds, one can indicate that it refers to bonds issued by public bodies 
(States, international institutions, public enterprises, provinces, muni-
cipalities) or private borrowers, outside their national legal order, 
and denominated in a currency which is freely chosen but is often an 
internationally accepted currency or currency formula. As far as 
their duration is concerned, both long-term securities (bonds, debentures) 
and medium-term ("notes") or short-term securities (CDs, certificates of 
deposit) are encountered. These securities are always bearer securities 
but circulate mainly in the form of book-keeping entries with clearing 
organizations. Shares are not dealt in on this market: only a few Japanese 
shares have been floated here in the form of bearer certificates specially 
designed for this purpose; however, as a further development of this market 
it is expected that shares will become more frequent, both at issue and in 
the secondary trade. 
The trade in Eurobonds takes place between major banks and specialized banking 
concerns. The London merchant bankers, the European branches or subsidiaries 
98 of American banks, the major Swiss banks, the Larger German, Belgian 
and Dutch banks and their Luxembourg subsidiaries, together with some 
stockbroking firms, can be said to constitute the core of the market. 
But there are no admission conditions or territorial limitations, so that 
the volume of realised securities business and not the legal status is 
considered to be the decisive factor for entering this market. Between 
banks, the trade takes place in the name of the bank and often for the own 
account: unlike on the stock exchange market, commission business is not 
preponderant here. As a result of this method of dealing, so-called 
"market-makers" or "market-holders" have come to the fore: they systemati-
cally buy and sell securities for their own account. Usually they are also 
in close contact with owners of large portfolios of the securities in 
question. They play a preponderant role on the market, where they are 
generally regarded as being prepared to act as the counterparty for the 
usual quantities. As a result of this activity they publish price lists 
showing bid and ask prices. The normal market price can be set within 
the limits of these prices. From the strictly legal point of view, these 
price lists are not binding. Furthermore they do not provide any guarantee 
that no negotiations will take place outside the indicated range. For 
instance, price reductions for large orders frequently occur. 
This trade cannot be clearly located geographically. It is predominantly 
conducted by means of telecommunications, a larger or smaller number of 
individual contacts being made for each transaction. Principals give orders 
from all over the world. The transactions are as a rule executed through 
the intermediary of one of the two accepted clearing organizations, 
Euroclear and Cedel. 
140. This trade takes place for the most part outside the ambit of any national 
regulatory system. The markedly international character and high degree of 
potential volatility of this business explain the reluctance of national 
authorities to intervene by imposing regulations. The spontaneous tendency 
to move towards areas with the least degree of regulation leads to a certain 
legal vacuum. 
Nevertheless, this market has several points of contact with the national 
regulatory systems. A first very important point is derived from the rule, 
existing in all Member States (except for Italy), whereby only recognized 
or registered securities dealers are allowed to trade in securities. As a 
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public: obstacles of foreign exchange legislation, unfamiliarity with 
the medium, etc. have the effect of causing this market to be generally 
confined to professionals or to more sophisticated investors. 
A second point of connection is more technical in nature. Very often 
prudential financial regulation, or the applicable trust deed, or other 
similar rules prevent institutional investors from investing in unquoted 
securities. Therefore quotation on a stock exchange is practically always 
sought for Eurobonds what makes them suitable for the investment insti-
tutions. The Stock Exchanges of Luxembourg, Frankfurt and London appear to 
have included many of these securities in their quotation lists. In the 
other European stock exchanges Eurobonds are encountered only sporadically 
(Amsterdam, Brussels) or not at all (for instance Paris, Milan, Copenhagen). 
Admission to a stock exchange quotation does not, however, go along with 
extensive trading on the exchange: although no figures are known, stock 
exchange dealings in Luxembourg are estimated at ten per cent of the overall 
turnover in these securities of the Luxembourg banks. Actually only small 
transactions (so-called odd lots) are carried out here, while the other 
transactions are arranged direct between the banks. No numerical data are 
to hand for the other stock exchanges. In London the market operates 
primarily between merchant banks: as these are not members of the stock 
exchange association, there is no obligation for these transactions to be 
carried out on the stock exchange. 
Upon admission to exchange quotation, the exchange authorities apply the 
same rules as for any other bond issue. There appear to be no substantial 
relaxations of the admission conditions or of the supervision. There is 
merely less strict supervision about the wide distribution of the securities 
among investors and of the circulation of the prospectus, which has to be 
prepared and submitted for examination in any case. The customary prospectus 
for Eurobond issues largely complies with the American practice and is 
supplemented by the competent control authority's own requirements. 
Apart from what precedes, the Eurobond trade is not regulated. An important 
effort towards self-regulation is being made by the "Association of Inter-
national Bond Dealers" (A.I.B.D.) established in Zurich, of which all banks 
active in this business are members. According to the statutes of this 
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discussion of questions relating to the international securities markets 
and to issue rules which will govern their functions" and also "to establish 
and maintain a close liaison between the primary and secondary markets in 
1 
international securities" . The association has formulated an extensive 
set of rules and recommendations concerning trading in Eurobonds. These 
rules govern, among other things, the legal framing of the transactions. 
From this point of view these rules are comparable to a traditional set 
of regulations for securities transactions (interpretation of the orders, 
minimum quantities, non-standard conditions, confirmation notes, payment 
and delivery, execution, etc.).As far as market management is concerned, 
the only rule worthy of special mention here, is the rule whereby secondary 
market transactions are discouraged prior to the signing of the undei— 
writing distribution agreements or on an "if, as and when issued" basis -
2 
a rule which is also to be found in American securities regulation . 
2. The telephone markets 
141. In nearly all Member States, transactions outside the stock exchange, even 
in quoted securities, are carried out without the brokers having to meet 
physically on an exchange floor. As these dealings mainly take place by 
telephone, they can be referred to as "the telephone markets". 
a. Telephone dealings in quoted securities 
142. In several countries quoted securities are dealt in outsioe the stock 
exchange. Only in France is this severely restricted and control exercised 
by the corporation. In the Netherlands the same basic rule applies, but 
there are many departures from it: before- and after-hours dealings of 
brokers are used as means of arbitrage for international Dutch securities. 
In Belgium the banks appear to deal in quoted bonds from their own portfolios. 
1 
Own translation of Art. 2(2) and (3) of the statutes of the A.I.B.D. 
Recommendation in Rule 161 of the A.I.B.D. 
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out the transactions on the stock exchange. The last-mentioned principle 
applies in the United Kingdom, and it is assumed that practically all 
transactions in quoted securities take place on the stock exchange. An 
exception is made for large blocks, as their execution in the market would 
have a disturbing effect. Another exception was already mentioned and 
relates to Eurobonds. These transactions are effected outside the exchange, 
by or with the assistance of merchant banks. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany the current securities business has also to be brought to the 
exchange: how much business is diverted from the floor is unknown. 
In Luxembourg, Denmark and Italy there is no obligation at all to carry out 
the dealings on the stock exchange. The stock exchange market is merely a 
subdivision of the overall interbank market. 
143. In all Member States, block transactions can be executed outside the exchange, 
with the assistance of a securities dealer. In France, the corporation has 
to give its approval for these transactions, while certain conditions apply 
in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In Belgium the law generally 
allows transfers outside the stock exchange, while in Germany block trans-
actions are considered to be an acceptable departure from general contract 
conditions which the banks have undertaken to observe. Only in London 
have special facilities been organized for the execution of these transactions. 
b. Telephone dealings in unquoted securities 
144. Except in France, where unquoted securities are dealt in through brokers 
in a structured "hors cote" (outside the stock exchange) market, there appear 
to be limited organized markets in unquoted securities in only two Member 
States. 
In the Netherlands two stock exchange member firms organize a market in 
so-called "unlisted securities" ("incourante fondsen"), most of which have 
a rather thin market. The corporation of securities brokers has granted, 
in fact, a monopoly to these two member firms, authorizing them - and no 
other firms - to publish price lists for these securities. On this basis 
these firms have set up a specialized trade, and offer to investors the 
102 the related services and facilities, such as documentation concerning 
the issuers, centralization of orders, finding of potential buyers, 
quotation list, etc. In principle they act as mere intermediaries between 
buyers and sellers, limiting themselves to bring the parties together. 
In the United Kingdom there has been a similar phenomenon for about the 
last four years. Here a firm of "licensed dealers", without the cooperation 
of the Stock Exchange, has organized a so-called "ovei—the-counter market" 
in 15 securities of 12 companies. This firm, too, makes its services 
available to the public and provides, among other things, information about 
the issuers, the trend of quotations, etc. There is a prospect of extension 
of its activity to the primary market. The firm also acts as a mere intei— 
mediary. 
145. In the other Member States security dealers also act as market-makers in 
unquoted securities. This is the case with a few free brokers in 
Frankfurt and a few brokers in Brussels. But they do not specially 
advertise this part of their business. No statistical data about this 
business are known. The same applies to transactions in unquoted securities, 
for which brokers have not given any assistance, or in which they merely 
registered the pre-existing transfer between the parties.These trans-
actions are of a more exceptional nature (for instance transfer of a 
controlling block) or are considered not to belong to the ordinary 
securities business (e.g. transfer of shares between institutional 
investors, for which it is only required in France that a security dealer 
shall act as intermediary). 
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THE MAJOR SYSTEMS OF SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE EEC 
146. If one Looks at the different systems of securities regulation in each 
of the nine European Member States, it appears that one can distinguish 
three organizational patterns. As a relevant criterion for this classi-
fication, it is proposed to weigh corporative influence and intervention 
against State or public action. According to this criterion, Europe would be 
divided geographically. This division conceals however more profound 
differences. On the one hand, one finds a Northern European pattern, as found 
in the United Kingdom, in Ireland and the Netherlands, and on the other hand, 
and in sharp contrast, a French and Italian pattern with the emphasis on 
State control. Between the two there is a transitional area consisting of 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic of Germany. This division is 
not fortuitous: it is to be found in several fields of social organization 
and human behaviour. Some speak here of the Protestant, Germanic north, 
as against the Catholic Romance south. 
1. THE NORTHERN PATTERN OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
147. In the northern European countries, securities regulation is essentially 
stock exchange regulation. This pattern is marked by an organization which 
is mainly based on private law, whereby rules are framed or imposed by 
making use primarily of the technique of the law of associations and of 
the law of contract. The State holds itself completely aloof, but respects 
the private organization and sometimes gives it some privileges. Pressure 
is, however, being exerted from several quarters in favour of more official 
supervision and action. The private stock exchange system has resisted 
these attacks by various means including further extension of its private-
law organization and control, and by incorporation into its private body of 
rules of norms which in other countries had to be imposed by State action. 
Owing partly to the fact that these are the most important securities 
markets in the European Community, the whole regulatory machinery in these 
countries cannot be said to be any less comprehensive or less incisive 
than the regulatory patterns which are to be found in the southern countries 
where the organization and rules are established primarily by the State. 
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countries by generally imposed public regulations are here included either 
in associative rules or in commitments which can probably be characterized 
as private contract Law arrangements. This approach also influences the 
emphasis which is laid on certain matters rather than on others. We thus 
find that in both countries the rules concerning membership, as regards 
both its acquisition and maintenance, receive special attention. The 
reliability of the stock exchange system depends to an appreciable extent 
on the reliability of the members of the association, including their 
reliability as regards compliance with the association's regulations and 
as regards correct execution of stock exchange transactions. The annual 
renewal of membership of the (United Kingdom and Ireland) Stock Exchange, 
or the extensiveness of the regulations and controls regarding the solvency 
and financial position of the members, can be mentioned as examples. The 
stringency of these rules contrasts sharply with the controls in Belgium, 
Luxembourg and even Italy, which are confined to mere access of the candidate 
to the market. The associative basis also pervades the decision by which 
securities are admitted to the market: a member of the association has to 
support the application, whereby he testifies the correctness of the sub-
mitted information. One could analyse the admission decision as declaring 
the security eligible for trade among members, so that one could hold the 
association liable for the reputability of the proposed investment and whether 
good delivery of the securities can be made (e.g. as to their material form). 
In both countries the stock exchange authorities' action appears not only 
to affect the field of information and disclosure but in addition to impose 
very far-reaching rules of organization and behaviour on issuers. Although 
this is done on a contractual basis, the issuer's freedom is here sometimes 
appreciably restricted. This policing effort, which has not reached a 
comparable development in the other countries, can be attributed to the 
same, above-mentioned philosophy, namely that the association has to secure 
the smoothness of its members' securities dealings, by,inter alia full dis-
closure of all relevant information to all market participants, or by 
expelling securities that would disrupt the market. The market organization 
reflects this concern: in both countries we find the institution, not 
existing in any other country, of the jobber or "hoekman". The market-
regulating action of these operators is experienced as a favourable 
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sought. The battle against market-distorting started earlier in these 
countries than in others; the result however may be different in form: 
examples are rules against corporate "raiding" ("overval") or even on 
take-over, insider trading, etc. It seems significant that cases of market 
manipulation are investigated, in London, on a systematic basis. 
148. The private-law basis confines the regulations to stock exchange dealings, 
and does not cover the whole security system. Although the issue of securities 
is not supervised, this absence has in both countries been Largely compensated 
for. The stock exchange authorities make admission of the securities 
contingent upon the submission of the issuer to their control as early as 
the time of issue. The same question arises with regard to the people 
involved in the securities business: the association's supervision does not 
extend to all participants in securities affairs: this is the case with 
investment consultants in the Netherlands, and with securities dealers 
of all kinds in the United Kingdom, who are subject only to the rather loose 
supervision of the Department of Trade. The association's powers of investi-
gation, inspection and imposition of sanctions are rather limited. Criticism 
has been levelled against these restrictions and also against the secret 
and discretionary manner in which these powers are used. The judicial 
authorities appear to have been very reluctant, and perhaps not entitled, 
to intervene in these affairs of the corporation. 
This completely private form of organization also means that the stock 
exchange system is largely tailored to the interests of the association 
and its members. These interests are viewed broadly and are understood to 
include the functioning of the securities market as an efficient, flexible 
market, assuring fair and reliable price-formation. Institutionally at least, 
the general interest is not included. The stock exchange authority is fully 
aware of its responsibility to the public at large, without this inducing 
it to make structural adjustments or undertake purposeful efforts to promote 
the public interest. Primarily with respect to the exchanges' function in 
the overall securities business, and in company life, especially with regard 
to the role of the exchange in financing industry, this mainly associative 
structure of the exchange managements appears to have given rise to certain 
criticisms. It is precisely action with regard to the admission of securities 
and the related policy towards these companies, that has prompted state 
intervention in some other Member States. 
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exchange managements have given to their pursuit of the public interest. 
There are, it is true, unofficial contacts with interested authorities, 
for instance with the Bank of England in London. The need for written 
justification to the general public of policy decisions (for instance by 
means of annual reports) is felt, and has partly been translated into action 
in the Netherlands. 
2. THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN REGULATORY PATTERN 
149. The central European pattern of securities regulation is to be found in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and, with some differences, also in Belgium 
and Luxembourg. It is also encountered in Austria and Switzerland. It 
consists of a limited intermixture of official and corporative intervention, 
the public authority confining itself to making available the required 
legal, technical (1) and corporative frameworks and delegating the manage-
ment of the stock markets, either by law or de facto, to corporative bodies. 
The public authority itself does not participate in the management but 
reserves the right to keep a check on the exercise of these powers by the 
corporative bodies. This check is as a rule confined to legality, or refers 
to a vague general public interest. No references to any official policy 
with regard to securities are found. Furthermore the public authority only 
keeps check on decisions and does not maintain a watch over the overall 
behaviour and above all not over what the corporations refrain from doing. 
The corporative bodies do not appear to be required anywhere to account 
for their policy as a whole, for instance in an annual report, either to 
the public authority or to public opinion. Furthermore the public authority 
cannot give any instructions to the corporative bodies or induce them to 
take action. For this it would have to have recourse to changes of the 
statute. Only if there is a danger of general confidence in the stock 
exchange or the securities system being shaken, for instance by a big crisis, 
1 
For instance by lifting the prohibition on forward transactions, or by 
enacting statutes enabling securities transfers to be cleared by book 
entries, etc. 
108 can the State intervene and close the stock exchanges. As the Largest 
borrower of capital and the authority responsible for monetary policy, it 
thereby safeguards the public interest. The delegation of the right of 
management to corporative bodies seems to have greatly weakened the 
public authorities' further interest in the stock exchange system, even 
on the plane of control. The absence of any administrative control bureau-
cracy of any dimension and the rarity of its interventions can be pointed 
to here as external indications. 
150. Belgium and Luxembourg call for special mention here. In both countries 
the official control agency, which supervises disclosure on issue of 
securities or on their admission to stock exchange quotation, has extended 
its authority over certain aspects of their securities markets, more 
particularly over those directly related to the "stock exchange status" 
of quoted companies, their conduct and other duties. The action is informal 
and based more on persuasion and prestige than on legal powers. The Belgian 
Banking Commission has been more active in this field than its Luxembourg 
sister institution: it deals with questions such as the transfer of con-
trolling shares, or the regulation of take-overs, etc., fields of action in 
which not so much the exchange's mechanisms and its functioning, as the 
consequences in company law retain its attention. Other fields of action 
deal with shareholders' preemptive rights, the publication of annual reports, 
particularly containing consolidated financial statements, etc. This general 
company law oriented tendency links up with one of the feature of the 
southern European organization pattern, which is analysed below. The action 
here remains informal, however, and rarely affects stock exchange behaviour 
itself, nor the behaviour of brokers or other persons concerned with the 
securities trade. 
151. The corporative bodies govern the stock exchange system mainly in accordance 
with corporative requirements and interests. We thus find quite strict, 
sometimes discretionary (1) admission rules for new members of the corporation, 
but little attention is paid to the permanent conditions of membership, 
1 
Since the revision of the German Stock Exchange Law in 1975, admission of 
security dealers to trading on the stock exchange is a legal right for 
anyone who meets the conditions laid down. This is not the case in the other 
countries dealt with here. 
109 including the financial obligations. Considerable interest is taken in 
the technical operation of the market (price determination), while much 
less interest is shown in the behaviour of the principals (no stock-exchange-
oriented regulations concerning take-over bids, insider trading or other 
types of manipulation; hesitation with regard to suspension of dealings, no 
permanent stock watch programmes for detecting abnormal price movements). 
The concentration of all transactions in quoted securities on the exchange 
market is not felt to be a fundamental requirement. The German banks only 
gave way on this point under very heavy pressure from the Government. In 
Belgium, too, the rule had to be laid down by law. Lastly, there is the 
whole area of the relations between the exchange management and the companies 
whose securities are quoted: this relationship is confined to the admission 
decision, with its corresponding disclosure; it does not extend to a 
follow-up on a permanent basis. In some countries issuers are put under 
pressure to enlarge disclosure of material information to yearly or half-
yearly reports. This pressure does not come from the stock exchange bodies 
but from the public authorities (Banking Commission) or from the industrial 
associations (Germany). Although there is concern among the stock exchange 
leaders about the exchange's proper place in the overall financial system, 
few sign of this spirit is to be found in the way the corporations have 
developed the stock exchange system. 
3. THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION PATTERN 
152. The southern European organization pattern (France and Italy) has grown up 
from a stock exchange system which once was comparable to the above described 
central-European pattern. The stock exchange management was entrusted to the 
corporation, but the State, worrying about its financial needs, reserved to 
itself certain powers of intervention with regard to appointment or dismissal 
of brokers. In practice, in these countries, too, the corporation managed 
the entire stock exchange functioning. Only with the laws of 1967, in France, 
and of 1974, in Italy, was government intervention further extended. Certain 
parts of securities regulation were withdrawn from corporative decision 
making, and non-corporative supervision was introduced on stock exchange 
110 business. Although the stock exchange system in the two countries displays 
great similarities, points of difference seem to indicate a higher degree 
of State intervention in Italy than in France. This tendency can be 
deduced from the texts of the statutes. Whether this tendency will be con-
firmed in their application, cannot yet be said, as the Italian control 
agency has so far only partly carried out its tasks. 
153. The general organization pattern is introduced by legislation. At the 
same time authority is vested in the subsidiary bodies, both public and 
corporative. 
154. The corporation is composed of the brokers, who are obliged to be members. 
The brokers are appointed by the political authority, the Minister of 
Finance, whose free right of appointment is as a rule restricted. The minister 
is entitled to exercise some powers of higher supervision over these, his 
ministerial officers: only the minister and not the corporation can impose 
the stricter disciplinary measures (suspension, dismissal) which put an end 
to the official mandate. Actual control over brokers - over compliance with 
the requirements for their appointment or with their financial obligations -
is exercised not by the minister but by the corporation, whjch informs the 
minister and proposes any sanctions. 
155. The corporation itself is not subject to State supervision. Nor are there 
any measures of higher supervision. The powers which are vested in the 
corporation and which are exercised by the latter mainly through the issuing 
of the stock exchange regulations are much wider in France than in Italy. 
In both cases we find that they cover all "personal" matters, such as 
supervision of the brokers, or of their financial and other obligations, 
disciplinary investigations, etc. In France, the corporation is also entitled 
to ensure the general management of the official market, including its 
organization, the type of transactions suitable to exchange dealing; opening 
and closing times, etc. This power also involves the day-to-day running of 
the exchange market. In Italy this last-mentioned field was primarily reserved 
to a corporative body while the Government reserved innumerable aspects 
of stock exchange management for the public body mentioned below. 
HI 156. A second Line of organization was added hereto, in France in 1967 and 
in Italy in 1974-1975. This change forms part of a more extensive renewal 
of the legal machinery for promoting business financing. With regard to 
financing through securities issue, a similar course was taken in both 
countries. The new policy was entrusted to a newly established public 
agency, in France the Commission des operations de bourse (COB) and in Italy 
the Cotnmissione nazionale per le societa e la borsa (CONSOB). These agencies 
are, firstly, independent in relation to the central State authority: apart 
from appointing the members of the commission, the minister does not exercise 
any appreciable general supervision. Special supervisory rights apply with 
regard to their regulatory decisions. Secondly, these agencies are composed 
of persons from different circles. The formulation of an independent policy 
attuned to the general interest is left to the interplay of forces resulting 
from the individual interests and views of each of the members of these 
commissions. These agencies have a dual function: they are not merely 
control bodies but also have powers of action, including action with regard 
to the admission of securities and to general market organization. The 
Government thus appears to have extended its duty of safeguarding public 
confidence into an active policy with regard to the securities system, with 
a further view towards promoting business financing. 
157. The allocation of powers was in both countries effected by a decree with 
force of law: clear instructions concerning the exercise of the powers 
were not always provided, so that these agencies are empowered to decide 
upon their own policy in the fields of securities regulation assigned to 
them. 
The powers of these agencies can in the first place be defined negatively. 
The matters which affect brokers personally as well as corporative matters 
which have no immediate repercussion on the operation of the exchange 
markets were unchanged and thus continue to come under the jurisdiction 
of the corporation and the ministry. This status quo is all the more 
surprising as in both countries the brokers have for a long time been 
112 regarded as "ministerial officers" and therefore already belong to the 
public sphere. The phenomenon cannot be explained by the balance of power 
alone: the legislators judged that an intervention with regard to the 
personal status of brokers was not appropriate for the attainment of their 
aims. For the achievement of these the public body was given powers in two 
other fields, mentioned below. 
158. The most important field of action, assigned to the newly established public 
agencies, is found to concern, in both countries, the relationship between 
the stock exchange market and the business world. In France, the new issue 
market formed a necessary part of the COB's powers, while in Italy there are 
plans to extend CONSOB's powers to securities issues. In both countries 
the central core of the new agencies' powers lies in the admission of 
securities to quotation, or their removal from official trading. The right 
to admit securities includes the fixing of conditions for their admission; 
in Italy these conditions will have to be laid down in a regulatory decision 
by CONSOB. In both countries, the agency is also entitled to impose admission 
of securities to the official market: although in practice difficult to use, 
it seems indicative of the underlying philosophy that this power has been 
conferred to these agencies. As a complement to their admission power, the 
control agencies in both countries are empowered to supervise the information 
which is published by the issuers of securities, whether obligatorily or 
voluntarily. The agency cannot, however, impose new forms of disclosure. 
It can co-ordinate and extend existing forms of disclosure in order to 
make the entire system more meaningful. The statute has granted only limited 
means of action to realise an overall disclosure policy: the French COB 
mainly relies on persuasion, on motivating of issuers for the new disclosure 
approach, while trying at the same time to obtain their understanding and 
co-operation. Companies applying for admission to quotation are made aware 
of the important significance and of the further implications of the 
advocated disclosure policy and are encouraged to expand it as fully as possible. 
Issue disclosure excepted, there is no prior control on the other forms 
of information: the control agency would seem above all to be the survey and 
analysis center of the larger, quoted companies, that keeps in touch with 
them and would, if necessary, correct any attitude or lines of conduct felt 
to be wrong. In several cases the public authority appears to have gone 
113 beyond the field of information. Recommendations are made to the companies 
with regard to their conduct, particularly those aspects of it which can 
have direct impact on the financial markets. Mention may be made here of 
the French agency's action with regard to occasional information, or its 
recommendations to revitalize the role of the shareholders may be cited 
as examples along with the compaign for greater public awareness of the 
damaging effects of insider trading, or market manipulations. From this 
still incompletely differentiated set of rules there could one day be 
developed a code of conduct, regulating quoted companies' behaviour and 
duties with respect to the broad and moving body of present and future 
shareholders, and the financial public at large. 
159. In addition to their powers with regard to issuers, both the French and 
the Italian control agencies appear to dispose of considerable action and 
control instruments in connection with exchange transactions. Thus the 
French control agency, in this case along with the corporative authorities,has 
been empowered to impose generally applicable measures with respect to the 
functioning of the exchange markets. This statute enabled the COB to adopt 
rules designed to keep the behaviour of principals for exchange transactions 
within certain reasonable bounds (mainly in the field of take-over bids, 
but also in that of the sale of controlling shares or block transactions). 
The Italian CONSOB has very considerable powers to regulate stock exchange 
dealings: it can regulate the types of transactions and their legal 
characteristics, work out local stock exchange ordinances, etc. The public 
agency is not concerned with actual stock exchange dealings: the organization 
of these is left to corporatively organized bodies, possibly, as in Italy, 
possessing the right to keep check on compliance with the rules regarding 
price determination. But in addition a new field of control has been opened 
up for government action. This function could be described as keeping watch 
over the honesty of stock exchange dealings. Its purpose, directly linked to 
enhancing the transparency of securities markets, is to prevent public 
confidence from being shaken or undermined by market manipulation, such 
as have occurred in the past, by detecting and sanctioning insider trading, 
or by restraining the manoeuvres of the contestants in take-over battles. 
In France this task is regarded as part of the COB's general function of 
114 keeping watch over the "proper functioning of the exchange markets". In 
the first years, implementation of this mandate related mainly to take-over 
bids, a field in which both the Compagnie des Agents de Change and the COB 
took regulatory action. More recently attention has been directed towards 
cases of insider trading brought to light by the COB as part of its general 
task of market surveillance. Abnormal looking price variations are systemati-
cally tracked down, and if no acceptable explanation is found, are further 
investigated. In France, there is no general interdiction of market mani-
pulation (comp. the American Rule 10 b-5) : only in cases of insider trading 
has the COB been active to investigate and to send offenders to the judicial 
authorities. In other cases, action was confined to a recommendation. 
In Italy, too, a first step has been taken in this direction: here C0NS0B 
is empowered to examine the regularity of stock exchange transactions and 
of the methods of financing of security transactions not only at the brokers' 
offices, but also at all banks and other financial intermediaries, as well 
as at companies, or enterprises whose shares or securities are quoted on 
an exchange. The right of investigation expressly includes government 
organizations. As yet there are no general provisions in force in Italy 
prohibiting market manipulation or insider trading. 
160. The southern European system has been radically changed in the quite recent 
past. Powers, mainly with regard to admission of securities, have been 
taken away from the corporative bodies and entrusted to a newly established 
public body. Implicitly this public body is given a general function of 
stimulating not so much the stock exchange system as the relations between 
companies and the investing public. Mainly using disclosure as instrument 
for their action, these agencies make an effort to create an atmosphere 
of trust and mutual understanding on the basis of which, the investing public's 
interest in the companies, and in providing those companies with risk-
capital, is to be fostered. The public body is acting here not only as 
the censor but also as the animator of the securities system. The control 
powers with regard to stock exchange transactions are governed by the same 
philosophy: the moral soundness of security dealings on the stock exchange 
must be guaranteed and market-distorting factors must be excluded, because 
115 this is the prerequisite for the restoration of public confidence. 
For this it is necessary to ensure that stock exchange trading shall take 
place not only flexibly, quickly, efficiently and "transparently" but also 
in a manner which is sufficiently moral and conducive to confidence; 
manipulation, "raiding" and insider trading are calculated t0 undermine 
confidence. In both sectors where powers are conferred, the fostering of 
public confidence is the primary aim of government policy. This is undei— 
standable if one bears in mind the fact that in both cases the reform of 
the stock exchange system was carried out in order to stimulate business 
financing, especially by the provision of risk capital. This form of 
credit-granting, like any other, requires confidence on the part of those 
providing the capital. The use of the Government's authority to promote 
confidence has long been an element of the State's financial policy. The 
field of application and the means employed, on the other hand, are new. 
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HARMONIZATION PROPOSALS 
1. REASONS FOR THE FORMULATION OF A TWO-PART PROPOSAL 
161. The present state of the European securities market could be schematically 
presented as follows. On the one hand there are a number of national 
submarkets which mainly serve as a secondary market, usually for shares of 
national companies. These markets as a rule have an individual cast: 
rules of national securities regulation form the basis of local, national 
methods of negotiation and price formation, of local requirements for 
persons and securities, etc. The partitioning between the national sub-
markets is due largely to foreign exchange or monetary measures. 
Even intheabsence of these the bridges between them are narrow and only 
usable to a limited extent. Arbitrage appears to have been revived for 
some time now under the influence of telecommunications. Nevertheless, 
there cannot be said to be any wide, unified securities market: lack of 
transparency, unfamiliarity with other markets or pure absence of interest 
contribute to this fragmentation. Here again there are many nuances: so
me 
markets operate in contact with others, while others function in a more 
self-contained way (examples are Italy and Denmark). 
Above these national submarkets there extends the extremely important 
international securities market. Its Eurobond sector is undoubtedly the 
most important: as an issue market it is bigger than any one of the 
national issue markets and it is also assumed - despite the lack of 
statistical data - that the scale of secondary trading puts most national 
markets in its shade. The extensive financing facilities found here by 
States and by government or private undertakings, the flexible procedures 
117 and, altogether, the efficiency of the issue practice have induced many an 
issuer and banker, irrespective of where they are Located in the world, 
to choose this market in preference to their national capital market. 
The residents of several Member States can freely, or subject to certain 
limitations, invest in these securities, the attractiveness of which is 
enhanced by the de facto freedom from personal income tax levied on the 
interest coupons. Despite certain links with the system of securities 
regulation of some of the Member States, this market is not subject to any 
control regulations. This does not, under normal circumstances, make its 
operation any less safe. 
162. With this de facto situation as the starting point, an attempt will now be 
made to indicate the sectors in which the present systems of regulation 
can be harmonized. It may be expected that these harmonization activities 
will remove the obstacles which at present still bar the way to interstate 
security dealings. But we must look further. In addition to the removal 
of the obstacles, we must examine what measures can contribute to more 
efficient, safe and above all intensive interstate securities transactions. 
Ultimately the question must be posed whether we ought not rather to strive 
to achieve an integrated European securities market which covers the whole 
Community and in which anyone meeting the generally applicable conditions 
can participate . 
163. The angle of approach chosen here is that of securities regulation, from 
which the various interventions relating to securities have been analysed. 
That several other kinds of measure represent a serious obstacle to inter-
state security dealings needs no proof. Foreign exchange regulations some-
times have the effect of directly restricting interstate trading. But tax 
118 rules, or regulations and practices concerning transfer of securities 
by book transfers or clearing of transactions, and even purely technical 
regulations (the printing of the certificates) can produce rigidities, 
distortions and sometimes serious hindrances to integration of securities 
markets. 
These subjects have had to be disregarded here, even though they are of 
essential importance for the integration of securities markets. All that 
can be done here is to express the hope that, in parallel with the studies 
and harmonization activities on the structural plane studied here, 
continued efforts will be made - or action initiated if necessary - to 
remove these hindrances to trading in securities. 
164. The harmonization of the structural rules concerning the securities markets 
ultimately serves to expand the financing possibilities of public author-
ities and business undertakings. The making available of more and as a 
rule cheaper capital can be regarded as a condition for economic prosperity. 
Harmonization therefore aims at removing the obstacles which prevent or 
impede access to the capital or securities markets. Access to the capital 
markets must be possible in all Member States in similar or at least 
non-competition-distorting circumstances. And the lenders of money, the 
investors, in all Member States must enjoy the same kinds of safeguards. 
In fact the harmonization process plays a more radical role: it leads to 
a levelling of the national systems of regulations, not always -
as people are sometimes inclined to assert-at the level of least regulation. 
119 Furthermore it contributes towards the development, in policy-making 
circles among others, of a more all-embracing view with regard to the 
function and organization of security markets. 
165. Up to the present the European Community has usually looked at harmonization 
with regard to securities regulation from the above-mentioned point of view. 
This approach has given rise to the proposals for directives concerning the 
prospectus to be published in connection with the admission of securities 
to a stock exchange quotation, or concerning conditions for admission of 
securities to stock exchange quotation. The recommendation of a European Code of 
Conduct for security transactions must not be left unmentioned here, 
nor the activities planned or now in progress concerning canvassing, 
continuous information, insider trading, etc. 
In the present state of development of the European Community this approach 
is undoubtedly the one most legally justifiable and, above all, is probably 
the most realistic and feasible. For these reasons this is the Line of 
thinking that will be followed and developed here. In the following 
sections (Nos. 168 to 201) an indication will be given of some fields of 
securities regulation, which in the light of the comparative law analysis, 
could be considered for further efforts towards convergence. Some fields may 
appear to be of more immediate interest for the liberalisation of inter— 
state securities trading . Nevertheless, an overall effort for the 
harmonization of the whole system remains, since all fields are inter-
dependent, the only sound approach. 
166. By both design and method, harmonization of national regulations is 
essentially a limited approach. It tends to be very much concerned with 
detail, aiming at regulating all points down to the smallest particulars, 
120 and this greatly impedes and slows down the decision-making process.Further-
more, it is in fact only possible to harmonize in those fields where most, and 
above all the most influential, Member States have themselves either taken 
regulatory action or at least have favoured self-regulatory action. 
Harmonization can therefore hardly ever have a renewing effect: it remains 
bound to the paths which some or several of the Member States have taken, 
without being capable of developing individual, new views of its qwn. 
Lastly, harmonization always takes place in a limited sector of the whole 
system, which is not conducive to coherence and sometimes causes the inter-
relationships to be lost sight of. 
It would therefore appear to be useful, in the light of the comparative 
survey of legislation, to take a look at the whole system and formulate 
a few ideas capable of inspiring future development and initiatives 
concerning the organization of securities markets. 
As a starting point of this line of reasoning we find the doubt as 
to the integrating power of harmonization. Integration of the markets 
cannot take place before the removal of the various structural, fiscal, 
foreign exchange and other obstacles. Whether this means that integration 
will actually take place can be doubted. Will an additional effort not 
have to be made in order to promote foreign securities among the investors 
and their advisers in each of the Member States? Even if all markets were 
freely accessible, will the mutual comparability of securities from 
different Member States be impeded by innumerable factors, including, for 
instance, market techniques or book-keeping methods, etc? If integration 
is to come about on its own force , the question arises as to in what 
circumstances and according to what rules this process is to take place. 
Will a supra-national equity market grow up in addition to the present 
Eurobond market? Some people are of the opinion that it is best to leave 
the markets to the inherent forces which govern them. Others believe that 
121 it is better to follow the developments very closely and to get 
hold on them, and monitor the creation of the new market. 
167. In the light of these developments, two series of proposals are formulated 
in the following sections. A first series concerns the fields in which 
harmonization activities can be undertaken in the near future. The second 
series of proposals should be regarded primarily as a discussion basis, 
as a long-term model. The two series of proposals can be considered 
separately. Actually they are intended to be complementary: partial 
harmonization in no way prevents the coming into existence of integrated 
trading, but in fact contributes to it. But integrated trading can be 
brought about separately from harmonization in the sub-areas mentioned 
below, and would without doubt greatly simplify harmonization. 
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DEALINGS IN SECURITIES 
The harmonization proposals relate to the most important sectors of 
regulation and control of securities. Although from many points of view 
there are close interconnections between the various proposals, it is 
preferable to consider each one separately. 
2.1 DISCLOSURE ON ISSUE OF SECURITIES 
168. In the majority of the Member States there is no disclosure required 
on the public issue of securities. Only in three of the nine Member 
States is supervision exercised with regard to the issue information pro-
vided to investors. In these countries the protection of investors on 
subscription appears to be more fully organized. 
In the present state of affairs an undeniable need for issue disclosure 
can be felt, above all in those countries where issue control takes effect 
only upon admission of the securities to a stock exchange quotation. This 
need is all the greater because the securities concerned as a rule are 
not proposed for exchange trading, or would net qualify anyway, whether 
for lack of quality or for other reasons. 
It does not appear desirable to require all Member States to introduce 
information control on issue. The differences in the regulatory tradition 
between the two groups of Member States are too great for such a radical 
interference with the regulatory system to be regarded as a practicable 
proposal. Moreover, for most transactions, disclosure on admission to 
quotation seems to be of equal quality as would be required on issue. 
The institutional implications of the organization of information control 
on issue are considerable, and are usually rejected as undesirable in these 
Member States. 
123 In order to ensure that investors in a L L Member States shall enjoy 
equal safeguards, it should be proposed that national legislators 
introduce a general disclosure requirement on public issue or offering 
of shares or bonds applying to the issuers or whoever offers those 
securities for sale. Secondary distribution is mentioned in this connection 
for clarity's sake: the fact that the securities have already existed 
for some time in no way changes the need for protection of investors. 
With regard to its content the information to be disclosed should be 
permanently defined in the statute, or in a decree, and should be 
distinctly greater in extent than the "statutory notification" (notice 
legale"), to be published in Belgium or France. No external supervision 
is exercised with regard to the accuracy of this information. The issuer 
and its managers should be expressly required to certify that the 
information printed is true and not misleading. The financial statements 
should have to be certified by an auditor or accountant. This data should 
have to be published by means of a brochure supplied to investors: this 
is an essential condition for the application of any sanctions, as described 
below. 
The arrangement proposed here is inspired by the British system. 
The co-ordination with the present disclosures, required on stock exchange 
admission, is also inspired by the British example. Issuers who are held 
to general financial disclosure on admission to exchange quotation, 
would be exempted from the legal disclosure requirement; the same rule 
would apply when in special cases, the exchange authorities do not require 
full disclosure. In order to qualify for the exemptions, however, it would 
be required, in accordance with present practice, that supervision is 
exercised by the exchange authorities on this information, and that the 
information be available not later than the time of issue. 
124 This approach avoids any institutional innovation which could stand in 
the way of effective protection of investors. It deprives issuers of the 
possibility of gaining an advantage by not applying for admission 
to a stock exchange quotation. It can be considered as an effective 
instrument for investor protection, since the most dangerous securities 
issues shun daylight. 
This reform does not require any radical amendment of the present law. 
Depending on the standpoint adopted, it may be thought sufficient to adapt 
the existing company law (Germany, Netherlands, Denmark, Italy) or to 
introduce a general separate rule applicable to all public issues of 
securities (for instance also applicable to issues of bonds by foundations, 
non-profit-making associations, state enterprises, etc.). It should be 
possible to define the field of application by means of a concept of 
"distribution of shares or bonds among the public", possibly to be further 
refined by an implementing measure. As to the content of the disclosure 
requirement, it could be described by an enumeration to be taken 
either from the annexes to the prospectus directive, or from the list 
appended to the British Companies Act. 
169. The comparative law survey shows that the legislator has intervened, or is 
considering taking action, in several Member States in order to introduce 
measures of investor protection in connection with the public issuing 
of investment instruments which are not covered by the classical definition 
of shares or bonds suitable for stock exchange trading. Two approaches 
could be followed for regulating these investments: if documents of title 
are publicly offered for sale, then the protective measures should apply 
irrespective of the nature of the rights conferred (membership, claims, 
or any other right). The other line of thinking is to make all investment 
125 schemes where the participating investors expect to derive an 
advantage from joint management subject to supervision. 
In several Member States the need is already being felt to subject 
these forms of investment, which can seriously compete with the 
traditional capital market, to some form of investor-protecting 
intervention. It may sound paradoxical to say that in this sector, 
where the need for investor protection is most keenly felt, it would 
appear premature to propose common measures. The explanation of this 
attitude lies in the unusually complicated questions of definition 
and legislative technique. It is not clear whether disclosure can be 
regarded as sufficiently adequate as a device for investor protection, or 
whether the control body would not have to be given the power - incidentally 
difficult and very delicate to handle - of forbidding dubious investments. 
Lastly, institutional aspects would arise in countries which have not 
introduced information control on issue. Up to the present none of the 
Member States appears to have managed to establish a satisfactory regulatory 
scheme in this particular field of investor protection. In the United States, 
however, these investments are subject to the general supervision of the 
control authority, which has in most cases resulted in effective protection 
of investors. 
126 2.2 PROSPECTUS LIABILITIES 
170. Several Member States have express Legal provisions with regard 
to the responsibility of issuers in respect of incorrect, incomplete 
or misleading information distributed in connection with the issue 
and sale of securities. This responsibility is as a rule referred to 
as prospectus liability. Unlike in the United States, these provisions 
have remained a dead letter in Europe. In some cases, indeed, the 
judicial authorities appear to have denied that issue disclosures 
have any bearing upon the issuers' liability. 
These differences from the North American legal tradition are attribut-
able to several factors. It is often asserted that the permissibility 
in the United States of agreements between lawyer and client concerning 
the sharing of the proceeds of legal action (contingent fee) provides 
the incentive for the innumerable lawsuits in this field. The stricter 
rules with regard to financial liability and a general legal tradition 
are likewise to blame for the decay of prospectus liability in Western 
Europe. In some countries, including in Germany in the mutual fund field, 
more effective rules have been introduced. It is proposed that uniform 
remedial rules should be formulated, applicable in the whole Community, 
sanctioning the distribution of incorrect, incomplete or misleading 
issue information. 
The following principles could be followed: 
1. The burden of proof on the investor must be lightened, particularly 
with regard to causation. The fact that the information was 
incorrect, incomplete or misleading will be sufficient grounds for 
127 applications, without its being necessary to prove that the in-
correct, incomplete or misleading information formed the basis of 
the investment decision. It must, however, be proved that the 
investor had received the prospectus at the time of the investment 
decision, irrespective of whether he had read it or not. 
2. The benefit of special remedies is confined to investors who have 
subscribed for or purchased securities within the issue. It would 
inure to sellers of securities, or to those investors who have not 
bought in view of the information contained in the prospectus. 
To these cases, common law would remain applicable. 
3. The remedy would be confined to restitution, whereby the investor 
has to surrender his certificate against reimbursement of the money 
invested; damages have not to be proved, but are assumed. 
4. A short limitation period, for instance six months, should be 
established. 
128 2.3 THE STATUS OF THE INTERMEDIARIES 
171. The intermediaries involved in securities dealings can be subdivided 
according to whether they enjoy the status of a bank or credit 
institution, are registered as brokers or belong to a residual category 
which is referred to as the "ancillary professions". The latter 
usually just bring orders to banks or brokers. 
2.3.1 The banks 
172. The legal position of banks in the securities business is in most 
countries not only a question of stock exchange regulations. In 
countries where the banks have no direct access to the stock exchange 
market (Belgium, France, Italy, Denmark, United Kingdom and Ireland) 
they sometimes have to apply for special permits, or licences, in order 
to be allowed to enter the securities business. In the Member States 
where this permit or licence is required, no significant additional 
obligation ensues. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands the banks themselves are authorized to deal on the 
stock exchange. In these countries they have to fulfil the general 
conditions for admission. As the banks, under the banking control rules, 
are already subject to extensive financial obligations, the stock 
exchange regulations in some cases confine themselves to referring to 
the banking control rules and to compliance with them. Additional 
regulations applying specifically to stock exchange dealings are usually 
limited and apply mainly to the admission of the banks' representatives 
on the floor of the exchange. It can be assumed that for all these 
reasons, the present legal status of the banks with regard to their 
securities business is generally satisfactory. As to the banks activities 
in connection with securities, whether as dealers or as commission 
agents, it ought to be laid down that they, as the brokers, are subject 
to appropriate disciplinary sanctions if they, or their employees, behave 
improperly, including acting contrary to their clients' interests. 
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should have direct access to the exchange markets. In the majority 
of the Member States, this is not the rule at present, although one 
must bear in mind that the rule is sometimes evaded by participation 
in the capital of brokerages. In the present state of development of 
the securities markets in Europe, this question does not need to be dealt 
with at Community level. It is far from clear whether the coordination 
of the regulatory systems in this field would have any appreciable 
influence on intra-Community securities dealings. Moreover, such action 
would run counter to the long-established structures and traditions in 
the majority of the Member States. Harmonization efforts in this field 
are doomed to failure. 
Consideration should be given, however, to the question of how the 
relationship between the banks and brokers could or should develop 
in the longer term. So long as measures to strengthen the financial 
and economic position of brokers have not been fully implemented, the 
organization of competition between the two sectors would appear likely 
to bring about too unequal a struggle, which can only lead to domination 
by the banks. But the abolition of the monopolies makes sense if 
competition between the two sectors can be organized by equivalent 
and effective - albeit different - means. Maintaining the existing 
monopolies can be regarded as a transitional stage from which, in the 
interests of the operation of the securities market, the next step 
will not be taken until it has been made certain that the two sectors 
130 can compete with each other under conditions of economic equality. 
2.3.2 Brokers 
173. Unlike the posit ion concerning banks,the status of brokers is solely or 
mainly determined in the stock exchange legislation or regulations. 
There are considerable differences among the Member States, so that 
harmonization appears necessary. Harmonization ought furthermore 
appreciably to strengthen the status of this category of intermediaries 
in order to ensure their continued long-term existence in the market 
as strong and solvent market participants who, together with the banks, 
ensure the carrying out of securities dealings. 
Four sectors have to be considered for harmonization: financial or 
solvency requirements, strengthening of the firms, internal auditing, 
external control. Most Member States already have regulations containing 
a well-developed framework for brokers' activities; it is chiefly in 
Belgium and in Italy that rulemaking has lagged behind. The following 
proposals can be implemented both in a corporative system and within 
a primarily public framework. The question, whether an external, parti-
cularly governmental control would not be required on the corporation, 
its activities and its exercise of supervisory powers, cannot be dealt 
with in this context and furthermore must not be allowed to stand in 
the way of the realization of the following proposals. 
a. Rules regarding the solvency of firms 
174. In all countries firms of securities agents or brokers run 
solvency risks of varying extent. Even in countries where 
brokers are never allowed to deal for their own account, the 
delay in the settlement of the transaction creates an unavoid-
able solvency risk. As they are parties responsible for public 
131 confidence in securities transactions, it appears to be a minimum 
requirement for their activity that they should be obliged to meet 
certain solvency requirements. Fulfilment of these requirements can 
limit the solvency risk in international securities dealings, especially 
within the Community. In most Member States a start has already been 
made in this field: only in Belgium and Italy do the existing instruments 
still remain unused. 
The imposition and enforcement of a solvency requirement is a matter 
which affects brokers personally. It is, in accordance with the overall 
organization, a matter of corporative concern. In several Member States 
the corporation has been empowered by law to establish this requirement. 
This choice lies with the Member States, and does not appear to call for 
any regulation by the Community. 
At Community level the choice can be left open between one or more 
of the following simple solvency requirements: 
1. A net capital requirement for which a minimum of about 30 000 units 
of account best meets the current practice; the rule would apply 
for each broker authorized to deal on the exchange. Utilization 
of this capital in assets that are easily realizable and free 
of all encumbrance appears to be desirable. 
2. A guarantee system whereby a third party, recognized as solvent, 
would take over the afore-mentioned solvency obligation up to a 
certain amount. This third party could be either a collective 
guarantee fund of brokers or a bank, an insurance company, etc. 
The same minimum amount as for capital can be adopted here. 
3. The (French) solidarity system, which is partly a variant of 
132 the guarantee system, whereby a collective minimum solvency 
requirement would have to be complied with, this being equal 
to a minimum sum multiplied by the number of members. 
A. The possibility must be created of introducing more refined 
rules, whereby the risk which can be involved in these under-
takings can be more precisely determined and suitable solvency 
obligations imposed. 
The solvency obligation should be of a permanent nature: it 
is the absolute minimum without which the firm, unless specially 
authorized to do so by the corporation, cannot continue to operate. 
It should be required that compliance with this obligation be proved 
at least once per year to the corporation by means of a balance sheet 
certified by the firm's accountant. 
b. The internal organization of firms 
1. Measures of internal control 
175. Under present law all firms are already required to keep ordinary 
business accounts, without any uniform presentation or book-keeping 
rules being imposed by the corporation. It would appear to be an 
important principle of proper internal organization of the firm 
that, irrespective of the legal form in which it is r-in, an inde-
pendent accountant or auditor should be entrusted by the broker 
with the task of checking the books and compliance with the above-
discussed minimum solvency requirements. Furthermore, this accountant, 
who closely follows the firm's operation, would be empowered to 
exercise general supervision over the regularity of the transactions. 
Difficulties with regard to profitability, or risk concentration, 
133 and of course, solvency questions, should be detected by the 
accountant and, if necessary, reported to the corporative authority. 
The accountant serves here as the contact between the broker 
and the corporative control. 
As an alternative arrangement to the appointment of an 
accountant, it could be laid down that the corporation's services 
can themselves assume these tasks, provided that their terms of 
reference are identical. 
2. Association obligation 
176. A special requirement regarding the internal organization would be 
the interdiction of sole traders and the obligation to carry out 
the securities business with other people, whether in the form of 
a partnership or of a company, limited or not. The reason for this 
obligation is connected with the additional expectations and 
obligations with which brokers will have to comply in the future. 
The development of more extensive trading calls for stronger 
market parties: the association form can provide the manpower 
for this purpose, while the particular possibility of using 
the limited liability company structure for securities dealings 
could result in a considerable increase in financial capacity. 
The last-mentioned requirement also points to the increasing 
activity of dealers, trading for their own account, in which field 
they are in direct competition with the banks. Possible objections 
based on an alleged reduction of brokers' responsibility and 
on the effect thereof on their behaviour could be met by maintaining 
the unlimited liability of the broker, titular of the office or 
member of the association or company as far as stock 
exchange commitments are concerned. The requirement that the 
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possibilities for the rendering of services, especially in the 
sometimes neglected field of financial analysis and investment 
advice. Modernization of the profession by the training of young 
members can, in Larger offices based on association, be better 
extended and the profession thus made more attractive also for 
persons who are not traditionally involved in the securities 
business. The association requirement is also doubtless inspired 
by the "four-eyes" principle: the danger of going off the rails 
is reduced when policy decisions have to be tested against the 
opinion of fellow associates. As a transitional measure, this 
obligation can be waived for firms which at least meet the solvency 
requirement. 
c. Corporative control 
177. Within the corporative organization, a control office with an 
independent status would be set up. In the Member States where the 
corporation itself acts as the firm's auditor this additional step 
may be dispensed with. 
The control service would not as a rule operate actively at the 
broker's office: it would receive the accountant's reports, check 
these and suggest lines of action to the accountant if necessary. 
The accountant could be asked for additional reports on data which 
were relevant for the supervision. 
The control service would take action if the position of a firm 
were jeopardized, for example if the solvency ratio was endangered 
or if the firm was exposed to considerable risks. It would then 
get in touch with the accountant in order to re-establish balance. 
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to take the necessary action, the control service could request 
the corporation to take preventive measures or to impose sanctions 
for infringements. This action might include the provision of 
additional capital or of guarantees, the suspension of certain 
parts of the broker's activities and, possibly, even the obligatory 
appointment of a permanent supervisor , e.g. a delegate of the 
corporation with rights of control over the firm's business. 
These additional means of action must be regarded rather as 
refinements of the present somewhat rudimentary and purely 
repressive system of disciplinary sanctions. But the control service 
should be able to take direct action in a firm and carry out 
inspections and question persons if there is reasonable doubt about 
the accuracy of statements, whether made by the accountant or by 
the broker himself. 
d. Regulation of the ancillary activities and recognition of 
"financial advisers" as a regulated profession 
178. Abuses which have often severely shaken the confidence of investors 
were found in several Member States to be due to certain advisory 
practices engaged in by persons who do not enjoy the legal status 
of recognized security dealers but present themselves as investment 
consultants, portfolio managers, etc. Conversely there is a need, 
in certain - not necessarily the most well-to-do - strata of the 
population for serious and above all independent financial advice. 
Only banks and brokers offer this advice free of charge. 
Experience has shown that this advisory activity often leads to 
a conflict of interests which is not always solved in the manner 
most favourable to the investor. Consequently the action taken against 
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to promote the offer of sound, independent financial advice. 
The field of application of possible regulations could be fixed 
for the activity of advisers, of portfolio managers, and of 
"remisiers" or intermediate brokers for securities orders. The 
activity of recognized intermediaries (banks, brokers; canvassers, 
where permitted, etc.) would not be subjected to any additional 
requirements. Advice provided by the issuer itself for its own 
securities would also be exempted , provided that a regular issue 
prospectus (as described in section 168 above) had been published. 
Persons or businesses recommending or offering securities for 
acquisition, even from their own portfolios, would fall under either 
the issue regulations, or the rules governing "financial advisers". 
Except in France, there is no full set of rules applicable to financial 
advisers in any of the Member States. Consequently the action can 
be confined, in a first stage, to simple general control rules: 
a. Obligatory registration with the stock exchange authorities, or 
with the ministry; the title "financial adviser", or the like, 
would be protected and be reserved to these persons. 
b. Proof of honesty (no convictions) and of independence, including 
independence from banks and brokers. 
c. Securities orders, whether on national or on foreign markets, 
may only be executed with the intervention of a resident bank 
or broker. 
d. As to portfolio management, all securities and liquid funds under 
management should have to be deposited with a broker or bank 
and cannot be disposed of unless with the letter's signature. 
If substantial losses show up in the portfolio under management, 
the bank or broker would be requested to inform the investor thereof. 
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general data - without mentioning names of individual investors -
in order to obtain an idea of the activities of these advisers: 
on-the-spot checks should be possible if there are serious 
suspicions that the advisory activity is not being carried out 
properly, or that the adviser has given incorrect or incomplete 
information to the control authority. 
f. Disciplinary power should be vested in the above-mentioned 
authorities. 
g. Except on isolated occasions, the giving of investment advice for 
securities should not be permitted, except be recognized 
"financial advisers" or by the recognized intermediaries for 
security dealings. 
The investment advisers operating in banks or with brokers are 
not subject to any specific discipline in this respect. Their 
employees, however, should be hold to comply with the requirements 
of independence, objectivity and good faith which can be expected 
of professional advisers or administrators. As a minimum rule they 
should be obliged to undertake to act only in the interests of 
the investor, their principal, and to refrain from any advice 
or intervention in the event a conflict of interests would arise. 
Disciplinary sanctions should be introduced, also for banks and 
brokers. 
138 2.4 POLICY WITH REGARD TO ISSUERS OF SECURITIES 
179. It seems to be fairly generally accepted that issuers, particularly 
companies which rely on the confidence of the public for their financial 
means, are bound by more stringent rules of conduct and more incisive 
disclosure requirements towards this public. From the comparative law 
study three sets of rules could be distilled in this connection: 
most widely accepted are disclosure rules, which take effect 
either on issue or on admission to stock exchange trading, and which 
in several Member States are extended on a permanent basis to those 
securities that are admitted to exchange quotation (annual, half-yearly, 
quarterly and occasional information). Less widely accepted are the 
rules of behaviour which are imposed on issuers, primarily on admission 
of the securities to a stock exchange quotation (adaptation of articles 
of association, uniform issue conditions, respect of preemptive 
rights of existing shareholders with regard to subsequent share issues, 
etc.). Still in course of development are the rules governing the 
market behaviour of the companies, their directors and major stock-
holders: these are the regulations concerning market manipulation, 
the codes on take-over and mergers, the guidelines to prevent insider 
trading, the special fiduciary duties on transfer of controlling 
shares, etc. 
2.4.1 A new purpose-oriented overall disclosure policy 
180. With regard to financial disclosure, considerable efforts are being made 
at Community level to achieve some degree of harmonization between the 
various national systems: the directives on the harmonization of company 
law (in particular the directive on annual accounts (N° 4), the prospectus 
directive (N° 6) and the directive concerning the admission of securities) 
together with the European Code of Conduct should be specially recalled 
here. It is assumed that these Community measures have been 
accepted by all Member States. 
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has grown up from one or more, usually separate, statutory or cor-
porative sets of rules, which have been expanded and developed at the 
instigation of the control authorities. One rarely comes across any 
questions about the general purposes of this disclosure policy, its 
effectiveness, the dissemination of the information and its impact 
on the investors. Only in France does the control authority appear 
to have repeatedly shown concern about the relative ineffectiveness of 
financial information. It is thus not surprising that some people 
have had serious doubts about the actual significance of this disclosure 
system. In many cases the doubt is justified: frequently the information 
misses its target, or does not achieve its purpose. Its contents are 
often either unintelligible to the investor or meaningless to him. 
Without our wishing to cast doubt on the usefulness of financial 
disclosure itself, it is proposed that an investigation should be 
carried out as to what means can be employed in order to make the 
financial disclosure system more effective, taking into account the 
purposes for which it could be used. It is desirable that a new, 
overall disclosure policy should be defined at the Community level. 
Although it has not been the purpose of the present study to analyse 
the national disclosure systems and their underlying policy objectives, 
it is beyond doubt that this important control device cannot be disregarded 
altogether in this context. Therefore, a few guidelines for the 
development of a more effective disclosure policy are indicated. Their 
further elaboration can be recommended, within an overall study of 
present information and disclosure techniques and practices. 
It is usually very doubtful whether the present forms of disclosure 
achieve their declared purpose. A clearly identifiable example is pro-
vided by the prospectus, which, as a sales document, has a more 
precisely defined purpose. It is usually assumed that the prospectus 
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a well-founded investment decision. A prospectus rarely in fact 
corresponds to this description, so that the investor always has 
to have recourse to his financial adviser. Investors do not read 
the prospectus, so the financial intermediaries save themselves the 
expense of forwarding it to them. The prospectus is falling into 
disuse: it now only serves to provide information to the financial 
advisers. But for them its contents are often inadequate. The adviser 
in fact has to obtain data concerning, for instance, the business 
sector in which the issuer is operating, its competitive position, 
the risks in its sector, etc. from other sources or from his own 
general knowledge. The same applies to stock-exchange-oriented data: 
the position and trend of the security offered can only be assessed 
in comparison with other securities. This data is not contained 
in prospectuses. 
182. Before indicating the forms, contents and instruments of the 
financial disclosure system it would appear useful to analyse 
the differing, complicated and often inter-related purposes for 
which financial information is disclosed. It has been mentioned 
earlier that the maintenance of public confidence in the securities 
system can be considered to be the overriding aim while investor 
protection, monitoring of company law and practice, sales promotion, 
or transparency of market operations could be classified among 
the subsidiary aims. Room should be made for the disclosure system 
being adapted to this varied set of objectives, and this as to 
its content, its extent, the readability and the distribution of 
the information released. The issue prospectus, the purpose of which 
is to induce the investor to purchase the securities, must also 
in fact enable him to make the decision. In addition, a more 
sophisticated, less easily readable and more detailed disclosure 
document can be made available to the financial community, essentially 
the investment advisers. The same approach could be extended to the other 
types of financial disclosure. It can be presumed that an overall 
readjustment between the different types of disclosure will give rise 
to a deemphasis of issue or prospectus information, and to an expansion 
of annual, and essentially of stock-exchange-oriented information 
(quarterly and occasional information). This shift is in line with 
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being made by the participants in the market. 
183. The provision of financial information must also be reinvesti-
gated from an overall point of view. In the present state of 
affairs the approaches differ: disclosure is used as sales information 
(prospectus), as a reporting technique in internal company relations 
(annual reports) or as stock-market-oriented investment information 
(e.g. quarterly and above all occasional information). The prospectus, 
which contains an overall picture of the issuer, is useful mainly 
at the time of the initial issue of the securities or of their 
initial admission to a stock exchange quotation. After this admission 
has taken place, disclosure should be aimed to present not a sales 
document, but a "general survey" of the issuer, published from time 
to time (for instance, three-yearly) in which the whole of the 
longei—term trend can be outlined. Subsequent issues of securities 
do not need to be accompanied by more information than that which 
directly relates to the issue operation, while reference can be made 
to the "general survey" and the annual reports for other data. The 
annual reports should be required to present a complete, fair 
and accurate picture of the year under review. Apart from their 
reporting function in accordance with company law, annual reports 
could also be used for promotion or publicity purposes in 
connection with investment decisions, f°
r instance by inclusion of 
data relevant to portfolio management (such as: inclusion of certain 
142 ratios, or even of comparisons with other securities , etc.). 
This means assigning to the annual report a function which is 
already attributed to that document, but which has not always been 
logically developed to its full extent. The permanent and occasional 
information is pre-eminently market-oriented: all material 
information and data since the last annual report which has some 
bearing upon stock exchange prices should be released. This includes 
of course, quarterly data about sales and profits. 
184. The practical impact of the provision of information deserves 
special attention. The establishment is proposed of one or more 
central information banks, accessible to the public, in which all 
financial information would be stored. These information banks 
should be capable of distributing the information, for instance 
on microfiches and, for the market-oriented information, by telex, etc. 
Furthermore issuers would be urged to ascertain more precisely the 
identity of the holders of their securities, especially of their 
shareholders,in order to establish a permanent dialogue with them, 
in which financial information is one of the languages to be used. 
Finally, issuers would be required to report to the control authorities 
about the actual distribution of their financial disclosures. 
185. The whole of the information and disclosure regulations, thus 
reformulated, would be bundled together into a "code on information 
to be published by companies whose securities are quoted on the 
stock exchange". The various, at present disparate, information rules 
should thus be grouped together and harmonized with each other. As 
a general principle the requirement could be introduced that all 
data capable of materially influencing the assessment of the security 
or the exchange transactions must be published. 
186. In the present regulatory approach only issue or admission 
prospectuses are subject to preventive supervision. It is proposed 
that this supervision be retained, on the understanding that 
the contents of the prospectuses of companies whose securities are 
143 quoted on the stock exchange could be appreciably reduced. 
Furthermore, the preventive supervision should be systematically 
extended to the "general survey" which is to be published from time 
to time. 
To submit the other types of information to preventive supervision 
seems inpracticable. Therefore, it would seem sufficient that the 
control authorities be entitled to intervene when necessary and to 
check the fairness and accuracy of the information already disclosed. 
This intervention could take place whether ipso jure or on complaint. 
Extending disclosure supervision will also create the need for 
appropriate investigation and control powers. For in this field, 
unlike in the case of preventive supervision, no decision or 
authorisation would be required of the control authorities. Two 
instruments could be used. Firstly, the control bodies should be 
entitled to require, from the issuer, all information which they deem 
necessary for their own purposes of testing the fairness, completeness 
or accuracy of information published. In principle this data would 
not be published nor communicated unless necessary for the 
rectification of the published information, found to be untrue, 
incomplete or inaccurate. Furthermore, the control bodies should 
be empowered to delegate independent inspectors, entitled to examine 
all books, records and documents and to investigate whether data 
published is true, accurate and complete. Inspection orders should 
not be issued on a routine basis, but only if serious suspicions 
exist as to the truth, fairness or accuracy of the information published. 
The same rule would apply in cases where the issuer refuses to give 
information to the control authorities. Only if the suspicion is 
confirmed will the independent expert report his findings to the 
control authority. 
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dispose of a wide array of flexible instruments. Under present 
regulations they can only - apart from refusing the issue or 
admission to quotation - suspend exchange trading, stop quotations, 
or the publication thereof, or strike off a security altogether. It 
should be expressly stated that control bodies have the right to publish 
rectifications, or, if applicable, to censure an issuer if it has been 
ascertained from control investigations, that untrue, false, incomplete 
or misleading information has been published, the release of which 
could have had some impact on the exchange market. Another technique 
for action and enforcement of the disclosure policy could consist in 
the compulsory appointment of an official, within the company itself, 
who would be responsible for all matters of financial information, and 
who would dispose of general powers of inquiry and inspection, and 
could act as the permanent interlocutor of the control authority. 
In case of repeated infringements, this person could be declared 
"non grata" by the authority. 
It would seem premature, in the present stage of legal and technical 
developments, to propose radical adjustments with regard to civil 
remedies for violation of the permanent disclosure rules. Unlike 
prospectus liability, causal relationship between the false 
or misleading information and the damage caused is much more difficult 
to determine in the present field. Therefore it is proposed to maintain 
civil liability according to the rules of common law. 
A more active role, however, should be assigned to the control 
authorities in the enforcement field, by allowing them, on the one hand 
to appear in court in common law cases and to expose their views, 
145 and on the other hand, to authorize the judicial authorities to 
obtain their opinion on the false, fraudulent or misleading nature 
of the disclosure under review. 
188. The implementation of the foregoing proposals will probably entail 
amendment of existing legislation in some countries. It should 
be investigated to what extent this amendment of the law can be 
confined to a general declaration of principle, such as, for instance, 
that issuers must inform the market on an annual, half-yearly and 
occasional basis of all data and facts which are of importance 
for the development of the market. This declaration of principle 
could be further implemented by conventional arrangements concluded 
between the stock exchange authorities and the issuers. The flexibility 
of the approach could, however, give rise to legal objections, at 
least in some Member States. 
189. It seems realistic not to impose the rules discussed above in the 
same way on all companies. It should be possible, depending on whether 
the companies concerned are of European, national or local importance, 
to adapt the rules to the potential scale of circulation of their 
securities. Provided that the markets on which securities of each of 
these categories are traded are also adequately differentiated, there 
can be little objection to relaxations for smaller issuers. Issuers 
of European standing, on the other hand, ought to be subjected to the 
full disclosure standards. One would conclude by drawing attention 
to the fact that only few new disclosure rules are being proposed, 
but more efficient ones, that will be better conceived. 
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190. In several Member States the interventions with regard to companies 
whose securities are quoted on the stock exchange not only relate 
to the information to be distributed but increasing attention is 
being paid to the manner in which the issuer is organized (including 
examination of the articles of association) or in which the transaction 
is being structured (for instance standard issue conditions). This 
approach is often used for investment funds. 
Some of the subjects referred to here are, or should be, regulated 
by company law, which is in the process of being harmonized under 
the influence of the Community. This is the case with, among other 
things, the recognition of the preemptive right of existing share-
holders laid down in Art. 29 of the 2nd Directive concerning company 
law. In other fields draft directives are under consideration, or 
will be prepared later, e.g. with regard to issue conditions of 
bonds, or of other instruments of indebtedness. For this reason, it 
does not seem necessary, for the time being, to propose specific 
action with regard to issuers whose securities are admitted to 
exchange trading. 
191. Whether other rules of behaviour should be harmonized, and more 
particularly whether the attitude of issuers and of their managers vis-
a-vis the exchange markets ought at present to be made the subject 
of Community measures, is a question which cannot be answered in the 
affirmative in view of the great diversity of modes of behaviour 
in each of the Member States. Community action can only be - and 
is being - considered with regard to regulation of take-over bids. 
Although steps are being taken in some countries to revive and 
strengthen the relationships between issuers and their shareholders, 
it does not appear possible, other than by means of a general 
147 recommendation, to call upon issuers to Look after the interests 
of the holders of securities and treat them in a fair and equal 
manner. The introduction of a legally binding duty to this effect 
would represent, from the point of view of the present development 
of legislation in most Member States, an innovation which would 
be too fai—reaching and thus difficult to put into effect. 
148 2.5. THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
192. In the past the institutional aspects of the harmonization and 
integration process attracted attention mainly with regard to the 
question whether, in a united Europe, there would also be a need 
for a managing and control body, placed at the top of the securities 
system. Reference was made for this purpose to the American Securities 
and Exchange Commission. This development was also mentioned in 
the Segre Report, and recommended for further study. 
Several countries have rejected this organizational model more or 
less rigorously. Primarily Member States where the securities system 
is governed mainly by corporative or professional interests have 
shown great concern about administrative and bureaucratic intei— 
vention. In the United Kingdom these problems are part of the 
regularly recurring demand for more governmental control over the 
very powerful London financial world . As is known, this question 
is also being investigated by the Wilson Committee. 
The European context is fundamentally different from that of North 
America. Securities in general play a much more modest role. This is 
mainly the case on the national primary markets, where the govern-
ment and the financial intermediaries dominate the borrowing of 
capital, so that little room is left for the - public or private -
industrial and commercial issuers: The secondary markets , and 
mainly the traditional stock exchange markets, play a
 r.iuch smaller 
part than in the United States, while the attention of investors 
and issuers is directed more and more towards the Eurobond markets. 
The importance of the last-mentioned phenomenon for the American 
securities system is as yet very slight. 
149 The institutional framework of the western European securities system 
is based on a body of rules, different from country to country, 
each having its own, specific managing or control bodies. This 
difference is accentuated by fundamental discrepancies in the legal 
status of the control bodies, a state of affairs which, in the 
present regulatory scheme, can have fai—reaching consequences on 
their elaboration of future policies or action. As could be gathered 
from the comparative law survey, these differences of legal status, 
especially with regard to their qualification as a public agency, or 
as a corporative or professional body, are not due to chance or to 
historical circumstances but are the expression of the fundamental 
characteristics of the securities regulatory system, of which they 
form part. To a certain extent, one could also trace back these 
differences to the overall socio-economic systems of the societies 
in question. There would be very little point in striving to achieve 
uniformity in the limited field of the management and control of 
securities markets which we are studying here unless a similar 
development was observable in the overall social system. 
From the comparative law survey it could also be infered that the 
abOVe-mentioned bodies are as a rule amply equipped with instruments 
for stock exchange management and supervision of brokers. In some 
countries this is also the case in other fields, including the stock-
exchange-related company sector, the new issue market and the 
parallel securities markets. With regard to implementation, too, 
there appear - save for a few exceptions - to be no obvious qualitative 
differences: the distinction between public agencies and corporative 
bodies results in certain differences as to approach, but not with 
regard to the seriousness or thoroughness of the supervision. Where 
one does find appreciable differences, they seems to be connected 
with the relative extent or importance of the stock exchanges and of the 
150 securities system in the national financial structure, rather than 
with the legal status of the body in question. 
193. For all these reasons it appears desirable to keep the existing 
managing and control bodies, and on no account to replace them with a 
Superimposed control body of the type of the American S.E.C. On 
the other hand, it it worth recommending that the existing bodies 
be expanded, be provided with the necessary means of intervention 
and action wherever this is not yet the case and be employed for 
the pursuit of a common policy, or at least of a policy which is not 
contradictory or liable to produce distortions between the national 
markets. 
The establishment is proposed of a Consultative Body at Community 
level which would permanently map out the joint policy of the 
national managing and control bodies. Its aim must be not only the 
harmonization of national practices but also integration of the whole 
or part of the securities markets of the Member States. This body 
should be composed of representatives of the national managing and 
control bodies under the chairmanship of the European Commission, 
which should also provide the Secretariat. Joint measures decided 
upon in this body would be carried out in the most appropriate 
manner: in many cases an adaptation of the corporative regulations 
or even of the administrative practices would be sufficient. Only 
if necessary would the European Commission be invited to impose 
rules by way of a directive or in any other manner considered suitable. 
The Consultative Body would be authorized to formulate the joint 
policy, the implementation of which would be entrusted to the national 
bodies. But, just as the European Commission at present keeps check 
on the execution of Community measures, it should be proposed that 
151 a report be made to the Consultative Body concerning the imple-
mentation of the joint policy and that an examination be carried 
out in order to establish that national measures of implementation 
are in accordance with the jointly formulated plicy. This control 
function implies periodical reporting, for instance in order to 
give notification of all individual and general decisions and to 
state the reasons for which they were taken. Difficulties concerning 
cases of implementation should be discussed jointly and the remedies 
to any shortcomings sought. All Member States should, however, 
refrain from changes in their national securities system, unless 
the Consultative Body had been requested in advance to formulate 
a common policy on the subject. If, after a certain length of time, 
the Consultative Body did not appear to be prepared or able to state 
its opinion, then the Member State would resume its free right of 
decision. 
It is not the intention to equip the Consultative Body with rights of 
investigation and sanction. If certain problems require further 
investigation, it would seem advisable that a joint set of terms of 
reference be issued without this having to be coupled with on-the-spot 
inspections or checks. The imposition of sanctions can remain 
organized as at present: if the joint policy has been incorporated 
in a directive, then compliance could be called for by the European 
Commission in accordance with the Treaty. It would be useful to lay 
down that the Commission should issue a report every year on the 
findings and decisions made by the Consultative Body. 
194. Without prejudice to the permanent reporting to the Consultative Body, 
all national managing and control bodies should be required to publish 
152 an annual report in which, in addition to giving numerical and 
individual data to be specified later, they should state and 
explain all policy decisions, whether or not mentioning persons 
by name. This reporting could help to justify and legitimize the 
managing and control functions of the national bodies and would be 
conducive to greater objectivity in decision-making. Under present 
practice most managing and control bodies already publish more or 
less comprehensive annual reports, the value of which as public 
relations instruments depends on the completeness of their contents. 
This practice must be encouraged by calling upon the national 
authorities to publish complete and objective reports, supported by 
reasons, on their activities and decisions. 
This justifying of all decisions should be extended to the individual 
plane in order to give all parties adequate legal protection against 
the decisions of the bodies referred to here, even if these decisions 
are of a purely private nature. To this end, individual decisions 
should be supported by reasons. As to litigious matters, rules of 
due process, offering sufficient protection to the aggrieved party, 
should be observed. A right of appeal against the decisions of these 
bodies would lie and would be governed by the general principles 
of each national legal system. 
153 2.6. THE PARALLEL SECURITIES MARKETS 
It is useful to divide these markets into three submarkets, the 
parallel market in securities officially quoted in the same Member 
State, the market in unquoted securities and, lastly, the Eurobond 
market. 
1. The parallel markets in quoted securities 
195. Several Member States accept that even officially quoted securities 
can be simultaneously dealt in outside the stock exchange, whether 
on the same or on different conditions. This leads to the emptying 
of the exchange market and undermines the significance of exchange 
quotation. All parties engaging professionally in securities dealings 
should therefore be required to bring usual transactions in quoted 
securities into the stock exchange market. This obligation should 
be imposed only on securities dealers: it is a matter for the 
national legislator to judge whether to require that all transfers 
of securities shall be effected via a stockbroker or to allow certain 
transactions, for instance between institutional investors or in 
large blocks of securities, to be carried out directly between buyers 
and sellers. There would also be exempted from obligatory execution on 
the stock exchange those transactions which fall outside normal 
stock exchange business, including before-hours and aftei—hours 
securities trading, which are resorted to in some countries mainly 
for purposes of arbitrage with foreign markets with different 
business hours,or for trading in blocks of securities. The bulk 
of the business - normal security dealings - should have to continue 
to take place on the stock exchange. In addition, for the execution 
of orders in the parallel markets, both securities dealers and 
persons who are not members of the stock exchange should be required 
to inform the stock exchange authority of the conditions on which 
154 these off-the-floor transactions were effected such as their price, 
number of securities transferee], and the reasons for execution 
off-the-floor. The stock exchange authorities would be entitled 
to decide whether these parallel prices have to be communicated 
to the participants in the exchange markets. This communication 
would, as a rule, be effected for prices on the before- and aftei— 
hours markets, while an individual appreciation would be required 
for other cases, such as transfers of blocks, account having to be 
taken for these cases by special rules affecting these 
transactions or applicable to transfers of controlling shares. 
Foreign securities which are not quoted in the country in which 
they are being traded should be excluded from the arrangement. 
The proposed arrangement entails - especially for Italy and Denmark -
a change in the present procedures. The modification required will 
be less radical in the United Kingdom, and also in the Netherlands, 
where a comparable arrangement is already in force. 
Observance of the above-mentioned rules would be exercised and 
sanctions would be imposed in accordance with the principle governing 
each national regulatory system, i.e. by the corporation or by the 
general rules of law. 
2. The market in unquoted securities 
196. Although in all Member States markets in unquoted securities are 
useful, primarily as an introductory market or in order to create 
a certain degree of competition with the stock exchange market 
through the provision of alternative forms of trading, their actual 
importance differs greatly. 
The importance of these markets will increase as they will become 
better organized. They may prove to be suitable for accommodating 
those innumerable securities which exchange authorities would like to 
remove from the official quotation as offering insufficient depth 
for guaranteeing normal price formation. 
In most countries access to these markets is limited to recognized 
securities dealers. Only in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Italy, 
155 and to a smaller extent in the Federal Republic of Germany (1), do 
persons who are neither subject to the corporative rules of control 
nor recognized as banks appear on these markets. The professional 
requirements and guarantees, imposed on these intermediaries, and 
the supervision to which they are subjected are very limited, if not 
non-existent. It is desirable that there should be developed here 
an arrangement comparable to that applying to the members of the stock 
exchange, it being understood that it is to be left to the national 
authorities alone to answer the question whether or not they should be 
placed under the jurisdiction of the stock exchange authorities. 
If the answer appears to be in the negative, the national legislator 
would introduce alternative control mechanisms, for instance by 
encouraging the establishment of a parallel professional association 
or by exercising the supervision directly itself or entrusting it to 
a public body. As the extent of this market will as a rule remain much 
more limited, obligations similar in nature but less severe can be 
imposed. 
Persons or undertakings who present themselves as market-makers for 
certain securities traded on these parallel markets should have 
to undertake regularly to publish quotation or price lists showing 
bid and ask quotes which can be assumed to indicate the highest 
and the lowest prices at which actual transactions have taken place. 
All other persons should be forbidden to publish, post up or generally 
make known quotations or prices. 
(1) Namely those trading for their own account. 
156 Market-makers should in addition have to place at the disposal 
of the public an information dossier containing all the information 
that they have been able to collect about the issuers and the 
securities in which they are making a market. As mentioned earlier, 
it should be possible to require these issuers to provide 
information, the extent of it depending on the intensity of the 
trading. 
The market in Eurobonds 
197. The questions of regulation and control in the Eurobond market arise 
in an entirely different manner from how they appear in the national 
context. For direct regulations especially designed for this market 
are in fact purely voluntary in nature.It has been repeatedly 
emphasized that to burden the Eurobond market with regulations and 
controls would probably only lead to a shifting of the trade. Even 
now this market spontaneously seeks out the countries with the 
least regulation, this being particularly true in the field of 
taxation. Nor could one expect to derive much benefit, for the 
solution of questions connected with the secondary Eurobond market, 
from a generalized obligatory inclusion of these securities in the 
official trade on one of the national stock exchanges. Although 
this provides some guarantees with regard to the admission information, 
it does not appear to have led anywhere to the channelling of the 
transactions into the stock exchange market. 
The participants in this market all have the status of recognized 
banks or securities dealers. Reference can therefore be made to 
the proposals put forward earlier (sections 171 et seq) for reinforcing 
the status of securities dealers. This also applies-to the duties 
and codes of behaviour which should be imposed on dealers in this 
market. 
Up to the present dealing in this market has been mainly centralized 
in bonds, both ordinary and convertible. The quality of the borrowers 
157 is scrupulously investigated by the underwriting issuing houses or 
banks: only States, international organizations and internationally 
known public or private undertakings gain access to this market. 
Cases of default or bankruptcy have been extremely rare in the past, 
which is not always the case in the national capital markets. 
The information which is made available by the issuers at the time 
of issue or shortly thereafter is, looked at as a whole, not inferior 
to the issue information usually published in the Member States. 
Supervision over this information is in most cases exercised by the 
national authorities, either at the time of the issue itself (Luxembourg) 
or in connection with the admission of the securities to a stock 
exchange quotation (Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom). 
The dissemination of the issue information is as a rule limited, this 
being due partly to the method of distribution employed, but is also 
largely contributed to by the negative attitude of several Member 
States with regard to publicity about these securities. Without 
wishing to give an answer to the question whether a Member State should 
allow publicity for these securities, it seems indispensable that, 
if a State allows investors to purchase them, it must also enable them 
to be provided with proper information. 
198. The information on the Eurobond market is as a rule confined to issue 
information. In some cases, the drawing lists or the redemption reports 
are also published. One may ask oneself whether increased provision 
of information concerning the issuer should not be organized and 
whether the Luxembourg or German stock exchange authorities which are 
already involved in this field should not be requested to encourage 
initiatives for increased permanent financial information by Eurobond 
issuers. This question is particularly relevant for issuers of 
convertible bonds: investors are as a rule dependent for information 
158 on the stock exchanges where the share into which the bond can 
be converted is dealt in. As the Eurobond market appears to be 
developing towards more intensive use of telecommunications and 
electronic data-processing, it should be possible for these aids 
to be employed in order to ensure permanent provision of information. 
199. The lack of transparency of secondary trading in Eurobonds is one of 
the most urgent problems in this market. The absence of structured 
price formation greatly undermines the significance attributable to 
the bid and offer prices at present being published. The scarcity 
of information concerning prices realized and volumes changing hands 
prevents investors from gaining an idea of how the financial intei— 
mediary has performed his function. The methods of dealing, such as 
execution from dealers' own portfolios, or dealers actinq as 
commission agents, or as brokers, differ greatly, mainly 
in the relations between the investors and the financial intermediaries; 
as a result, equal participation in this market is greatly impaired. 
It is desirable that the banks or financial intermediaries which perform 
the function of market-makers on the Eurobond market should publish 
data concerning the transactions effected through them. The bid and 
ask prices published should - as is now already the case to a great 
extent - have to correspond to the price at which the intermediary, 
for a normal quantity, is bound to do business. These data should 
at least have to relate to the prices realized, which means that most 
159 transactions will have taken place at this price. The volume of 
transactions should also be published, preferably per transaction, 
or failing this in total, so that the depth of the market could be 
assessed. Although no obligation to carry out the transactions 
via the market-makers, or to subject these to a uniform system of 
price formation is proposed, it seems appropriate for the trans-
parency of the market that all transactions which are not concluded 
in accordance with the above-mentioned rules should be reported and 
that all participants in the market should be able to gain knowledge 
of the conditions on which these transactions were effected. 
200. The international nature of the Eurobond market precludes the external 
imposition of rules on the market participants or the issuers. 
Recognition of this reality does not mean that no recommendations can 
be made to the participants in the markets, who, as the overwhelming 
majority of them are resident in one of the Member States, can also 
be bound to observe certain modes of conduct. 
With regard to issuers, disclosure requirements could be imposed as 
a permanent undertaking which the issuer has to enter into on 
admission of the security to a stock exchange quotation. For the en-
forcement of this undertaking - which will only rarely be necessary -
an attempt can be made to devise more appropriate sanctions than 
suspension or delisting of the security, for instance by requesting 
a guarantee of the bank that introduced the application of exchange 
quotation. 
With regard to security dealers, the national - public or corporative -
rules should organize the above-mentioned minimum transaction in-
formation by introducing, as a general rule applicable both to Eurobonds 
and other unquoted securities, that published bid and ask prices shall 
be binding, while market-makers shall have to publish their prices 
160 201. 
and volumes; securities dealt in outside this market should have to 
be reported to the market-makers, mentioning prices and quantities; 
these transactions, too, should have to be published. 
The two above-mentionedmeasures solve only some of the problems 
of the Eurobond markets. Questions concerning the timing of issues, 
the creation of more flexible delivery and clearing mechanisms, the 
control of the secondary market, possible questions of a monetary 
nature, etc., have to be left, in the present state of development 
and structure, to market forces. Presumably the increasing tendency 
to self-organization and thus regulation of this market will lead to 
an appreciable improvement. The Eurex project can offer a valid 
alternative in this respect between regulated stock exchange trading 
and the present unstructured market. It is desirable that representa-
tives of these self-regulating organizations should also participate 
in the search for better common rules for securities transactions. 
161 3. THE FORMATION OF AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN SECURITIES TRADING SYSTEM 
202. Side by side with the implementation of the above-mentioned harmonization 
measures, it is necessary to activate thinking about the structure of 
future European securities trading. The following proposal for the 
establishment of a securities trade selectively spanning the whole of 
Europe can be used as a discussion basis. The proposal is the outcome of 
a number of observations. 
203. In the present organization pattern we find several submarkets for 
securities which are more or less clearly separated from each other. 
These markets are sometimes interwoven : admission of securities 
to stock exchange trading in several Member States appears to have 
been an indication, at the beginning of the 1970s, of this interpene-
tration. Other points of contact lie predominantly in the hands of a 
few securities dealers specializing in arbitrage. One cannot contend 
that this has led to the creation of an integrated market. True, the 
foreign securities markets are accessible in many Member States without 
any very great obstacles. Comparability of markets and securities are, 
however, in fact impeded by innumerable factors, including local 
differences with regard to method of quotation or dealing, differences 
in the provision of information, or shortcomings with regard to tele-
communications, etc. The different submarkets can be compared with 
communicating vessels: they react, sometimes with a certain delay, to 
each other's behaviour. This communication cannot alter the fact that 
each of the vessels individually is limited. 
The merging-together of the national securities markets could considerably 
improve the depth of the market, offer greater possibilities of execution, 
especially for larger, mainly institutional orders, and increase the 
flexibility and the representativeness of price formation. The making 
162 available of a more perfected market mechanism could help to expand 
the financing possibilities of public authorities and private 
businesses, by pooling together a sufficiently large volume of 
financial resources. Lastly, this market should be able to offer valid 
alternatives to the big financial markets developing outside the EEC. 
204. A second observation relates to the differentiation between securities, 
already present in most Member States, whereby securities are subjected 
to other rules according to the extent of their distribution among 
investors. One could consider to distinguish three sets of rules. 
Outside the stock exchange, in local markets with a greater or lesser 
degree of transparency, are traded securities with limited distribution 
and reduced turn-over, usually issued by smaller businesses, or by 
firms of local importance. Disclosure or market conduct rules imposed 
on these issuers are usually minimal. A second category consists of 
securities quoted on the stock exchange. Here considerable obligations 
are often imposed on their issuers, mainly by way of disclosure. Rarely is 
any account taken of the differences in size and ability to assume burdens 
of the different types of issuers. These requirements are as a rule 
formulated mainly in the light of the third category, the larger issuers 
whose securities are quoted on two or more stock exchanges in different 
Member States and who, in view of their size and the wide distribution 
of their securities, can be required to comply with the most stringent 
or comprehensive rules regard disclosure or exchange conduct. For these 
issuers there simultaneously arises a burdensome superimposition of 
national requirements. It would appear desirable to extend this distinction 
between these three categories of issuers in the field of securities 
transactions and to subject each category to different - and above all 
appropriate - conditions with regard to transact ions and publicity. 
It is thus desirable that securities with a small turnover and of only 
163 Local importance should not be retained in stock exchange trading, 
partly in order to prevent the public from thus being misled that 
a genuine price-formation for these securities has developed. Diffei— 
entiation also appears to be possible in matters of disclosure: 
securities whose distribution and significance is only local should 
on the one hand be brought out of the information vacuum in which 
they are at present in many Member States without being required to 
observe the discipline which has been created primarily for the larger 
issuers. 
The following discussion about an integrated European trade in 
securities can relate only to securities which are at present already 
internationally distributed, that is, which are as a rule admitted to 
a stock exchange quotation in several Member States. For other 
securities, namely those with a national or local distribution, a 
pattern of organization inspired by the above-mentioned harmonization 
proposals can be devised. 
205. A third observation relates to the schemes being developed or considered 
in several Member States, for the automation of important parts of 
the securities trade through use of electronic devices.The automation 
process has already taken place to a great extent with regard to 
clearing and book transfers of securities; not without great difficulty 
and with varying degrees of success, bridges have been built between 
the different clearing and security-transfer systems. In some Member 
States active use is made of telecommunication techniques for purposes 
of arbitrage (for instance in the Federal Republic of Germany), and 
price information is also transmitted in this way on the Eurobond market. 
A start does not yet appear to have been made, at least within the 
national context, on the taking of the last step. In several Member 
States more or less fully formulated plans are in existence for re-
organizing trading itself, and even price formation, by means of tele-
communications and information processing. It seems a predictable 
development that the physical presence of the securities dealers will 
become less and less necessary for the execution of securities trans-
actions. Perhaps their presence will only continue to be required for 
securities of local importance. 
164 A double consideration can be inferred. Firstly, that it would be 
regrettable if individual systems of computerized securities trading, 
which were not, or not easily, compatible were to be developed in each 
of the Member States. Arbitrage between automated security trading 
systems does not appear to be a desirable aim. It is therefore proposed 
that consultation should take place between the competent stock exchange 
authorities in order to ensure at least mutual compatibility of the 
automated securities trading systems that seem likely to be developed 
in the near future. In a subsequent phase consideration should be 
given to the integration of the national systems of securities trading, 
at least for those securities that are internationally traded . 
206. It should be possible to develop an "Integrated European Securities 
Trading System" along the following lines. 
1. CENTRALIZATION OF SECURITIES ORDERS 
This proposal is based on the idea that as many orders as possible 
for a certain security should be brought together. The depth of 
the market and the accuracy of price-formation require maximum 
centralization. The orders from the various Member States should 
therefore be transmitted by telecommunications to a centrally 
situated computer. How the price formation is to take olace within 
this computer is a matter which should be referred for technical 
investigation. One can think of market-makers who would establish 
successive prices, or of a system of single-prices,, whereby all 
buying and selling orders are matched at a given moment, and all 
orders executed at one single price. Combinations of the two systems 
remain conceivable, incorporation action by the financial intei— 
mediaries in the overall price-formation process. 
In connection with automated trading, clearing and security-transfer 
facilities should be provided. It should also be possible for tele-
communications and information-processing to be employed in order to 
transmit financial information, including market reports ("occasional 
information"), basic data and ratios concerning the issuer, etc. 
165 2. THE SECURITIES 
207. The integrated trading systems should only be open to securities 
with considerable or potential international distribution. One may 
think first of all of the securities of international or supranational 
organizations, the foreign debt of governments or public organizations, 
of multinational enterprises, etc. In a first stage objective access 
criteria should be worked out, for instance quotation on several 
national stock exchanges, issue in several Member States, etc. 
The securities which are not eligible for this integrated trading 
system would continue to be dealt in on the national stock exchanges 
or on the parallel securities markets. 
Admission of a security to the integrated trading should have to be 
preceded by admission to stock exchange trading in one of the Member 
States. For issuers established in the EEC, the location of the 
issuer's head office could be adopted as the criterion. For intei— 
national organizations or issuers not belonging to the Community, a 
special rule would have to be devised. 
The national stock exchange authority which received the application 
for admission to stock exchange trading, and possibly to integrated 
trading, would be responsible for the admission application and the 
subsequently applicable stock exchange rules. Admission conditions, 
publicity requirements, stock exchange rules, etc. should be laid 
down uniformly for the whole Community but administered by the 
national control authorities, whether corporative or public in nature. 
The considerable set of permanent information and behaviour rules, 
which each stock exchange now imposes on the major issuers whose 
securities are quoted on its floor, would be combined into one single 
set of rules, forming the European stock exchange status, the en-
forcement of which, along with possible sanctioning would be en-
trusted to the national control authorities. Room can therefore 
be allowed for the differing national approaches: the more legalistic 
line, the administrative method of application or the conventional 
166 approach can be regarded as equivalent methods of regulation. 
THE ADMITTED SECURITIES DEALERS 
208. It is not the intention to intervene in the national systems and 
traditions regarding the designation of the persons or enterprises, 
eligible for admission to securities trading. More particularly, 
it does not appear necessary to propose changes with regard to the 
participation of banks in securities transactions: reference is made 
in this respect to the national legislation. It is proposed, however, 
that the personal status of brokers, and, where necessary, of banks, 
should be strengthened in accordance with the lines set forth earlier 
for the national markets. 
It is proposed to admit as securities dealers in the integrated European 
securities trading system those undertakings or persons who, firstly, 
are authorized under their national legislation to execute orders for 
securities and, secondly, meet the additional safety requirements which 
would be necessary in this wider market. 
At a later stage consideration could be given to the question whether 
this rule could be extended to undertakings which under present 
legislation are not allowed to execute securities orders but are 
permitted to receive them or carry them out, where appropriate, by 
offsetting or by trading with professional colleagues. 
A few examples may throw further light on this approach. If, for 
instance, under French law only brokers may execute orders, this will 
mean that here only brokers will be able to participate in the inte-
grated system. French banks would be excluded from direct participation 
and, as previously, would pass their orders to French brokers or other 
participants in the market. If French banks were to be allowed also 
to pass their securities orders to, for instance, foreign market 
167 participants, this would presumably have to be coupled with the 
obligation that they should transmit securities orders of French 
origin to French brokers. Where, as is the case in Denmark or Italy, 
the majority of the transactions are effected outside the stock 
exchange, this could possibly remain the practice. 
Additional admission requirements to the integrated European Securities 
Market System may be necessary to ensure that only sufficiently 
financially reliable market participants enter the system. Among these 
requirements are to be mentioned: sufficient financial resources, 
internal organization, rules of internal and external control, etc. 
The admission conditions should be objectively defined and, where 
complied with, should automatically confer a right to participation. 
Determination of compliance with the conditions, and with the permanent 
operation requirements should remain entrusted to the national exchange 
authorities, among which close contact would have to be realized in 
order to ensure uniform, correct and proper performance of this task. 
The national stock exchange authorities should continue to exercise 
disciplinary supervision, including supervision to prevent infringe-
ments of the rules of the integrated trading system . As all market 
participants and the control authorities have mutual trust 
that each control body will exercise its control powers with equal 
conscience and precision, to the benefit of all participants, 
it seems necessary that this exercise of control power should be subject 
to some scrutiny and criticism (see N° 214). 
A. THE TRANSACTIONS 
209. Stock exchange managing and control bodies would be invited to consult 
each other on the point of determining which transactions will be 
allowed in the integrated trading systems, and what rules will be 
applicable: cash, forward, options, price fixing rules, restrictions 
on price fluctuations, etc. In principle,dealings should take place 
only in set minimum quantities (round lots), so that for small orders 
168 will have to be carried out on the national exchange on which the 
shares are quoted, unless suitable execution mechanisms can be 
provided. 
As on all the national markets, a body should be established to look 
after the central management of the market and to be responsible for, 
among other things, the proper operation of the whole system, the 
regularity of execution of business^ etc The powers of this body 
should be limited to what is done by the present commissioner or 
delegate for quotation. This task could be entrusted, e.g. to delegates 
of the national stock exchange bodies, or of the Committee which is 
mentioned below. 
Although still premature in the present state of development of the 
Community, it should be considered to carry on trading in a single unit 
of account, possibly even in a European currency, which could also be 
used as an instrument for payment. Pending this, trading can be done and 
settlement effected in the currency in which the security is denominated 
or in the issuer's national currency. 
Whether all transactions in securities admitted to this trading system 
should obligatorily be brought to the system and executed through it, 
can in the present state of regulation be left to the national legislation. 
If the national legislation permits execution of securities orders out-
side the stock exchange or by offsetting, execution of orders coming 
from this Member State could be effected outside the system. However, 
it does appear important that all transactions in securities admitted 
to the system, but executed outside the system, be reported, mentioning 
price and quantity. Should it be found that execution outside the system 
assumes considerable proportions, consultation should take place 
concerning the causes of this development. 
Although this is still vigorously disputed in several countries, it 
seems desirable that rules for combating unsound market practices 
169 (manipulation, insider trading) should be enacted and, at least as 
far as transactions on this market are concerned, declared generally 
applicable. 
5. THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
210. It does not seem feasible to establish an organization as important 
as the integrated market which has just been outlined without this 
having more or less radical institutional consequences. It is 
proposed that reliance should be placed as far as possible on 
the existing governing and control bodies, irrespective of whether 
they belong to the public or the corporative sphere. As the market 
should embrace the entire Community, the rules to be applied by these 
national authorities should be centrally formulated. The distinction 
between the two decision levels is already inherent in the present 
operation of the Community. The general policy Lines are formulated 
jointly, while their application and the imposition of sanctions 
are entrusted to the national authorities. More flexible procedures 
for Community decision-making and legislation are indispensable for 
the development of this organization pattern. 
The execution of the centrally formulated norm, or its application, 
are national matters to be organized by the Member States in the 
manner which they consider most appropriate. This means that several 
Member States can choose to incorporate the norm itself in almost 
identical terms in their national regulations or to adapt to it their 
administrative practices. Application of the norm in individual 
cases will also be entrusted to the national control authorities. 
Thus security dealers would be admitted and controlled in accordance 
with their national regulations, supplemented by the European require-
ments. The body responsible for control and sanctions would remain 
the national one, as a rule the corporative authority. A similar line 
170 of argument applies for the admission of securities to integrated 
trading: the application would be submitted to the national authorities, 
who would exercise control as regards the prospectus and compliance 
with the information and other obligations to be entered into. The 
imposition of sanctions would also be entrusted to the national bodies. 
211. If the integrated market is to accept the leading securities of every 
national stock exchange market, all Member States and all participants 
will have a parallel interest in the maintenance of sufficiently high 
standards with regard to market participants, the admission and continued 
eligibility of securities, and the regularity of trading. The admission 
of securities or the carrying out of transactions liable to undermine 
general confidence in the integrated market must be avoided. Procedures 
should be established to prevent or detect cases of preferential treat-
ment, excessive flexibility or neglect in supervision on the part of one 
of the national control bodies. It is not sufficient to formulate norms 
on a Community basis; the Member States also have a common interest 
in the effective and uniform application and interpretation of the norms. 
212. It is proposed that a Managing Committee should be established with 
powers on the one hand to establish the common norm and on the other hand 
to keep check on compliance with this norm by the national authorities. 
The Managing Committee should be acting attached to the European Commission. 
It would not have the right to impose sanctions on its own but thereto 
would have to resort to the Commission. 
213. The normative powers of the Committee would embrace the entire operation 
of the integrated European securities trading system. The norms would 
be directed to the national authorities, who would incorporate them in 
the most appropriate manner in their regulations or practices. The norms 
would not have the force of a directive: recourse could be had to the 
issuing of formal directives for matters which do not only touch 
the participating stock exchange authorities. 
171 214. The power of investigation would be an extension of the European 
Commission's present power to examine whether the Member States have 
fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty. Three means to this end 
can be envisaged: 
a. The national bodies would systematically report all decisions to 
the Committee, giving the reasons, the statement of which would 
be made generally compulsory; the Committee could if appropriate 
demand additional information and interview employees of the national 
bodies. 
b. Exceptionally, and if the Committee had serious and specific 
suspicions that the information supplied was incomplete or incorrect, 
it should be able to order an on-the-spot investigation in order to 
find out whether the Community norms were being properly complied with. 
c. Legally subordinate bodies, or other national agencies, should also 
be able to request the Committee to investigate whether the Community 
norm was being properly applied in a specific matter; within the 
framework the Committee could deliver an opinion on factual matters, 
which could be refered to in legal proceedings, whether before 
national or Community bodies. 
The Committee would not have the right to impose sanctions if it dis-
covered specific infringements. It should in such cases be able to 
announce its decision and notify the European Commission of the infringe-
ment . 
It is not necessary at this point to express an opinion as to the place 
of the Committee within the Community system. It is clear, however, that 
it should not be composed solely of persons representing the national 
securities markets but that representatives of the overriding general 
interest should also be able to codetermine the working of the Committee. 
Lastly, a few concluding thoughts. It is not intended that the organiza-
tion of the integrated European security market should duplicate the 
172 efforts now being made to organize a secondary market in Eurobonds. 
These are two separate and distinct problems: the market envisaged 
here is intended primarily to serve as an instrument for widening the 
financing possibilities of European enterprises and is therefore 
concerned mainly with dealings in equities. 
It is not altogether clear why the integrated trading system 
envisaged here could not be brought into being within the framework 
of a co-operation agreement between the national stock exchange and 
control bodies. 
It is proposed that the Commission of the European Communities should 
consult the Member States with regard to the creation of new forms of 
organization of securities markets designed to meet capital financing 
requirements. 
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